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Abstract
Transnational networks are growing in prevalence and importance as
states, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations seek to meet
climate change goals; yet, the organizations in these networks struggle between
the global, technical and local, contextual sources of power, authority, and
knowledge used to influence decision-making and governance. This dissertation
analyzes these contestations in Pacific Islands climate change diplomacy and
governance efforts by asking: i) What do power relations look like among the
Pacific Islands’ networked organizations? ii) To what authority do organizations
appeal to access sources of power? iii) What sources of knowledge are produced
and reproduced by these organizations? and iv) How do these patterns fit within
the broader history of the Pacific Islands and climate change? I draw from
interviews, document analysis, event participation, and social network analysis of
Pacific Island climate change diplomacy and governance. This examination leads
me to propose the concept of "Climate Empire,” which can be understood as the
network of knowledge and communicative services that imagine, build, and
administer the globe through a decentralized and deterritorialized apparatus of
rule.
In the Pacific Islands, Climate Empire upholds technical bureaucratic and
scientific approaches to overcoming climate challenges; however, the global
spaces in which these approaches are produced are reconnected with the
spaces of local resistance through data collection networks and efforts to
i

relocalize knowledge. Thus, the local/global divisions found in diplomacy and
governance in the Pacific Islands collectively produce and reform Climate Empire
as organizations interact in the network. Further research is necessary to
understand the extensiveness of Climate Empire, as well as to ensure the
inclusion and empowerment of Pacific Island voices in climate governance for
both justice and efficacy.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Transnational Climate Change Governance
Cyclone Winston tore through the islands of the Pacific in February 2016,
leaving incredible damage and death in its wake. As the death tolls were
particularly high, networks of government and nonprofit agencies associated with
disaster management began to ask the communities what happened, “Did you
get our warnings? Did you go to the evacuation centers?” What they found was
that words like “knots” and “Category 5,” unsurprisingly, did not mean much to
these individuals. The communities, therefore, did not know what to expect and
did not take precautions. In response, this network of agencies began to ask
communities how they speak of these issues amongst themselves and to
collaborate with them for solutions. The agencies found that communities had
simple sayings that they utilized that could be used in weather forecasts—winds
strong enough to blow bananas off trees or waves the height of the fales, the
open-air buildings in which they gather and work. By speaking of storm warnings
in this way instead of in technical terms, they might be able to save lives as local
communities could understand their warnings and take necessary precautions.
As they were doing this work, the agencies also noted that communities
have proverbs that they have been using for generations that indicate the timing
of their interactions with nature: the times for harvesting, when they can expect
storms or droughts, and how strong disasters are expected to be. The proverbs
are based on the nature around them, such as when the ylang-ylang plant
flowers and then the sea urchins are ready to harvest or when frigatebirds fly
1

against the wind a storm is coming.1 While these local proverbs can increase the
ability of islanders to read the world around them and reduce their vulnerability to
disaster, these traditional systems that they have had in place are no longer
entirely accurate in the midst of a changing climate. The ylang-ylang is now
flowering at all times in Samoa. Elements of the ‘seasons’ have disappeared as
climate change impacts weather patterns, taking with them the ability of the
community to read their environment, predict upcoming disasters, and prepare
for the challenges presented by living on small, somewhat isolated islands. There
are approximately 110 permanently inhabited islands in Fiji alone. The Pitcairn
Islands can go weeks without a passing ship. Connection to the outside world to
even collect warnings from the weather service is limited, and climate change
vastly exacerbates the vulnerabilities to which these islands are exposed.
Governing the Climate
Climate change has primarily been understood as occupying a global
space—the global climate is changing due to the global emission of carbon that
requires global solutions to fix the problem. While the global elements of climate
change are vitally important to understand and to act upon the challenges ahead,
experiences of climate change vary across scales and spaces. The way a farmer
in the Midwestern United States experiences climactic changes will differ greatly
from a fisherman on the Tuvalu coastline. While local-level practitioners and

1

These were off-handed examples discussed by participants, not meant to be
authoritative on the subject.
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decision-makers struggle to adapt to contextually changing environmental
conditions, they must also acclimatize to governance standards and strategies
decided upon at global levels. As Jasanoff has described, “Although the image
[of the Earth] may have attained universal currency, the means of producing and
reproducing [the Earth], as well as the ability to translate the mandate to ‘think
globally’ into science and action, are unequally distributed around the world”
(2004, p. 49). In other words, while the image of the globe may be nearuniversally known, the resources necessary to know the globe are limited, better
yet to translate that knowledge to local needs. However, global strategies still
mandate the world to ‘think globally,’ producing tensions in multi-scalar efforts.
This is seen as local environmental projects must now meet global project goals
and intensive tracking requirements for the SDGs, the Convention on Biological
Diversity, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
and others.
Through this dissertation, I seek to draw into discussion the local and
global elements of climate change governance. One way in which these
conversations are organized and oriented is through networks of climate change
practitioners and decision-makers situated at the local, regional (or
transnational), and global levels. States, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), private enterprises, and knowledge
producing institutions network together, either formally or informally, to meet
environmental challenges. While these organizations seek to collaboratively
3

achieve goals surrounding climate change, those goals and the solutions meant
to meet them are regularly contested. These contestations are grounded in who
has power in decision-making and practice, by what authority they have that
power, and what knowledges are considered legitimate to create and uphold that
authority (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2004; Scott, 1998).
Networks are a useful way to explore the interactions of power, authority,
and knowledge. Network theories assume that interactions between actors—
individuals or organizations—are grounded in the exchange of material and nonmaterial resources (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). These resources could be
finances, practical information, norms, standards, or understandings of the world.
Previous theories of networked governance have often assumed somewhat
power-neutral interactions between actors (e.g. Glasbergen, 1995; Goldsmith &
Eggers, 2004; O’Toole, 1997; Peters, 1998). Instead, this dissertation explores
the way in which networks can be understood as regular interactions between
actors who compete to secure legitimacy and viability in a complex, multi-scalar,
and resource-constrained world. Therefore, networked governance, in this
dissertation, is understood as a space of contested power relations where actors
compete over decision-making capabilities (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013).
Case Study: Pacific Islands
In order to provide greater insight into the power, authority, and knowledge
inherent in networked governance, this dissertation focuses on transnational
climate governance in the Pacific Islands. The Pacific Islands are undergoing
4

rapid biophysical transformation, which is decreasing the productivity of fisheries,
reducing the likelihood that communities can subsist off of the land or water, and
seeing a rapid loss of land into the ocean (Allen et al., 2014). Governance in this
region faces challenges as many nations are small, isolated, and have had a
long history of colonial control, which has left them lacking capacity in many ways
(Wesley-Smith, 2013). However, Pacific Island peoples also have a long history
of social and environmental adaptation that provides key knowledge and insights
into these growing environmental needs (Govan, 2009), thus presenting unique
opportunities for environmental governance.
Who Are the Pacific Islands?
The Pacific Islands are a collection of states located in the South Pacific
Ocean (Figure 1). This geopolitical group includes the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati,
the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu; as well as the US
territories of American Samoa, Guam, and Northern Mariana Islands; the French
territories and collectivities of French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and
Futuna; the British overseas territory of Pitcairn Islands; and the New Zealand
territory of Tokelau.2 Notably, Australia, New Zealand, and the Southeast Asian

2

The territorial and collectivity status of each island is unique; however, the
larger country is responsible for much of the governance of the islands in each
case. Additionally, the Cook Islands and the Marshall Islands both have free
association compacts with New Zealand and the US, respectively, but are still
considered independent.
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countries of the Philippines and Indonesia are not considered Pacific Islands
under this categorization. While Australia and New Zealand play important roles
in governance and finance in the region, they are also considered external
parties in most arrangements (apart from their status in regional IGOs that varies
considerably and is discussed below). Timor-Leste is considered a Pacific Island
in some arrangements.
Figure 1: Map of the Pacific Islands.

Papua New Guinea is the largest of the islands in terms of land mass
(462,840 km2) and economy (GDP: US$29.189 billion), with a population of over
8 million who speak 852 known languages. The Pitcairn Islands sits on the
opposite end of the scale, sitting at 47 km2, a GDP of USD$149,248, and a
6

population of 57. While geopolitically grouped, the Pacific Islands thus vary
significantly in terms of political and economic independence, capabilities, and
interests.
Pacific Island regional identity and governance has a complex relationship
with the history of colonialism in the region, particularly with United States,
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. For instance, nearly half of the
inhabitants of Fiji are of Indian origin, brought about by the British need for labor
in sugar cane fields in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Robertson, 2012).
The ethnic legacy of British colonial presence has plagued inter-ethnic relations
in Fiji for generations, leading in part to a series of coups in which the Indo-Fijian
government was overthrown by an indigenous Fijian, the most recent of which
was a 2006 military coup, which installed Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe (Frank)
Bainimarama (ibid.). The economies of Pacific Island nations are often tied to
these colonial histories, as well, as many Pacific Island nations rely on foreign aid
for significant portions of their budgets (Atteridge & Canales, 2017). Not only are
the Pacific Islands’ complex relations with colonial powers unique challenges for
their governance structures, these challenges are greatly exacerbated by their
precarious environmental state.
Pacific Island Environmental Struggles
In the Pacific Island nations, environmental degradation is happening at a
rapid rate, primarily due to global climate change (Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, &
Valentine, 2010). Climate change has had, and will continue to have, a
7

disproportionate impact on the islands. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change’s (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report argues that climate change
endangers coastal settlements, infrastructure, economic stability, and the
ecosystem services needed to ensure the success of the Pacific Islands into the
future (Allen et al. 2014). As Barnett and Campbell point out, however:
The effects of climate change on islands and the communities that live on
them are likely to be highly differentiated: not all places will experience the
same changes; where changes are similar the magnitude and timing of
them will likely differ; the sensitivity of ecological and social processes to
changes differs from place to place; the capacity of social systems to
adapt to these changes is not homogenous; and the significance of
changes to the social systems will also differ (different communities value
things differently). (2010, p. 22)
While the Pacific Islands as a whole face unique challenges in the face of climate
change due to their size and position, they also face a wide variety of island-byisland challenges. This makes investment into adaptive environmental
governance strategies even more crucial. However, with the capacity issues that
Pacific Island countries face, resource-intensive adaptive governance presents
its own set of challenges.
Atteridge and Canales (2017) found that finance to Pacific Island countries
in 2010–2014 specifically aimed at climate change reached a total of US$748
million. Climate change donors tend to be similar to traditional development
8

partners (Webber, 2015), causing the spikes in funding brought about by a global
interest in climate change to bring with them similar issues as are faced in
traditional development practices. As these environmental (and other) challenges
interact with small state governments and limited resources, regional efforts for
governance have emerged in efforts to coalesce power and meet the region’s
growing needs.
Regional Governance Efforts in the Pacific Islands
Efforts for collective regional governance began in 1947 under the
guidance of colonial powers (Fry, 1997). While many Pacific Island states have
become independent, those relationships between the Pacific and colonial
powers are still in place today and are now embedded in the decision-making
and funding of governance in the region. As one individual with whom I spoke
commented, the regional intergovernmental governance represents a
“decolonization process that warped into technical assistance.” These colonial
relationships are particularly complex within the Council of Regional
Organizations of the Pacific [CROP].
The CROP agencies include 10 regional intergovernmental organizations
tasked with different areas of governance from fisheries to tourism to power.
While each of the 10 agencies plays some role in climate change governance
due to the pervasive nature of the topic, three agencies are specifically tasked
with climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts—the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community (SPC), the Secretariat of the Regional Environmental
9

Programme (SPREP), and the University of the South Pacific (USP)—and the
Pacific Island Forum (PIF) is involved with setting the broader political agenda
around climate change. PIF represents the needs of independent nations in the
Pacific and is the political head of the CROP agencies, tasked with the goal of
improving functionality of regional intergovernmental governance of the Pacific
Islands. PIF was established in 1971 under the name South Pacific Forum. The
founding members were Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand,
Tonga, and Western Samoa (now Samoa).
While these organizations have long histories, they are regularly evolving
to try to meet the changing needs of the region. For instance, PIF membership
was recently changed to include two French territories—New Caledonia and
French Polynesia. Despite their status as French territories and collectivities,
they are now full voting members of PIF. Additionally, recent efforts have been
made to make the CROP agencies’ decision-making processes more inclusive
through the Framework for Pacific Regionalism. Multiple interviewees from this
study described the Framework for Pacific Regionalism as a “public policy
revolution," where the ‘black box’ of regional intergovernmental prioritization has
been opened up to public comment. However, these efforts are still very much in
their infancy and the results of which are left to be seen (see Slatter, 2015).
Other organizations have emerged in the Pacific to meet the needs of the
time. One of the more recent organizations is the Pacific Islands Development
Forum [PIDF]. The formation of PIDF began in 2012 and was led primarily by the
10

Fiji government. PIDF’s emergence reflects a complex set of factors, including
perceived failures of the regional governance system, the requirements of global
governance under the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and Fiji’s
desire to regain power and legitimacy in the region. Fiji had a bloodless coup in
2006 (and subsequent constitutional crisis) that led to their dismissal from the
PIF governing body in 2009 (Stewart, 2016). While they were readmitted to PIF
in 2014 after Fiji held democratic elections, Fiji’s relationship to PIF has remained
strained. PIDF has since worked to distinguish itself from PIF by focusing on
multi-stakeholder participation, inclusion of multiple local perspectives in
decision-making, and not being reliant on colonial powers’ aid which they
understand as making them accountable to those colonial powers. As an
emerging organization, PIDF is both a product of a transforming Pacific, and an
ardent promoter of the transformation occurring in the Pacific.
As climate change has come to the forefront of environmental global
governance efforts, the region has responded accordingly, seeking global funds
and scientific support for adaptation and mitigation efforts. These funds have
been primarily concentrated with states and IGOs, but the region has also seen
the influx of non-state actors with their own projects. Local environmental
governance efforts have also begun to include a climate change focus, creating a
space where multiple actors in environmental governance are battling over
funding, authoritative knowledge, and decision-making over governance.

11

Pacific Island Climate Change Governance Networks
The impact of power, authority, and knowledge relations is evident in the
socio-environmental history of the Pacific Islands’ efforts to network around and
contest the governance of climate change adaptation and mitigation. There is no
doubt as to the environmental impact of climate change on the Pacific Islands
(Allen et al., 2014). Recent news articles have discussed the loss of five of
Solomon Islands’ atolls into the ocean as sea level rise pushes onto land (“Five
Pacific Islands,” 2016). Yet, environmental challenges have made space for a
“problem closure,” which Hajer (1995) defines as the process of creating
solutions to a set of well-developed unquestioned problems. In other words, it is
the political act of limiting the options available for decision-making, thereby
limiting the space for democratic discourse. This has restricted the Islands’ ability
to shape their own future by not allowing them to construct what they see as the
actual problems to be solved. Barnett and Campbell argue that scientific models
of climate change in the Pacific, as one approach to a ‘well-defined problem,’
have the effect of rendering climate change as an environmental fact
against which actors can do little but suffer. They deny the agency of
people at risk: to define the problem in their own terms; to apply their own
systems of knowledge; to implement the solutions that are appropriate to
their needs and values and which accommodate uncertainty; and to make
knowledge claims of equal value to those of science. (2010, p. 2)
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Thus, constructions of environmental challenges have a distinct impact on
governance within the Pacific Islands (Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, & Valentine, 2010).
Govan (2009) and Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell (2013) have demonstrated
the ways in which local knowledge construction can bolster the impacts of
governance in the region. Yet, seemingly objective discussions about the
desirability of global policy options in the region are “significantly affect[ing] the
parameters within which future possibilities are worked out” (Fry, 1997, p. 27). In
other words, the way in which environmental and social challenges are spoken of
in organizations within the Pacific is delimiting the options that are available.
Transnational environmental governance networks in the Pacific are
growing in prevalence and importance as organizations seek to meet
environmental goals (Corlew, Keener, Finucane, Brewington, & Nunn-Crichton,
2015; Gruby & Campbell, 2013; Pietri, Stevenson, & Christie, 2015). However,
these networks struggle between the ‘global kinds of knowledge’ (Hulme, 2010)
created by scientific and international advocacy NGOs and IGOs in the region
and local, contextual knowledge (Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley, Torres, & Agduma,
2007) that is a large part of the actual governance of the environmental
challenges created by climate change. This has produced local/global struggles
(Jasanoff & Martello, 2004) that generate contestations between different
appeals to power, authority, and knowledge.
In this dissertation, I explore these relations of power, authority, and
knowledge through diplomatic efforts, as well as broader governance spaces.
13

Diplomacy in the Pacific Islands has transformed in recent years as the world has
tuned in to the climate impacts they are experiencing. Leaders such as former
President Anote Tong of Kiribati and the late Tony de Brum of the Marshall
Islands captured the world’s attention by demanding that those most responsible,
yet least impacted by climate change (developed states), demonstrate action to
assist those least responsible, yet most impacted (developing states). They also
demonstrated the capacity of Pacific Islanders to shape their own environmental
future. This power was exhibited in the Conference of Parties meeting in Paris in
2015 [COP21]. However, while presenting a relatively unified voice at COP21,
Pacific Islanders spent much of the lead-up to the conference struggling over
power, competing authorities, and alternative ways of knowing and
understanding social and environmental issues (Denton, 2017). These
contestations were created through the disjointed nature of local/global needs
and strategies.
As these decisions work their way into day-to-day environmental
governance, these contestations continue in similar, yet distinct ways.
Governance in the Pacific Islands has a long history of colonialism, external
control, and a perceived or real lack of agency. Much of the governance moneys
for Pacific Islands come from donors, namely Australia, New Zealand, the United
States [US], the European Union [EU], and others. This has led to a lot of projectbased work in which locals are unable or seriously challenged to direct the flow
of funds or make decisions on their own behalf. This dependency and lack of
14

agency has begun to slowly transform in recent years, however, in light of the
Islands’ emphasis on local power. Similar to the diplomatic space, governance
efforts have engaged in local/global contestations over access to power and
authority, and the knowledges that legitimately uphold those power relations.
While many authors have either exclusively looked at diplomatic efforts
(e.g. Carter, 2015; Corbett & Connell, 2017) or at governance in the Pacific (e.g.
Bartlett, Maltali, Petro, & Valentine, 2010; Sievanen, Gruby, & Campbell, 2013),
this dissertation looks at the interplay between the two and provides insight into
the nature of power, authority, and knowledge in multi-scalar networked relations.
The local/global framings and strategies are produced and reproduced within
governance and diplomacy spaces, providing a kind of feedback loop that
reinforces and transforms the work of networked Pacific Island decision-makers
and practitioners. This dissertation takes global diplomatic efforts and on-theground governance strategies out of their respective silos and discusses the
ways in which the decisions and actions at each level transform the options that
are available to the other. In order to investigate these multi-scalar networked
relations of power, authority, and knowledge, I utilized a mixed methods
approach, described below.
Research Strategy Overview
While there are number of ways to approach climate change governance,
I use power, authority, and knowledge relations within transnational climate
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change networks in the Pacific Islands to frame my discussion. My guiding
research questions are:
•
•
•
•

How and in what ways are power relations made manifest among the Pacific
Islands’ networked organizations?
To what types and sources of authority do organizations appeal to access
sources of power?
What knowledges are produced and reproduced by these organizations?
How do these patterns of power, authority, and knowledge align with within
the broader history of the Pacific Islands, specifically, and climate change
governance, in general?

To answer the first three questions on power, authority, and knowledge, I used a
mixed-methods approach with Social Network Analysis [SNA] and interviews with
Pacific Island climate change practitioners and decision-makers. First, in order to
gain insight into the ways in which these issues play out in diplomatic spaces, a
qualitative approach was used in which interviews and climate change
declarations were used to form the foundation for the analysis of ‘narrative
networks’ (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) in Pacific Island climate change
diplomacy. This analysis of ‘narrative networks’ was particularly useful due to the
ability to take a cross-sectional approach, where the outcomes of diplomatic
negotiations could be compared at a single point in time. This allowed for a
simple comparison of the dual constructions of hero, victim, villain, and policy
moral (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) in two diplomatic spaces. I used a basic
social network analysis to provide a qualitative visual representation for the
engagement in diplomatic spaces of organizations in the region.
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For an exploration of power, authority, and knowledge in climate change
governance in the region, I used a sequential mixed-methods design, where the
quantitative portion of analysis informed the more important qualitative element
(quantàQUAL design; Morgan, 2013). I conducted SNA using reports from the
Pacific Climate Change Portal to graphically visualize and quantitatively assess
the relationships between organizations engaged in transnational climate change
governance in the Pacific Islands. This also allowed me to draw boundaries
around the complex space of actors involved in climate change governance in
the region, which set the framework for the qualitative portion of the analysis. I
used the SNA graphic visualization in interviews in the Pacific, encouraging
participants to respond to what they saw and how they felt power, authority, and
knowledge works within governance in the region. These responses were not
used to confirm or deny the validity of the SNA visualization,3 but rather as a
focal point for our discussions.
For the qualitative analysis of approaches in both governance and
diplomacy, I used thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2012) to analyze the
interviews. This type of analysis uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the
data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes,

3

Due to my use of a social constructivist approach (e.g. Porter, 1994), it would
be challenging to say that the ‘reality’ of the interviews can confirm or deny the
‘reality’ of what is found in the Pacific Climate Change Portal dataset as each of
these realities is produced and reproduced independently yet in conjunction with
one another. That being said, the interviewees generally confirmed the SNA as
being similar to their ‘truth.’
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(5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. This was useful as
both diplomacy and governance of climate change in the Pacific—particularly
pertaining to power, authority, and knowledge as a whole—are understudied (see
exception: Barnett & Campbell, 2010). Thematic analysis encourages recursive
and iterative processes, where the researcher moves regularly back and forth
between elements of the data and themes (Braun & Clark, 2012). This allowed
me to be responsive to the lack of available literature by utilizing a more inductive
approach, while still remaining true to my theoretical interests. As opposed to a
rich description of the entire data set, this dissertation focused on detailed
accounts of particular aspects of the interviews and documents associated with
power, authority, and knowledge. A latent approach was used, going beyond the
semantic content and looking to underlying meanings. In other words, I used
narrative-network analysis for diplomacy (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013) and
discourse analysis for governance (Howarth, 2010) to situate the participants’
discussions in a broader social and historical context. More details on these
methods are located in Chapters 3 and 4.
I address my final question of how these relations of power, authority, and
knowledge fit within broader histories of environmental governance by pulling
from both the analysis of diplomacy and governance. Chapter 5 relies heavily on
a theoretical overview and critical update of the concept of Empire (Hardt &
Negri, 2000) that draws together the threads of local/global narrative and
discourse in this dissertation.
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Chapter Overview
The next two chapters will provide key background information in order to
set the stage for this research. In Chapter 2, I will provide a theoretical framework
for the exploration of power, authority, and knowledge within transnational
environmental governance networks in the Pacific Islands. I use threads of
literature from international relations, network governance, and science and
technology studies in order to form a holistic foundation for my research.
To gather the information presented in Chapter 3, I spent time in Suva,
Fiji, and Apia, Samoa, in August and September of 2015, a few months before
COP21 in Paris. In this chapter, I discuss the diplomatic efforts of the Pacific
Islands in the lead-up to COP21, particularly the declarations presented at the
Pacific Island Forum [PIF] Summit and Pacific Islands Development Forum
[PIDF] Summit. These declarations are explored from a narrative-network
approach, where both representation and narrative construction differed between
the two groups. The PIF Summit included a limited representation of states and
IGOs, producing what I refer to as a global technical narrative that emphasizes
the technical solutions to climate problems. Alternatively, the PIDF Summit had
broader participation that included more states and wide variety of domestic and
international NGOs, producing what I refer to as a local power narrative that
advocated local decision-making and information. The consequences of these
differing narrative-networks for diplomacy—including the COP21 agreement and
Fiji’s leadership of COP23—are also discussed.
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To gather the information that serves as the basis for Chapter 4, I returned
to the Pacific Islands for a trip that included Honolulu and Hilo, Hawai’i;
Melbourne, Australia; Suva, Fiji; Apia, Samoa; and Rarotonga, Cook Islands.
During this 7-week trip, I spoke with climate change practitioners and decisionmakers from government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs about their work. By
analyzing these interviews, I have seen the way in which the global/local
contestations from diplomacy are replicated, reproduced, and contested within
the Pacific Islands’ project-based governance efforts. I use Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand’s (2006) three environmental discourses—green governmentality,
ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism—to further explore the use
of discourse in producing and reaffirming the local/global contestations over the
power, authority, and knowledge of Pacific Island climate change governance
efforts.
In Chapter 5, I seek to integrate these discussions of power, authority, and
knowledge within the local and global efforts of Pacific Islands climate change
diplomacy and governance. Using the concept of Empire as developed by Hardt
& Negri (2000) with a critical update by Miller (2004), this chapter analyzes the
role of discourse in producing and reproducing Climate Empire within the Pacific
Islands and globally. Importantly, the local and global elements of climate change
diplomacy and governance are connected in the relocalization processes
inherent in global knowledge (Miller, 2004). In climate change spaces, data is
locally collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized within polices and projects.
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Chapter 5 explores the way in which this relocalization process impacts climate
governance and diplomacy in the Pacific Islands and globally.
Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude by summarizing and discussing themes
from the dissertation that will form the foundation for recommendations for
governance in the Pacific Islands. While issues of power, authority, and
knowledge are highlighted due to the small size and big presence of the Pacific
Islands on the global stage, their situation is not wholly unique. This chapter
integrates the global and local approaches to create a more systematic approach
to understanding climate governance, while also describing the
recommendations put forward by participants.
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Chapter 2: Power, Authority, and Knowledge in Networked
Governance
Transnational environmental issues—water scarcity, sea level rise,
biodiversity loss, and others—are pushing their way into governance priorities at
unprecedented rates, ensuring that single states alone cannot accomplish the
goals of governing (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012). Due to the nature of these
environmental challenges, a decentralization of governance is occurring in which
power and authority are distributed across multiple arenas that function between
and outside of state boundaries (Rosenau, 2007). These polycentric governance
spaces (Ostrom, 2010)4 include nonstate actors that face very different
challenges than states when trying to impact governance.
Networks are growing in prominence as one way of investigating these
complex spheres of authority within transnational environmental governance (e.g.
Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Hadden, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1999;
Stone, 2008). Acknowledging the role of networks in international decisionmaking takes the conversation away from the dyadic, behavioral, state-centric
focus that has taken up much of the scholarship in international relations, and
allows for a more relational and holistic view of political interactions among state

4

While some would argue for a heavier reliance on Ostrom’s work in this
dissertation, I find that transnational environmental governance lacks the
localized institutions and face-to-face interactions that are necessary for the norm
coherence fostering collective action in Ostrom’s work. Thus, her work will not be
dealt with directly.
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and nonstate actors. Thus, international relations theories would benefit from a
greater understanding of networked relations.
At the same time, while emphasizing vital elements of relationality, many
authors of networked governance have put forward a view of networks that is
primarily nonhierarchical and voluntary (e.g. Glasbergen, 1995; Goldsmith &
Eggers, 2004; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997; O’Toole, 1997; Peters, 1998).
Under this set of assumptions, the networked organizations work toward
collective action under a set of commonly agreed-to goals (Peters, 1998).
However, as Eilstrup-Sangiovanni explains, “Although networks are often
described as fundamentally flat and decentralized, in reality many social
networks entail elements of both centralization and de facto hierarchy” (2017, p.
692) that influence the flow of power within the network. Thus, this dissertation
seeks to call greater attention to the power, authority, and legitimizing knowledge
that are contested in arenas of decision-making and which create distinctly
unequal governance structures (Davies, 2012).
In addition to the literatures on international relations and networked
governance, the Science, Technology, and Society (STS) literature brings key
insights into the study of international environmental governance. STS scholars
have explored the complex interactions between science, policy, and society
under the lens of a power/knowledge relationship (Foucault, 1980), or the ways
in which knowledge is interlaced with the production of power relations in the
social order. Scholars of science have worked to open up the “black box” of
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scientific knowledge production by questioning the construction of science,
playing it against the political and subjective elements of knowledge creation
(Agrawal, 2005; Bocking, 2004; Hajer, 1995; Jasanoff, 2004; Litfin, 1994). These
authors seek to deconstruct the taken-for-granted character of normalizing,
categorizing, and standardizing science by looking to the way that discourses,
values, political economic drivers, and social constructions of nature impact the
scientific process. This dissertation integrates the investigation of science and
power found in the STS literature with questions of networked authority emerging
in international environmental governance.
In this chapter, I position this dissertation within the existing literature
regarding the various elements of power, authority, and knowledge within
transnational environmental governance networks. First, I situate my
understanding of transnational governance as a multi-actor space that includes
non-state actors. Next, I explore the ways in which this understanding of multiactor governance is embedded in an understanding of power that is productive
(rather than merely restrictive), relational (rather than held by a specific actor),
and distributed throughout society (rather than exclusive to the state). I describe
how this power is expressed through the text and practices of discourses. This
leads to a discussion of power/knowledge—or the ways in which this productive,
relational, and societal discursive power is heavily embedded in regimes of
knowledge and ways of understanding the world—and is further explored through
local and global constructions of knowledge. Next, I introduce the role of
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networks in organizing the complexities of this dynamic, multi-actor space.
Specifically within transnational environmental networks, I explore the ways in
which power, authority, and knowledge are organized according to traditional,
bureaucratic, scientific, and practical relations. These discussions set the stage
for the investigation of climate change diplomacy and governance in the Pacific
Islands undertaken in this dissertation.
Transnational Governance
There is a growing level of acknowledgement that transnational issues,
such as environmental degradation, security, economic processes, etc., are in
need of transnational governance solutions. It is important to be clear that
transnational governance differs from transnational government (Rosenau 2007),
though the two could, theoretically, be one and the same. Governance is "the
broader system of formal or informal institutions in which the management
actions are embedded and which provide the essential direction, resources, and
structure needed to meet the overarching governance goals" (Bodin & Prell,
2011, p. 45). While many authors point to the continued strength and sovereignty
of states (e.g. Keohane, 1982; Krasner, 1999), multi-actor governance is gaining
authority and legitimacy on the global stage (Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009;
Betsill & Corell, 2001; Biermann & Pattberg, 2012; Boström & Hallström, 2010;
Gulbrandsen & Andresen, 2004; Hadden, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). These
governance efforts are the attempt by states and other nonstate actors to create
order amidst the disorder inherent in transnational problems.
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Conceptualizing transnational governance in this way takes the
conversation away from the centrality of the state, and groupings of states, and
includes a realm of diverse organizations and mechanisms to take on the
problems and solutions of governance. This is not to say that the territorially
defined state does not retain certain unique privileges and authorities, but rather
that authority can also be found, in varying degrees, in the hands of civil society
(e.g. Wapner, 1995), powerful individual actors (e.g. Cooper, 2008), market
forces (e.g. Cashore, 2002), and intergovernmental organizations that have a
bureaucratic power of their own (e.g. Jinnah, 2010).
The state, civil society, and private entities can all be key players in efforts
toward transnational governance. In this understanding of governance, power
and authority is distributed across multiple arenas, or ‘spheres of authority’
(Rosenau, 2007, p. 88) that function between and outside of state boundaries.
The spheres of authority, for Rosenau, are concerned with directives being
issued and adherents complying. However, “compliance can be intentional or
unintentional, conscious or subconscious, or immediate or halting, the result of a
host of interactive and reinforcing dynamics” (ibid., p. 90). In other words,
compliance is not reliant on the ability to coerce, but could be indicative of the
diffusion of norms or standards. This latter element of compliance will be dealt
with most extensively in this dissertation, and is directly related to the way in
which power is understood.
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Views on Power
Lukes argues that power is an “essentially contested” concept (2005, p.
63). In other words, the very act of discussing and defining power is fluid and
rests heavily on the ontological and epistemological perspectives of the
researcher. Due to this, conceptualizations of power have fractured in a variety of
ways—agentic versus structural power, power held in the sovereign versus
power held in society, power as capacity versus relational power, and others.
This dissertation focuses on the last debate, particularly the ways in which
Foucault’s relational ontology has transformed the study of power.
The tradition of power as capacity began as a focus on the state, or
sovereign power. This is a juridical power, where power is possessed as a right,
similar to the way in which one possesses a commodity. These descriptions see
power as embedded within the capacity to enact the sovereign will. Hobbes’
(1651) theories of the Leviathan, Locke’s (1689) social contract, Rousseau’s
(1762) formation of the “general will”, and Mill’s (1896) process of utilitarianism—
while having their own set of divergences on issues of legitimacy and decision
making—all focus on the mechanisms by which the sovereign gains, keeps, and
uses power.
Other theorists have expanded this definition of power further out in
society, while still understanding power as a capacity. Waltz (1979), for instance,
draws a distinction between the legal, sovereign authority to compel and the
broader capacity to influence others’ behavior. Marxist tradition looks to what
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Foucault refers to as the ‘economic functionality’ of power (2003, p. 14). Power is
structural in that it is embedded within the broader societal system, but it is still a
capacity that is used by way of mode of production. The capitalist has power
based on the ability to direct the flow of capital; the proletariat only has her own
capacity for labor (Marx & Engels, 1978).
Another key reading in regards to power as capacity is found in Lukes’
(2005) “three faces of power.” The first face comes from Dahl, where “A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B otherwise
would not do” (1957, 202–03). The second comes from Bachrach and Baratz
(1962) where non-decision making or agenda setting is also considered power—
the power to enact one’s will by keeping an item off the decision-making agenda.
The third face is a bit more ambiguous, were one enacts power through
structuring decision, thereby impacting the preferences of others by delimiting the
options available. Similarly, within the realist IR tradition, Krause (1991) draws on
distinctions between states’ bargaining power (through treats of punishment
and/or promises), structural power (by altering the range of options), and
hegemonic power (by determining the rules of the game), while Nye (2008)
introduces “soft power,” or the ability for states to get other states to want what
they want through cooption rather than coercion. While Lukes, Krause, and Nye
further expand the mechanisms of power, power is still a capacity that is held and
enacted to change others’ actions and minds.
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Power as capacity has a long history in political thought; however, it has
its limitations. Understanding power as capacity assumes that given x set of traits
and capabilities, the user will be able to exercise y power. It is a quantitative
understanding of power that can succumb to reductionism and essentialism.
Whether by appealing to objective interests (e.g. Rawls’ (1971) ‘primary goods’
or Sen’s (2009) ‘basic human capabilities’), pre-structured identities (Marx &
Engels’ (1978) class-based interest), or constraints on decision-making (Lukes’
(2005) third face of power), analysis of this type of power can only occur if the
researcher knows the true interests of the individual on the receiving end of
power, which effectively flattens the human into a unidimensional being. In so
doing it pays limited attention to the way that norms, identities, and relations
constantly are shaped by and shape interactions—effectively the way that power
fluidly moves in and through societies to construct and actively change interests,
identities, and conditions for decision-making.
Barnett and Duvall (2005) have called upon IR to broaden its view of
power. Power, then, is understood through the filter of, “(1) the kinds of social
relations through which actors’ capacities are affected (and effected); and, (2) the
specificity of those social relations” (ibid., p. 45). They argue that that
understandings of power need to move beyond analyses of the (still necessary)
compulsory, institutional, and structural powers, to include productive power.
Productive power is further explained below via the work of Michel Foucault.
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Productive, Relational, and Societal Power
Foucault understands power as productive—it not only constrains A from
doing something B does not want done, it also creates new relations and
subjectivities, or subject identities in relation to power. This includes the beliefs,
attitudes, orientations, and understandings that a person may hold. It
fundamentally transforms both A and B. It is not located in a person or place, but
is rather diffused throughout all relations in society. Power “is deployed and
exercised through a net-like organization,” suggesting that both A and B are
wrapped up in its circulation (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). In other words, Foucault’s
conception of power is not a capacity one has or exercises, but rather it is
inescapable, ever present, and constantly producing new relations. Instead of
starting with preformed subjects, interests, or material realities, Foucault starts
with the relationship itself and asks how these particular social relations produce
power.
This can be seen, for example, in the way that climate change as a
concept has formed new interests and power relations in the Pacific Islands. As
climate change mitigation and adaptation have been taken up as a cause by the
developed world, resources have been directed toward the scientific information,
professional development, and capacity building deemed necessary by outside
funders for the Pacific Islands to meet its climate change challenges (Atteridge &
Canales, 2017). As Foucault argues, “Power never ceases in its interrogation, its
inquisition, its registration of truth; it institutionalizes, professionalizes, and
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rewards its pursuit” (1980, p. 93). In the pursuit of climate ‘truths’ meant to
govern the globe, many actors—Pacific Islanders, development partners, INGOs,
etc.—have experienced a new form of power where global scientific knowledge
and bureaucratic structures now govern much of their decision-making.
These types of power are produced through the governmentality of
everyday lives. Governmentalities are the ways of thinking about governing, or
the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 2009). Governmentalities that support the
modern administrative state do not rely solely on the juridical sovereign state—or
the legal arm of state coercion—but rather dictate conditions of normality within
every home, every workplace, every school, and every relation therein.
Governmentalities are enacted through dispotif, defined as, “A thoroughly
heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements,
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much
as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). The system of relations formed under the
dispotif produces a particular set of power apparatuses and a series of
knowledges that transform the subjectivities of individuals (Foucault, 2009).
Thus, looking at the full range of institutions, procedures, and tactics at work in a
given society can give greater insight into how power is produced and upheld.
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While the critiques lodged against Foucault are important—primarily the
lack of attention to both agential possibilities for resistance5 and empirical
guidelines—looking to the productive and relational power within society remains
an important goal for, as Foucault states,
it is interested in defining and discovering, beneath the forms of justice
that have been instituted, the order that has been imposed, the forgotten
past of real struggles, actual victories, and defeats which may have been
disguised but which remain profoundly inscribed. (2003, p. 56)
In other words, by exploring power in this way, political discourse is reopened for
negotiation. This is important as, many times, decisions within governance can
be presented as apolitical, or just a matter of course, when in fact their histories
are fraught with politics, now hidden. An example of this is the scientific method:

5

The quote most often used to signal the agent within Foucault’s writing, and
then to grossly critique it, is “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet,
or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
relation to power” (1984, p.95). However, while most critiques (e.g. Lukes, 2005;
Grewal, 2008) dismiss this as positioning the choice of the agent as useless
combat power, or as Giddens states, “Foucault’s ‘bodies’ are not agents” (1984,
p. 154), it is important to address this quote within the field of literary studies out
of which Foucault emerged. Saussure’s theory of language was based on the
relational and differential conceptions of language, by which one is created in
relation or in differentiation of the “other”. This was further expanded by Derrida,
breaking down binaries but imbuing linguistic rationality and difference with
power. Coming from this genealogy, this interpretation of the role of the agent
through resistance can easily be interpreted being constructed in relation to
power. In other words, the form of the resistance is necessarily constructed in
relation to the mechanisms of power employed against it, which then directly
impact the nature of power, itself. This does not take away the power of the
agent to resist, but rather directs resistance—and power—through their relations.
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once debated, it is now taken for granted as the only way for true scientific
discovery, which hides the ways in which this is productive of certain privileged
forms of knowledge (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). Thus, it is critical to understand
the ways in which power is produced and reproduced through the discursive
practices of actors.
Discursive Power
Discourse, as a concept within social sciences, is understood under a
number of different frameworks. The primary split between understandings of
discourse is whether it is narrowly defined as talk or defined a system of
representation (Howarth, 2000). The way in which one defines ‘discourse’ is
many times embedded in one’s theoretical home. Howarth (2000) explains that
positivists and empiricists tend to view discourses as talk, where ‘frames,’ or
instruments for common and strategic discussion, are the focus (e.g. McAdam,
McCarthy, & Zald, 2006). Realists,6 on the other hand, tend to view discourses as
objects both with their own structure and within the structure of the social world
(e.g. Harré, 1975). The goal of these ways of knowing is to expose the ‘true’ work
of discourse.
While substantial work has been done understanding discourse as talk,
this dissertation follows an understanding of discourse as a system of
representation. Even within this categorization, there is a broad range of

6

This refers to scientific or critical realists, not specifically to realists of IR theory.
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ontological approaches, as described by Howarth (2000). Marxists take the
realist foundation and focus on the ideological systems at play within the
processes of economic production and reproduction (e.g. Zižek, 1994).
Additionally, there is the work of Norman Fairclough (2014) and his introduction
of a school of thought called critical discourse analysis [CDA]. In this look at
discourse, Fairclough and his school investigate the way in which discourse
relates to both the linguistic (text) and non-linguistic (material practices,
institutions, etc.) elements of social reality. Giddens’ (1984) theory of
structuration—or the production and reproduction of social systems through both
structure and agency—comes out of this school of thought. The goal of CDA is to
uncover the ways in which discourse is used by the powerful to oppress and to
give the oppressed tools to overcome their oppression.
Finally, Howarth (2000) describes the post-structural turn of discourse.
Under this school of thought, contingency and ambiguity are elements of an
inherently incomplete discourse. Instead of a structured ideology of Marxist
discourse or the hegemony of Antonio Gramsci, the power of discourse here runs
throughout all relations in society and, while still subject to dominance, is never
fully formed. Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal
Mouffe form the groundwork of post-structuralist discourse. Under these
theoretical assumptions, “discourses constitute symbolic systems and social
orders, and the task of discourse analysis is to examine their historical and
political construction and functioning” (Howarth, 2000, p. 5). In other words, this
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school of thought considers the way some discourses have gained dominance in
society, and looks to how they got to be in the position of dominance. Within this
camp, there are divisions between analytical styles. Foucault has produced
archeological and genealogical analytic approaches to analyze
power/knowledge. Laclau and Mouffe have approached the analysis of discourse
from a post-Marxist perspective in order to draw into conversation the full range
of political identities. As this approach assumes, “political identities are not pregiven but constituted and re-constituted through debate in the public sphere”
(Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. xvii).
This dissertation draws directly from a post-structural approach to
discourse to understand power in transnational environmental governance. I look
to Foucault’s genealogical approach to “entertain the claims to attention of local,
discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claim of unitary
body of theory which would filter, hierarchize, and order them in the name of
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and
its objects” (1980, p. 83). Thus, this dissertation seeks to deconstruct, if only
partially, the power/knowledge complexes at work in climate change governance
in the Pacific Islands. I also pay key attention to Laclau and Mouffe’s partially
fixed spaces of meaning, and their ability to produce dominant discourses but
remain open for negotiation. As they put it, “The practice of articulation, therefore,
consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the
partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, as a
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result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude
of the field of discursivity” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 100, italics in original). This
is important as I explore the plurivocity, or the space for multiple voices and
multiple stories, at play in Pacific Islands climate change governance.7
Discourse in Environmental Governance
While theories of discourse can be abstract, their application to
environmental policy can bring a certain level of concreteness. From the release
of Maarten Hajer’s (1995) well-known book The Politics of Environmental
Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process to today, Hajer and
colleagues have led the way on clarifying the role of discourse in environmental
policy. He defines discourse as, “an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices” (Hajer &
Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). Thus, in the post-structural tradition, Hajer and Versteeg
consider discourse more broadly than a set of speech acts or a collection of
texts, but rather emphasize way in which power is practiced throughout social
and physical systems through discourse. They describe discourse in more detail:
[Post-structural Discourse Theory] has an anti-essentialist ontology; it
assumes the existence of multiple, socially constructed realities instead of
a single reality, governed by immutable natural laws. Characteristically,

7

This is an admittedly limited exploration into a broad and deep history of
discourse. For greater detail, pleases refer to Howarth (2000).
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the approach takes a critical stance towards ‘truth’ and puts emphasis on
the communications through which knowledge is exchanged. Because
reality is seen as socially constructed, the analysis of meaning becomes
central; for interpretative environmental policy research, it is not an
environmental phenomenon in itself that is important, but the way in which
society makes sense of this phenomenon. Dying forests do not contain in
themselves the reason for the public attention and concern they receive.
The fact that they do receive this attention at a specific place and time
cannot be deduced from a natural-scientific analysis of its urgency, but
from the symbols and experiences that govern the way people think and
act (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 176)
This post-structural, interpretative approach to discourse in environmental policy
thus analyses the underlying practices and knowledges that produce and
reproduce power relations throughout society.
The power of discourse, then, comes in the ability to both frame the
problem and structure the 'solution' within environmental challenges through the
production, dissemination, and legitimation of knowledge (Foucault, 1980)
including information about processes and procedures (Barnett & Finnemore,
1999), knowledge about the physical and social world (Miller, 2007), and the
limits of what is considered acceptable (Hulme, 2010). While particular
environmental discourses may gain more or less ground in a particular situation
(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006; Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994; Wesselink,
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Buchanan, Georgiadou, & Turnhout, 2013), they are never final as they are
always open for renegotiation (Butler, 1997; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This
negotiation over knowledge is further explored in the next section.
Power and Knowledge
A key element of environmental governance is the production and
reproduction of scientific knowledge. Foucault discusses science as embedded in
“regimes of truth” which designate which ideas are deemed valid or false (2010,
p. 36). These regimes of truth are not simple reflections of the natural world, but
rather are produced by and produce power relations within society as they
engage with political struggles over legitimate knowledges. As Foucault (1980)
has discussed, the cornering of a single ‘truth’ is a discursive strategy that is
meant to stifle and delegitimize alternative ways of understanding the world.
Thus, he advocates for an exploration into the ways in which these ‘truths’ come
to be under particular power/knowledge complexes. He provides a number of
examples of this, from the construction of sexuality (Foucault, 1984) to the way in
which madness came to be understood (Foucault, 1988). With sexuality, he
explored the way that confession—and the admission of guilt—brought about the
existence of sexuality as a discursive object, known through efforts to surveil,
analyze, and eventually medicalize sexuality. This lent itself to a
power/knowledge complex that circumscribed certain sexualities as normal or
abnormal through adherence to a particular set of knowledges.
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Additionally, Jasanoff (2004) describes this power/knowledge relationship
as coproduction. Coproduction, according to Jasanoff, is concerned with the
ways in which the social and natural orders are being constructed together,
inextricable from one another. She argues that analyzing knowledge as
coproduced through interactions of material and social systems, “offers new
ways of thinking about power, highlighting the often invisible role of knowledge,
expertise, technical practices, and material objects in shaping, sustaining,
subverting, and transforming relations of authority” (ibid., p. 4). She explains,
“Scientific knowledge, in particular, is not a transcendent mirror of society. It both
embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, conventions,
discourses, instruments, and institutions” (ibid., p. 3). Thus, looking to
power/knowledge through a coproductive lens clarifies the ways in which
particular understandings of the world are privileged in questions of what is being
studied, why it is being studied, and how it is being studied—through what tools
and methodologies (Jasanoff, 2004; Porter, 1994; Scott, 1998).
Understanding the coproduction of human/environmental relations can
reveal the power inherent in management strategies. As Engel-Di Mauro argues,
“Without taking into account that the biophysical also entails a social
understanding, there will continue to be a reinforcement of socially predominant
ideologies, a passively political act" (2014, p. 33). Choices about environmental
use, even those perceived by many to be ‘apolitical,’ in fact have power. For
instance, the use of scientific forestry in late eighteenth-century Germany used a
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technical approach to produce high timber yields that allowed them to ignore the
“vast, complex, and negotiated social uses of the forest for hunting and
gathering, pasturage, fishing …” (Scott, 1998, p. 13). As Hull and Robertson
articulate, “the constructs of ecological science necessarily serve double duty:
they are both descriptive (scientific) and prescriptive (political); they are used to
describe what is and to prescribe what ought to be” (2000, p. 98). In other words,
understanding nature according to realist, positivist, and empiricist approaches,
where authoritative science is simply used to find the ‘truth’ of the natural world,
can obscure political choices that take place when understanding and studying
the environment.
These underlying political choices are further explored through Agrawal’s
(2005) analysis of environmentality. Environmentality is a play on ‘environment’
and ‘governmentality,’ and is “an approach to studying environmental politics that
takes seriously the conceptual building blocks of power/knowledges, institutions,
and subjectivities” (ibid., p. 8). He argues that environmentality produces new
subjects under the totalizing, or all-encompassing, statistical discourses of
conservation in Indian forests, making decision-making less democratic. It also
transforms the very individuals themselves, forcing them to appeal to statistical
measurements to have their voices be heard. As Agrawal argues, “once precise,
statistical, generalizing arguments are invoked in the service of polity, it is difficult
to counter them with vague, descriptive, anecdotal evidence. It is in this
characteristic of statistical representations…that their colonizing effects are to be
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found” (ibid., p. 35). In other words, the authority of statistical knowledge in
environmental governance makes it challenging to introduce other ways of
understanding the world. This is further explored in the challenges of global and
local knowledge divisions.
Global and Local Knowledge
Power/knowledge, while it takes many forms, is here explored in the
divides between the ‘globalizing’ effects of scientific knowledge production and
local, or situated, knowledge construction. As Hulme describes global
knowledge,
Knowledge about multi-scalar processes and globally-aggregated
outcomes that is insensitive to the peculiarities of place and context opens
the way for unitary globalised explanations and predictions of
environmental change. Masquerading as universal truths, these assert
themselves as the unassailable view from everywhere. (2010, p. 559)
In other words, global types of knowledge are unconcerned with the context in
which they are created. The geographic locales and economic statuses of
researchers, the ontological location of the project, the priorities of funders, the
choice of what to study and how to study it, etc., are considered to not
considerably impact the outcome of the research. Instead, global knowledge
produces outcomes meant to predict change across time and space, irrespective
of the context in which it was created.
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Global knowledge, then, creates a power/knowledge complex through
delimiting the options that are considered legitimate in decision-making and
governance. As Turnhout, Dewulf, and Hulme describe it, “Knowledge and power
embrace tightly as globalized knowledge conditions the political imaginary of
global environmental governance and vice versa: how one knows constrains how
one governs and how one governs shapes what one needs to know” (2016, no
page). This creates a space in which only the problems that are identified and
solutions supported by globalized knowledge are considered legitimate. In this
way, authoritative science—knowledge that is unanimous, quantitative,
generalized, and conducted according to scientific process (Bocking, 2004)—is
many times the only form of knowledge that is considered within discussion of
environmental issues. For instance, this can be seen in many conversations
surrounding epistemic communities (Adler & Haas, 1992; Haas, 1989). Many
times, the negotiations between these communities are seen as the only spaces
for dissent, as opposed to any dissent that might question the basis of globalized
knowledge.
By contrast, the construction of local knowledge denies the “view from
everywhere” (Hulme, 2010, p. 559), and rather captures the nuance of local
situations. This type of knowledge aligns with Lejano and Ingram’s definition of
ways of knowing: an “active process of meaning construction” within a policy
space, where actors interact with one another and objects in ways that either
confirm or reshape their relation to the world (2009, p. 656). These objects can
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include scientific reports, forums, rules, etc., that are interpreted by an
actor/organization through their own understanding of the world. Defining
knowledge in this way opens up the conversation to understand the ways in
which multiple knowledges besides global, authoritative science may find
authority within decision-making spaces. While multiple ways of knowing are
considered and discussed within this dissertation, they are not on an even
playing field within governance, a topic further explored in subsequent chapters.
Construction of the “local” has taken different definitional and normative
forms. Many writers that advocate for “community” or “local” solutions tend to
have a set of assumptions—spatial smallness, social homogeneity, and norm
similarity (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) or flat power dynamics and a focus on civil
society (Mohan & Stokke, 2000)—that are not shared here. Thus, it is important
to distinguish between an acknowledgement, inclusion, and study of the local
through multiple ways of knowing, such as is the goal here, and a valorization of
a static and singular “local” that is inherently normatively good (Martello &
Jasanoff, 2004). While the term local will be used throughout this dissertation, it
will be used along the lines of Haraway’s (1988) concept of situated knowledge.
Situated knowledge is removed from scale, and is rather understood to be
contextually specific and produced in-situ, impacted by the researchers’ ontology
and experience in a specific place and time. Therefore, instead of an overlysimplified and naïve understanding of the local, this dissertation sees local
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knowledge as simply an approach to knowledge generation in which context and
nuance are considered in its production.
This global/local distinction is especially important in the realm of
environmental governance, and specifically climate change. Martello and
Jasanoff (2004) have argued that while globalization has been extensively
covered in social science research, research on the relationship between
globalization and localization has been limited. They give a few reasons why this
could be. First, the global and local tend to be investigated by different
disciplines, which have little overlap. Additionally, studies tend to see the local as
doomed from the beginning due to its being the “other” to the inevitable wave of
globalization. Finally, the local and the global are many times presented as static
instead of dynamic and open for reinterpretation. In light of these issues, Martello
and Jasanoff argue that more should be done to draw the local and global into
conversation. One way in which this can be accomplished is through the
introduction of network approaches into the study of local and global relations.
Network Approaches
Over the last three decades, social networks have been explored
conceptually, visually, and mathematically, leading to a plethora of research
agendas seeking to advance understanding of the social world. Social networks
have seen a substantial increase in the last 10 years both with the uptake of
social network theory in a variety of fields and the methodological development of
computer technologies and analysis tools (Table 1). Instead of behavioral
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science that seeks to analyze decision-making based on individual attributes—
age, gender, political affiliation, etc.—network studies approach analysis from a
relational perspective (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In other words, people are
understood to make decisions based on more than their individual attributes, but
also based on the exchanges that take place according to their social ties to
others.
Table 1: Chart of publications with “social network” in the title, retrieved from Web
of Science (19 Jan, 2017).
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Wasserman and Faust define the network as: “a finite set of actors
connected by a set of ties” (1995, p. 20). Based on this definition, however, one
could see networks everywhere—interactions at the bus station, shopping cart
collisions at the grocery store, and more. In order to add specificity and rigor,
they note the following assumptions as fundamental to the social network
perspective:
• Interdependence of actors and their actions;
• Material and non-material resources can/do flow through relational ties/links;
• Patterns of interaction produce the network structure, and this structure then
impacts the behavior of individuals and groups; and
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• Network structure has relative longevity (it may change over time, but it is
rather stable).
The boundaries that these assumptions place on the network ensure that the
phenomena being studied are, in fact, social phenomena, rather than
happenstance encounters.
Utilizing social network approaches to study transnational environmental
governance has distinct advantages. First, with the decentralization of authority
occurring within transnational governance, networks more accurately mirror the
reality of these governance arrangements than other state-centric investigations.
Networks also form a useful tool by which to analyze and visualize a complex set
of interactions among a large number of actors. This can facilitate a greater
understanding of the structural elements of interactions by looking to the locales
in which various organizations are situated within the network. Additionally, the
relational focus of networks allows for a shift away from a static, behavioral
approach and considers the way that actors’ ways of understanding problems
and solutions to environmental challenges can change over time according to
their interactions with other actors.
Networks are also useful in capturing the multiple scales in which
transnational environmental governance efforts work and interact. As opposed to
single-level analyses, such as Keohane’s (1982) analysis of international
regimes, network approaches can capture actors at multiple scales that include
both local and global understandings of the world, and demonstrate the ways in
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which actors in these scales link together. Thus, networks are useful theoretical
and methodological tools for understanding relationships of power, authority, and
knowledge within transnational environmental governance at all levels.
Power, Authority, and Knowledge in Transnational Networks
Traditionally, international environmental decision-making has focused on
the power of the state to achieve state interests (e.g. Abbot & Snidal, 2000;
Keohane, 1982; Krasner, 1999; Vaubel, 2006). However, a relational ontology of
power provides a different set of foci, such as the ways in which nonstate actors
shape what is possible by generating norms to which states adhere (Finnemore
& Sikkink, 1998; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Mitchell, 1998; Rosenau, 2007),
producing and sharing information on which decisions are based (Jasanoff, 2004,
2005; Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Miller, 2007; Scholte, 2004; Wapner, 1995), creating
and maintaining processes and procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), and
providing practical support for program implementation and on-the-ground
legitimacy (Abers & Keck, 2013; Cooper & Vargas, 2004). For instance, Keck
and Sikkink’s (1999) transnational advocacy networks use the boomerang effect,
where the networks of organizations investigate perceived injustices in national
contexts, then put pressure on other nations to force the transgressing nation to
change its ways. This is particularly seen in humanitarian issues, but they also
talk about it in the realm of environmental governance. Additionally, Wapner’s
(1995) transnational environmental advocacy groups actively change state and
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nonstate decision-making through expanding discourse, changing market
conditions, and establishing legitimacy of environmental programs.
This impact on decision-making is not limited to activist NGOs, either;
power is evident in the bureaucracies and secretariats of international
organizations (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Jinnah, 2010), knowledgeproducing institutions (Miller, 2007; Miller & Edwards, 2001), and standardsetting institutions (Böstrom & Hallström, 2010; Cashore, 2002), all of which take
part in and form the networks of environmental governance. These organizations
produce new ways of knowing about environmental issues including information
about processes and procedures, knowledge about the physical and social world,
and the limits of what is considered acceptable. These things can help to
facilitate cooperation and shared understanding among network members, and at
times the global polity; however, as with all power, there are risks. Hulme (2010)
gives the example of the way in which the 2° limit on global warming has been
used by the IPCC to stabilize normative goals around the climate and delimit the
storyline on which the public’s imagination must be built. However, he argues
that this framing may damage local communities as they seek to write their own
narratives and seek their own futures.
The primary challenges around issues of power and authority within
networked environmental governance are due to the potential for undemocratic
governance. These multiple and diffuse authorities have implications as powerful
actors in networks can potentially be less transparent and accountable than the
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state (Biermann & Gupta, 2011; Vaubel, 2006). Transnational governance is
semi-private or quasi-public and dispersed through restricted sites, where
boundaries are “indeterminate and opaque” (Stone, 2008, p. 22). Networks are at
times used to mobilize dominant liberal ideology at the expense of other value
systems (Friedrichs, 2005) or to stifle the voice of the global South (Glenn, 2008).
In other words, the power and authority held by nonstate actors that work in and
through transnational environmental governance networks can shift power away
from the public.
This challenge to accountability extends to the knowledge utilized within
decision spaces as well. The control over technical expertise and information
creates a situation in which these networked organizations, especially when
working in transnational space, can leave local communities out of environmental
decisions that impact their lives, thereby breaking down democratic processes. In
an aptly titled book, Conservation is Our Government Now, West (2006) provides
a vivid example of the ways in which conservation efforts transformed the power
relationships and ways of life in local communities within Papua New Guinea.
West argued, "Local historic subsistence practices were curtailed or were to be
curtailed so that the local people, who through these practices were a threat to
biodiversity, could engage in economic and subsistence practices sanctioned by
conservation biologists and development practitioners as environmentally
appropriate" (ibid., p. 35). The use of expertise to put the conservation of nature
outside of and above human interactions of the lands seriously damaged the
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opportunities for a more public participation, as well as the resilience of these
communities.
Additionally, Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell (2013) look at the way that
the Fijian marine protected areas put in to meet the needs of the Convention on
Biological Diversity have slowly pushed the management practices of those
areas from serving the local population to excluding them through standard
practices. These authors demonstrate the ways in which expertise, bureaucratic
frameworks, and universalizing standards set by transnational and global
environmental organizations that work in and through governance networks can
shift power away from local communities, and even democratic states, and into
the hands of nonstate actors.
Within networks of environmental governance, organizations appeal to
various types of authority and ways of knowing to legitimize their power position.
The power, authority, and knowledge relations tend to organize in particular
ways, each with their own facilitative and restrictive elements. Below I explore
elements of traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and practical power, authority,
and knowledge relations (Table 2).
Typology of Power, Authority, and Knowledge Relations
Sovereign power is grounded in the authority of the state or those to
whom the state delegates that authority. With the state-centric concentration of
international relations, much of the focus in understanding decision-making and
action has been on traditional authority, such as the sovereignty of the state
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(Krasner, 1999), juridical or disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980), or the appeal to
delegated authority by intergovernmental actors (Jinnah, 2010). Under a
traditional framework of power, authority, and knowledge, the state and those to
whom the state has delegated power appeal to knowledges that produce and
uphold the sovereign. However, in an era of networked governance relations,
these knowledges are many times delegated to nonstate actors for their
production. While sovereign power has potential advantages on issues of
transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of environmental governance as it is
open to democratic procedures in most Pacific Island states, current trends in
both global governance (Biermann & Pattberg, 2012) and decentralization into
networks (Bodin & Prell, 2011) are expected to limit the scope of sovereign
power. This is not to say that states and those to whom states delegate authority
do not have a premiere role to play in transnational environmental governance,
but rather that governance trends are making space for other organizations to
play key roles in environmental decision-making, such as bureaucratic, scientific,
and functional relations.
Networked relations call to attention the multiple different types of
authority that are employed by organizations in transnational environmental
governance. In addition to sovereign power, bureaucratic power is found in
rational-legal authority and the authority gained through control over technical
expertise and information by organizations outside the state (Barnett &
Finnemore, 1999, 2004). This authority is “invested in legalities, procedures, and
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rules and thus rendered impersonal” through bureaucratization in the
classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of norms (Barnett & Finnemore,
1999, p. 707). While the process of creating procedures and seemingly
depoliticizing decisions can streamline the broader governance process, access
to bureaucratic authority and knowledge of legalities and procedures can be
inaccessible to the broader public. Barnett and Finnemore argue, “The irony in …
these features of authority is that they make bureaucracies powerful precisely by
creating the appearance of depoliticization” (1999, p. 708). In other words, as
decisions are focused on the legalities, procedures, and rules of governance,
deep political divisions are washed over or ignored. While streamlining some
processes bureaucratic governance mechanisms can increase efficiency, there
are tradeoffs as democratic access to these spaces of decision-making is limited.
Additionally, contestations over authority within environmental governance
are intertwined with the scientific power gained through the control of legitimate
knowledge, or expert authority. One of the primary divides within climate
governance comes in the local and global strategies and knowledges and their
struggles to be authoritative (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Hulme, 2010). In this
space, authoritative science (Bocking, 2004) meets the challenges of scaling
knowledge to a global level by collapsing the nuance of local conditions. The
objectivity of scientific procedure is used as a strategy to gain authority for
decision-making, thus giving scientific knowledge, and those who employ it, the
power to shape decision-making. While standardization and expert-driven
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knowledge creation can create significant innovations and technological
successes, it has risks. Scientific information is costly, both in terms of finances
and time resources, and can delegitimize other forms of knowledge (Agrawal,
2005; Bocking, 2004; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2005; Jasanoff & Martello, 2004;
Miller & Edwards, 2001). As Porter reminds us, “the form of life epitomized by
quantification depends on the art of forgetting” (1994, p. 396). Forgetting local
and contextual knowledge can create governance that is ill-fitting for the nuances
of the social and environmental system in which it is being employed. Therefore,
expertise can provide key insight into environmental realities, but can be costprohibitive and be used to delegitimize other forms of knowledge for decisionmaking if not properly considered.
A final understanding of authority is found in the appeal to functional
power through practical authority. Abers and Keck define practical authority as
“a kind of power in which the capabilities to solve problems and recognition by
others allows an actor to make decisions that others follow” (2013, p. 7). This
authority is not based solely on delegation from the state, positionality, or on
externally defined expertise. Instead, this authority is found in the capability to
provide tangible recommendations that are borne out through practice. Cooper
and Vargas (2004) take a similar approach when analyzing the implementation of
sustainable development, focusing on feasibility requirements, such as technical
and administrative capacity, legal frameworks, political acceptance, and more.
Appeals to functional authority tend to shift away from authoritative science by
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appealing strongly to the contextual nature of knowledge production (Haraway,
1988; Lejano & Ingram, 2009). Functional power through access to practical
authority and local, contextual knowledge relies on governance that is entrusted
to those who have shown themselves to be capable and knowledgeable.
However, gaining this type of authority is challenging on a transnational scale, as
it is grounded in reputations, relationships, and experience with particular locales
(Abers & Keck, 2014). Building those foundational elements of functional power
are challenging even at the local level, better yet when governance is concerned
with environmental challenges crossing state borders. Finding ways to connect
the local/global elements of power, authority, and knowledge, however, could
provide insights into possibilities for environmental governance.
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Scientific information is
costly and can
delegitimize other forms
of knowledge

Scientific
knowledge
provides
governance with
much needed
information about
the natural world
Authoritative science
(Bocking, 2004)

Contextual or situated
(Haraway, 1988;
Lejano et al., 2007)

Expert
(Miller, 2007)

Practical
(Abers & Keck,
2013)

International
organizations

Epistemic
communities

Governance
network

Bureaucratic

Scientific

Functional

Governance is
entrusted to those
who have shown
themselves to be
capable

Democratic access to
these sites of decisionmaking is limited

Bureaucratic
procedures
streamline
governance

Norm construction
and operations
(Barnett &
Finnemore, 2004;
Finnemore &
Sikkink, 1998)

Rational-legal
(Barnett &
Finnemore,
2004)

Traditional

Challenging to make this
work for transnational
organizations due to
localism

Decentralization has
decreased the viability of
sovereign power

Legitimacy can be
established
through democratic
procedures

Legibility, statistical
governance,
increased efficiency
(Scott, 1998)

Sovereign
(Krasner,
1999) or
delegated
(Jinnah, 2010)

Consequences for
Networked Governance

Nation-state or
delegated
organization

Benefits for
Networked
Governance

Knowledges

Authority

Location

Power

Table 2: Chart of power/authority/knowledge relations.

55

These multiple appeals to authority and legitimizing knowledges—
traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and functional—can bring about
consequences for governance. Using the Pacific Islands as a case study, I will
further explore the interactions between power, authority, and knowledge in
transnational environmental governance.
Conclusion
The role of transnational governance in mitigating the effects of climate
change and environmental degradation is complex, fraught with contradictions,
and yet vitally necessary in order to avoid both environmental and social
catastrophe. States have traditionally been defined as the supreme legal
authority over a territory; however, while states may still play central roles in
decision-making and regulatory mechanisms, the territorially limited state is no
longer sufficient to meet the growing need for governance across state borders.
Transnational governance, then, has developed as an outgrowth of the
inadequacy of the state in dealing with transnational problems.
Understanding governance in a multi-actor space, inclusive of the
bureaucracies and secretariats of international organizations (Barnett &
Finnemore, 1999, 2004; Jinnah, 2010), knowledge-producing institutions (Miller,
2007; Miller & Edwards, 2001), standard-setting institutions (Böstrom &
Hallström, 2010; Cashore, 2002), and others, requires an understanding of
power, authority, and knowledge that is broad enough to include the various
facets of governing that these organizations bring to the table. Thus,
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understanding power as productive, relational, and distributed throughout society
through networks of discursive practices can bring to light the less visible
elements of power.
Specifically, the authority of various power/knowledge complexes—such
as authoritative science regimes—can create challenges between local and
global ways of knowing the earth. This makes it vitally important to explore the
ways in which power, authority, and knowledge are organized. These
discussions set the stage for the investigation of climate change diplomacy and
governance in the Pacific Islands undertaken in this dissertation.
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Chapter 3: Narrative-Networks in Diplomatic Spaces
What I will tell my daughter
They say there are no mountains
in the Marshalls – our island
that is so close
to an expiration date
But I will tell you there were mountains
who were men
giants who walked across the sea
sounding the call for the world
to hear our story.
-Kathy Jetñil-Kijiner, Marshallese Poet
Introduction
Transboundary environmental problems have been on the forefront of the
agenda since the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where the UNFCCC was
adopted. Parties to the convention have met yearly at the Conferences of the
Parties [COP], which has led to the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, the 2010 Cancún
agreements, and the 2012 Doha Amendment. These agreements have held
varying degrees of weight in the international sphere, but none have shown a
significant commitment to address the immediate and long-term impacts of
climate change (Ivanova, 2016).
This chapter discusses the Pacific Islands’ diplomatic efforts in the lead up
to the 2015 Paris COP (otherwise known as COP21). COP21 produced the
strongest climate change agreement thus far. As Ivanova describes it:
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[The Paris Agreement] meets the core criteria for effectiveness of an
international treaty as outlined by scholars, researchers, and the UN
Secretary-General: universal participation, significant emission reduction
commitments, transparency and accountability, finance, and high
compliance rates…The agreement is ambitious and universal; it
possesses a binding, yet flexible legal nature, clear procedures for
accountability, and a credible financial structure. (2016, p. 412)
While still having room for improvement,8 the Paris Agreement represented a
dramatic shift in the international commitment to reducing the causes and
impacts of climate change. The ability to accomplish this agreement did not occur
overnight, but rather was a product of a long history of contestation around
transnational environmental governance. Whether through delineations among
developed vs. developing countries, producers vs. consumers of climate
challenges, the wealthy vs. the poor, negotiations around climate change have
drawn a series of lines that define who should be “for” or “against” climate
strategies, although these lines shift through time. One element of this process is
the narrative utilized by individuals as they network with others.
The narrative of a network is the shared story it tells when working to
shape and accomplish its goals—the heroes, villains, and victims, both human

8

For instance, the Paris Agreement did not address compensation for loss and
damages, actionable discussion of indigenous participation, or a call to end fossil
fuel extraction, and also lacks sanctions for those who do not meet their goals.
Also, the Trump administration has vowed to withdraw from the accord.
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and nonhuman, that form the basis of the larger fabula, or tale of the issue at
hand (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). Narrative does productive work within
the process of governance in a variety of ways—it determines the goals and
problems to be solved, identifies tools to solve the problem, distributes the
benefits and burdens of policy and implementation, creates rules for inclusion
and exclusion, and generates rationales that legitimate these choices (McBeth,
Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). In other words, narrative not only limits what is
possible within governance, it also works to create the possible. Identifying the
role of narrative provides key insights into the ways in which networks emerge
and establish their authority for governance. As networks work across
local/global divides, the power of narrative is both a strategy of negotiation in this
multi-scalar space and a product of this negotiation. In other words, narrative is
used to bolster the authority of networks of organizations as organizations
transform the narrative to meet their own ends, and is also a durable product of
that negotiation that has been institutionalized into dominant discourses.
Therefore, it is informative to study the way in which various actors are
employing narratives, as well as how those narratives came to be.
During the COP21 climate change negotiation preparation, two dominant
narratives were employed in the Pacific Islands that distinguished two network
constructions for negotiation stances. Using a narrative-network approach
(Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013), this chapter will further explore what I call the
global technical narrative employed by many regional intergovernmental
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organizations that manifested in the Pacific Islands Forum [PIF] Summit’s Pacific
Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on Climate Change, alongside the local
power narrative employed by local NGOs during the writing of the Pacific Island
Development Forum [PIDF] Summit’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change.
Through this chapter, I will consider the way in which international climate
networks are emerging and establishing authority in transnational environmental
governance. I will then look to the way that, as organizations network around
environmental issues, struggles over local and global knowledges work through
the narrative used by these networks. Finally, I will consider the implications of
these narrative-networks for climate change governance in the Pacific Islands
and in future diplomatic efforts.
Scientific Authority in Multi-Scalar Space
Contestations over authority within environmental governance are
intertwined with what is considered legitimate knowledge. One of the primary
divides within climate governance comes in the local and global strategies and
knowledges and their struggles to be authoritative (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004;
Hulme, 2010). Global knowledges tend to emulate what Bocking (2004) refers to
as authoritative science—knowledge gained through procedures that are
unanimous, quantitative, generalized, and conducted according to scientific
process. This type of knowledge meets the challenges of scaling knowledge to a
global level by collapsing the nuance of local conditions. The objectivity of
scientific procedure is used as a strategy to gain authority for decision-making,
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thus giving scientific knowledge, and those who employ it, the power to shape
decision-making. As Turnhout, Dewulf, and Hulme describe it, “Knowledge and
power embrace tightly as globalized knowledge conditions the political imaginary
of global environmental governance and vice versa: how one knows constrains
how one governs and how one governs shapes what one needs to know” (2016,
no page). In other words, the use of global, objective, authoritative science can
shape what is perceived as possible within transnational environmental
governance.
This type of global scientific knowledge plays a vitally important role in the
governance of the climate due to the nature of global atmospheric change. By
appealing to authoritative science, however, transnational environmental
networks can leave local communities out of environmental decisions that impact
their lives, thereby breaking down democratic processes. As Hulme describes it,
this type of science makes ‘global kinds of knowledge,’ or “knowledge which
erases geographical and cultural difference and in which scale collapses to the
global” (2010, p. 559). He gives the example of the way in which the 2°C
[Celsius] limit on global warming has been used by the IPCC to stabilize
normative goals around the climate and delimit the storyline on which the public’s
imagination must be built. He argues that this globalizing knowledge may
damage local communities as they seek to write their own narratives and pursue
their own futures.
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With these challenges presented by global, objective, authoritative science
in transnational environmental governance, many environmental governance
scholars are exploring the authority of local, practical, contextual knowledge.
Bocking argues, “tacit prescriptive commitments embedded in scientific
knowledge, especially relating to controlling and transforming nature, may fit
poorly with local attitudes that emphasize adaptation and coexistence” (2004, p.
28). In this way, Bocking argues that authoritative science can be used in efforts
to reform nature that may be in contrast to the adaptive and coproduced values
of local communities in regards to nature. Instead, Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley,
Torres, and Agduma (2007) provide an argument for how particular
environmental governance efforts may need to undergo contextualization in order
to have institutional coherence with the everyday patterns and practices of
localities. In other words, governance is to be adaptive to both the environmental
and social contexts in which it is being embedded. However, in climate change
governance, this local knowledge must compete for legitimacy with global ways
of knowing. This struggle over the authority of knowledge in local and global
space is played out in the narrative employed by networks of environmental
organizations.
Narrative-Networks
Authority within the network can be created and bolstered through the use
of narrative strategies, such as is found in advocating the use of global scientific
knowledge production and the need for local input. Struggles between the
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authorities of global and local knowledge production play themselves out through
narrative-networks. Previous discussions of networks have focused primarily on
evidence of interactions between actors, but how those interactions shaped the
actors in the network and how actors shape interactions in the network have
been left “black boxed” in much of the literature. Instead, narrative-networks, as
discussed by Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013) form as actors write themselves
into the larger story of the environmental issue. In a narrative-network, network
actors and network narratives are mutually constituted. In other words, a
narrative-network is created by the common use of a narrative by actors in the
network, and the narrative-network is made possible by the existence of a
community that fosters the narrative. This allows for narrative-networks to be
understood as produced by both the actors and the narrative.
In the analysis of policy, narrative is the basic underlying storyline on
which the legitimation of decision-making relies. Policy narratives incorporate
identity, trust, and alterity—or the creation of the “other” that the network must be
working against. The use of characterization—heroes, villains, and victims, both
human and nonhuman—lends itself to an “us” and “them” that works to
strengthen organizational ties to the network. It also prescribes policy morals,
where ‘solutions’ are given to the problems at hand based on who is considered
the hero, villain, and victim. Additionally, gaps in the conventional narrative are
employed by some narrative-networks to offer alternatives to the dominant
network. This allows narrative-networks to bridge, integrate, translate, and
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generate knowledge across various sources and value perspectives, while also
allowing for their own narrative to be employed. While nonhumans’ roles in the
network are also important to understanding the narrative-network, this chapter
will focus on the human elements of the network.
Evaluating emergent climate networks as narrative-networks can provide
opportunities to trace their narratives throughout the policy process. As they work
to impact diplomacy at a transnational level, the narratives of various networks
struggle to be represented. Looking to the impact of networks’ use of heroes,
victims, and villains on transnational policies, one can see where voices were
heard, and where they were underrepresented. In the case of the Pacific Islands,
these struggles are playing out as local and global voices are being made the
hero or villainized to meet particular ends.
Narrative-Networks in the Pacific Islands
In order to combat the growing threat of environmental degradation,
transnational environmental diplomatic networks are emerging that include the
Pacific Island nations, regional intergovernmental organizations, civil society,
private sector participants, and states that are external to the region (Corlew,
Keener, Finucane, Brewington, & Nunn-Crichton, 2015; Gruby & Campbell, 2013;
Pietri, Stevenson, & Christie, 2015). These networks struggle between the ‘global
kinds of knowledge’ (Hulme, 2010) created by agencies in the region and local,
contextual knowledge (Lejano, Ingram, Whiteley, Torres, & Agduma, 2007) that
is a large part of climate change adaptation and mitigation. Battles over climate
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change negotiation stances, the use of traditional knowledges and
methodologies, and the inclusion or exclusion of particular voices have caused
networks in the region to work to establish their own narrative strategies for
authority.
Particularly when it comes to climate change diplomacy, dominant
scientific narratives have worked to set the parameters of decision-making under
a “problem closure,” which Hajer (1995) defines as the process of creating
solutions to a set of unquestioned, well-developed problems. Thus, narrative
constructions of the challenges presented by climate change—including the
scientific models, classifications, and regulations—impact climate change
diplomacy and governance within the Pacific Islands by producing problem
closure. Even as scientific narrative constructions have gained dominance within
transnational climate diplomacy in the region, networks of organizations that
favor local constructions of knowledge are resisting the narrative hegemony of
this problem closure. While Govan (2009) and Sievanen, Gruby, and Campbell
(2013) have demonstrated the ways in which local knowledge construction can
bolster the impacts of governance in the region, more should be done to explore
these narrative-networks of global/local knowledge and governance within the
Pacific Islands. This chapter seeks to investigate these narrative-networks as
they manifested in climate change diplomacy surrounding the 2015 PIF and PIDF
Summits leading up to the COP21.
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Pacific Islands Climate Change Diplomacy
The Pacific Islands—through governments, intergovernmental
organizations, or civil society organizations—were some of the most highly vocal
proponents of a climate change mitigation agreement at COP21 (Carter, 2015).
At the United Nations Third Small Islands Developing States Conference in 2014,
Enele Sopoaga, Prime Minister of Tuvalu, stated “Pacific negotiators need to be
in sync at the UNFCCC”; Tony de Brum, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Marshall
Islands, asserted that “there has been a failure of traditional diplomacy at the UN
… we need a new brand of diplomacy … one voice diplomacy”; and President
Anote Tong of Kiribati argued “we need to establish alliances that are nontraditional, that serve our best interest” (as cited in Carter, 2015). Efforts to speak
with one voice were also evident through the 3rd Annual PIDF Summit, with civil
society and government leaders emphasizing the “one family” of the Pacific
Islands, stating “our lives and our destinies are intertwined,” and encouraging
one another to be “singing together the same song.” These pledges of
collaboration ran throughout the meeting. However, even with these longstanding efforts to speak with one voice, the multiple climate change declarations
that came out of the Pacific during the final months leading up to COP21 showed
important differences. This chapter further explores the opportunities and
challenges for narrative-networks in climate change diplomacy efforts in the
Pacific Islands.
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Materials and Methods
While the Pacific Islands have a diverse and comprehensive network of
state and nonstate actors (as is demonstrated in the next chapter of this
dissertation), this chapter focuses on this simplified network of transnational
organizations that participated in the PIF and PIDF Summits to demonstrate the
differentiation of narrative within climate change negotiation stances. In order to
gain information on the process of transnational environmental diplomacy in the
Pacific Islands, I conducted interviews with 22 key regional players (interview
guide in Appendix A); attended 3rd Annual PIDF Summit, 1–4 September, 2015,
that was attended by delegates from 15 of the Pacific Islands including heads of
state; and collected grey papers and other archival data on regional
environmental work in the Pacific in both Apia, Samoa, and Suva, Fiji. I then
compared the interviews to participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits, and to
their respective outcomes in the form of declarations. Participation in the PIF and
PIDF Summits was visualized using a basic qualitative network for further clarity.
The methods are further described below.
Thematic and Narrative Analysis of Interviews
For the analysis of the interviews, I used thematic analysis (Braun &
Clarke, 2012). This type of analysis uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the
data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes,
(5) defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. I began by
organizing the data around themes generally following the topics of power,
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authority, and knowledge that run throughout this dissertation, then working
toward more specific thematic areas. These included agenda-setting, capacity
opportunities and challenges, knowledge use, and collaboration strategies. There
was a notable distinction between the language used by organizations in two
groups, which aligned closely with the participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits.
In order to further analyze this division, I then organized the interview
responses based on participation in the PIF and PIDF Summits. For interviewees
that were part of organizations that attended both summits, their interviews were
associated with the summit for which their organization’s participation was
weighted more heavily. For instance, a CROP agency that participated in both
summits would be associated with the PIF summit due to their heightened role in
that network. No state leader was interviewed for this study; however, statements
made by state leaders at the PIDF Summit were included in the PIDF network, as
their statements were associated with that event. As the interviews were
conducted under the assurance of anonymity, all individual and organizational
identifiers have been removed. Those statements made at the PIDF Summit, as
they were made in a public forum, may be attributed to their speaker.
The findings from the thematic analysis were then compared to the
wording seen in the Summit Declarations—the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders
Declaration on Climate Change Action and the Suva Declaration on Climate
Change—and found to have distinct similarities. While the thematic analysis
highlighted the differences between the two groups and their respective
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declarations in regards to perceptions of power, authority, and knowledge, their
differences remained rather vague. Narrative analysis, particularly through
characterization—or the act of determining the hero, victim, and villain—brought
clarity to these differences. Successful characterization, according to Lejano,
Ingram, and Ingram (2013) involves simultaneous individuation and
categorization, where the character is both uniquely believable and archetypically
recognizable. Thus, while the characterization presented in this chapter is
organized categorically, the actual language used by participants included
individual nuance that is not fully captured in this type of analysis. In other words,
each participant brought their own unique perspectives to the overall story told by
the narrative-networks. It should be noted here that, although I borrow heavily
from Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram’s (2013) work, this analysis does not deal with
the depth of their nuance with narrative-networks. Future work would benefit from
a more complete use of their framework.
Network Visualization
For the qualitative visualization of the network in the Pacific Islands, I used
a simple affiliation network of attendance at the PIF Summit and the PIDF
Summit in the months leading up to the COP21 negotiations in Paris in
December 2015. I accomplished this using what is known as a bipartite network,
where the organizations are connected to the event that they attended and not to
each other (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This can make it clear which
organizations participated in only one summit or both summits. The level of
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participation in the summit was also weighted to demonstrate the level of impact
an organization could be expected to have on the summit. This is described
below.
Participation was weighted using a classification system generated by PIF
and PIDF. For PIF, the independent and self-governing states of the Pacific
Islands, along with Australia and New Zealand, held central positions in the
Summit, along with the CROP agencies, of which PIF is the political head. Thus,
these states’ and agencies’ tie to the PIF Summit received a weighting of 3 for
their central role in decision- making. The territory and collectivities in
attendance—French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Tokelau—are described as
“associate members” due to their secondary involvement, and thus their tie to the
PIF Summit is given a 2 weighting. A number of intergovernmental organizations
and Timor-Leste are listed as “observers” for their background involvement in the
Summit, and thus their tie to the PIF Summit receives a 1 weighting. This is
reflected in the weight, or thickness, of the lines associated with these actors’
connection to the PIF Summit node.
For the PIDF Summit, all Pacific Island states that were in attendance and
involved in discussions around the Suva Declaration on Climate change received
a 3 weighting for their tie to the PIDF Summit. Organizations that have signed
memoranda of understanding of cooperation with PIDF—the Secretariat for the
Pacific Community, the Melanesian Spearhead Group Secretariat, the University
of the South Pacific, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and the
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World Wide Fund for Nature—received a 2 weighting for their tie to the PIDF
Summit due to their heightened engagement in decision-making in the summit.
Other nonprofits and non-Pacific Island states in attendance were given a 1
weighting for their tie to the PIDF Summit. Attendance and level of participation
of state and nonstate actors in each of these summits is represented below (Fig.
2).
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Figure 2: Network of attendance at the PIF Summit and PIDF Summit.
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Looking at the attendance and participation in the PIF Summit, decision-

making was limited to governments and to CROP agencies, with some other
international organizations in attendance. Also of note is the strength of
participation of Australia and New Zealand—who are considered core
members—as well as the lower levels of participation among French Polynesia,
New Caledonia, and Tokelau—who are only associate members due to their
status as territories and collectivities. The PIDF Summit, in contrast, included
representatives from 14 domestic NGOs and 7 international NGOs alongside
numerous governmental and intergovernmental organization representatives.
Private citizens and university personnel from the Pacific Islands also played key
roles in deliberations. While these organizations did not have a vote on the final
declaration, their participation was largely considered in transforming the PIDF
Summit’s final declaration. Australia and New Zealand were in attendance, but
not given membership in PIDF, whereas French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and
Tokelau were given full membership.
The next sections will explore this cross-section of the narrative-networks
in the Pacific Islands in more detail, paying particular attention to the
characterization used by the two networks. While, again, this network is a
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simplified representation of much larger networks of organizations surrounding
transnational environmental diplomacy in the Pacific Islands, participation in the
PIF and PIDF Summits is a useful differentiation for exploring the divergence of
narrative-networks in the Pacific Islands surrounding climate change strategies.
Pacific Island Forum Summit Narrative
Based on interviews and analysis of archival data, those in leadership
positions at the PIF Summit follow what I refer to as a global technical narrative.
These regional environmental organizations discuss the limited funding, projectbased management, and high levels of bureaucracy in transnational governance.
In this narrative, the Pacific Island states are the victim of environmental or social
disaster, and are primarily powerless without the aid of colonial powers. Lack of
capacity, resources, and scientific information play the villain, causing efforts to
achieve sustainability—environmental, social, and economic—to fail. Regional
environmental organizations are thus poised to write themselves in as the hero,
where better science, more resources, and standardized procedural mechanisms
are necessary to overcome capacity deficits. This creates a policy moral, or
policy-driven solution, that pushes for greater regional functionality in the form of
increased resources, greater access to information, and greater decision-making
capability in the hands of the regional environmental organizations.
Through this narrative, the regional organizations privilege global kinds of
knowledge (Hulme, 2010) and authoritative science (Bocking, 2004). Multiple
individuals working in the major regional organizations with whom I spoke
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emphasized their role in controlling knowledge within the network. They
discussed their efforts to “manag[e] the flow of information,” “interpret proposals,”
act as “gatekeepers” and a “clearinghouse for information,” in order to ensure
“quality control of information.” One of the participants in the PIF Summit stated
during an interview:
It's that informal authority with the countries, because we have no
authority at all. They have authority over us, but we have a lot of informal
authority over them. And respect because we hold so much expertise. And
we’re a pathway to other sources of help, funding, and success.
The control over authoritative science and resources is seen as giving regional
organizations their authority to hold some power over states. These regional
organizations, particularly those involved in climate governance (SPC, SPREP,
USP, and PIFs) can thus be described as boundary organizations (Cash et al.,
2006), or organizations that mediate and facilitate the coproduction of
knowledge. As one interviewee stated:
I think one of the challenges, though, with opening up all of these alliances
and stakeholder consultation groups is that you still need to have some
quality control of information. So, if you open up these things, and you
open up the door, and you just accept information, there is a risk that that
information is wrong. And that’s where I think really the role of the CROP
agencies as the regional technical experts have a role in scrutinizing
information, too. To say, “well, this advice came from stakeholders, and
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it’s great to get different views, but actually these are maybe some points
of clarification.” Because that open door can bring in some interesting
ideas. #laughs# … It’s just a risk, but I think it’s a manageable risk within
our regional architecture. And that’s really what the role of the CROP
agencies are selected to be. These are the technical advisory bodies for
the region.
They act as scientific authorities, judging the legitimacy of funding proposals and
managing the quality and flow of information. Their role as boundary
organizations is also tied to the role of colonial states as external funders. Due to
their perceived low levels of capacity, they rely on colonial states for resources
and in turn provide a space for them in decision-making.
While these boundary organizations can serve important efficiency
functions within regional environmental diplomacy and governance, these can
also serve to stifle, delegitimize, and displace certain forms of knowledge (Lejano
& Ingram, 2009), including the local practical knowledge of populations who
actively use environmental goods in the Pacific Islands. These regional boundary
organizations make these decisions about inclusion and exclusion through nontransparent processes, such as the selection of particular sciences for
management strategies, the recommendations made to decision makers, and the
streamlining of funders to approved scientific endeavors. One interviewee
described the limitations of local knowledge as, “people know all the high-level
jargon, but understanding the basic underlying issues is a challenge . . . there are
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serious knowledge gaps.” In order to mitigate for these perceived limitations,
interviewees from regional organizations discussed how they would ‘steer’
funders toward proposals that use “replicable data.” These decisions are typically
not open to democratic accountability measures, and the decisions may not be
representative of the needs and desires of local populations. This is not to say
that other forms of knowledge, such as indigenous or practical understandings of
the natural world, are left unconsidered, nor that these proposals with replicable
data are necessarily in conflict with these ways of knowing. However, the
participants from regional organizations in the Pacific Islands emphasized the
challenges in capturing, recording, and scaling these knowledge sources, and, at
times, used these justifications to exclude alternative conceptions of the world
from many of their final decisions.
At the 2015 PIF Leaders’ Meeting, the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders
Declaration on Climate Change Action was created through deliberations among
Pacific Island leaders, regional organization leaders, and leaders of colonial
powers. Table 3 shows a selection of the demands made in the PIF declaration.
Those phrases that highlight the global technical narrative are in bold.
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Table 3: Narrative analysis of the Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Declaration on
Climate Change Action.
Victim: Pacific Island States
•reiterate that Pacific Island Countries and Territories are amongst the most
vulnerable and least able to adapt and to respond; and the adverse
consequences they face as a result of climate change ... are significantly
disproportionate to negligible collective contribution to the global
greenhouse gas emissions.
•recognition of the special circumstances and vulnerability of Small Island
Developing States (SIDS), particularly those in the Pacific, and Least
Developed Countries;
Villain: Lack of Capacity, Resources, and Scientific Information
•are alarmed at the current and projected impacts of climate change,
coupled with the region’s physical vulnerability and limited capacity, are
exacerbating the challenges on the sustainable development efforts and
future existence of Pacific Island Countries and Territories.
•[call for] a commitment to scale up the provision of financial
resources...and a request for Parties to continue to enhance their
enabling environments and policy frameworks to facilitate the
mobilisation and effective deployment of climate change finance;
Hero: Regional Organizations
•support for ongoing and improved weather, climate, water, and related
environmental services, their analysis and modeling of impacts to
inform political, economic and social policies in the Pacific;
•The outcome should also encourage Parties to ensure improved
effectiveness of existing and new support, and provide support for
readiness activities for capacity constrained countries
•provisions for regular review of mitigation commitments, in light of the
most recent science
Moral: Greater Regional Functionality

•recognise the need to accelerate and intensify efforts to adapt to the
impacts of climate change, and to further develop and implement
policies, strategies and legislative frameworks, with support where
necessary, to climate-proof essential physical infrastructure, adapt key
economic sectors and ensure climate-resilient sustainable development
for present and future generations.
•accelerated and effective delivery of international support for the design
and implementation of adaptation and mitigation actions especially for
the most vulnerable countries already experiencing existential
challenges from climate change, in relation to capacity building,
technology transfer, knowledge and information sharing, and improved
access to climate change finance
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The PIF Summit declaration focused heavily on the global technical
narrative reflected in interview statements and archives. The vulnerability of the
Pacific Islands was emphasized, establishing their victimhood to the villain of low
governance capacity and environmental instability. While the PIF narrativenetwork would acknowledge that prominent greenhouse gas emitters case the
environmental instability, systemic issues are downplayed in this declaration. The
regional organizations underscored their role as the hero in this narrative by
providing authoritative science to inform decision-making. The policy moral, then,
demands that regional organizations increase their functionality to accelerate and
intensify effective adaptation and mitigation actions through technology, science,
and finance. Through this, the global technical narrative that privileges the global
over the local is reflected in the PIF Declaration on Climate Action.
While not as heavily emphasized, it is important to note that impacts on
marginalized populations were also considered. The PIF Summit declaration
discussed the “recognition of the disproportionate impact of climate change on
women, youth, the elderly, disabled, indigenous peoples and other vulnerable
and marginalised groups” and the “acknowledgment of the crucial role women
will play in a global solution to climate change.” However, the PIF Declaration on
Climate Action focused primarily on increased capacity for scientific knowledge
and governance, along with heightened functionality of regional organizations.
This is in contrast to the PIDF Summit narrative.
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Pacific Islands Development Forum Summit Narrative
Those organizations that are highly involved in the PIDF network employ
what I refer to as a local power narrative, or a storyline that puts local
communities at the forefront of decision-making on climate activities. In this
narrative, Pacific Island states are the victims of environmental and social
disaster—similar to other regional organizations’ narrative—and yet they have
the power to adapt both their environmental and social strategies to achieve
change. They see colonial powers, through funding and positions of power in
other regional environmental organizations’ decision-making structures, as being
just as much the villain as their environmental vulnerability, due to colonial
powers’ ability to take the decision-making authority out of the hands of Pacific
Island peoples. Instead, the local power narrative advocates for the Pacific Island
peoples’ engagement in their own decision-making to act as the hero. This left
the participants of the PIDF Summit with a policy moral of local inclusion in
decision-making and governance. This establishes a process for the Pacific
Island peoples to regain power in determining their own environmental futures.
This is not to say that the PIDF Summit narrative dismisses the role of global
decision-making around climate change, such as would be present at COP21.
Rather, it calls for more voices to take part in the on-the-ground decision-making
that would empower local communities to take part in their own climate futures.
Through this narrative, interviewees and PIDF participants were interested
in highlighting their own power. They emphasized the importance of shifting
81

perceptions of their status from “Small Island States” to “Large Ocean States,”
discussing the “hammer” of regulation that they could bring down on illegal
fishing and poor use of their ocean’s Exclusive Economic Zones. They desired to
be “subjects, not objects” of climate change discussions, and resisted being
“regulated to the sidelines,” as they felt they had been in previous decisionmaking experiences. As the Republic of the Marshall Islands Foreign Minister
Tony de Brum stated:
This year has been an apocalyptic year for the Pacific, and climate change
is the culprit. From Nangka to Dolphin to Maysak, our region is starting to
feel like a war zone. People have died, homes have been destroyed, and
economies left in ruins. But while our boat has been rocked, our resolve to
weather the storm and turn the tide has grown stronger. As I have said
before, while some like to dismiss us as small island nations, we are in
fact large ocean nations. … The world must know that the Pacific Islands
are leaders, and not simply bystanders to the unsustainable path the world
is currently headed on. Too often we let our big brothers in the Pacific
family dictate our policies to us, rather than seeking to engage them in a
discussion about what really matters to our shared region. Sometimes we
need to be frank and fearless in telling them that enough is enough: you
are talking about our survival here in a way you would not tolerate others
doing to you. If Australia and New Zealand genuinely want to be
considered Pacific powers then this means not only projecting their
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presence, but protecting ours. This must not be a debate over semantics–
it is a debate for regional security and for our survival.
This type of powerful language was used throughout the PIDF Summit, and in
discussions with those who were highly involved in the PIDF Summit network.
PIDF’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change, in contrast to the PIF
declaration, was created through an open, participatory process. During the PIDF
Summit prior to COP21, political contestation took place among states, nonstate
actors, and private individuals to position the Pacific Islands on a variety of
climate change issues. Not only was the strength of language debated—legally
binding mandates and deep-decarbonization tactics—but also the level of
representation the declaration exhibited was discussed. Civil society
organizations representing youth, women, and more were given space to
express their voices directly to Pacific Island leaders, and were able to advise on
how the Pacific Islands should be positioned in upcoming COP21 negotiations.
There was not total agreement about what should hold primary importance,
allowing stances to be negotiated and discussed (otherwise known as plurivocity
in the network; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). The goal of the PIDF Summit
was described as “providing the space to provide our voices to provide a
collaborative solution." Table 4 shows a selection of the demands made in the
PIDF declaration. In bold are the phrases that demonstrate the commitment to
the local power narrative of the PIDF narrative-network.
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Table 4: Narrative analysis of PIDF’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change.
Victim: Pacific Islands

•See and suffer from the adverse impacts of climate change, including but
not limited to [list of environmental impacts], with scientific evidence
clearly informing us these impacts will further intensify over time;
Villain: Ecological Vulnerability

•Are gravely distressed that climate change poses irreversible loss and
damage to our people, societies, livelihoods, and natural environments;
creating existential threats to our very survival and other violations of
human rights to entire Pacific Small Island Developing States;
•Highlight that irreversible loss and damage caused by climate change goes
beyond adaptation and is already a reality for PSIDS if there is inadequate
mitigation action, and that climate change is already resulting in forced
displacement of island populations and the loss of land and territorial
integrity and further highlight that such loss and damage results in
breaches of social and economic rights;
Hero: Pacific Island Peoples

•a new global dialogue on the implementation of an international
moratorium on the development and expansion of fossil fuel extracting
industries, particularly the construction of new coal mines, as an urgent
step towards decarbonising the global economy;
•the development of Pacific based research and technology capacity as an
essential foundation for innovation in our response to climate change;
Moral: Local Inclusion in Decision-Making

•Recognize that addressing gender based inequality and discrimination is
essential for effective
•action on climate change
•Recognize the importance of engaging, as equal partners, civil society,
women, youth and persons with disabilities, in all efforts towards building
climate change resilience;
•capacity building on formal and non-formal education, knowledge
management, with a particular emphasis on national languages and
communication of climate change;
•support to enable the greater involvement of community, civil society
(including women, youth and persons with disabilities) and the private
sector, in our climate change responses and initiatives.
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The PIDF’s Suva Declaration on Climate Change reflects the local power
narrative, or the desire to put decision-making about local climate actions into the
hands of local communities. While this narrative agrees that the Pacific Islands is
the victim of environmental disaster, they are not painted as a powerless,
vulnerable victim. In this narrative, the Pacific Islands are set in place to begin ‘a
new global dialog’ that focuses on deep-decarbonization of the global economy
and positions the Pacific Islands to be a leader in environmental innovation. This
highlights the power of Pacific Island nations to make a change in their own
climate futures. While this narrative also features the need for technological
innovation and scientific knowledge, the focus is on these innovations coming
from the Pacific, itself. Additionally, local voices are discussed as vital to climate
governance, with a focus on equality of partnership of nonstate actors through
making climate governance legible to local communities. This is made possible
through making knowledge accessible via both formal and non-formal education,
language translation, and others. In other words, the goal is not a central,
authoritative science standing alone, but rather a distributed, contextual
knowledge that can be bolstered through inclusion of local communities.
Returning again to Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram (2013) analysis of
narrative-networks, the narrative in the PIDF Suva Declaration on Climate
Change is attempting to bridge, integrate, translate, and generate knowledge to
fill in the gaps of the dominant global technical knowledge narrative with
discussions of local power. PIDF participants consistently discussed the break
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from colonial powers seeking to control their climate change agenda (otherwise
known as alterity in the network, where actors present an alternative to the
dominant narrative; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). Fijian Prime Minister
Bainimarama9 stated at the beginning of the PIDF Summit, “It is time for Australia
to stop trying to undermine PIDF by urging regional leaders not to attend…Step
back from the table and allow us to make our own decisions.” Others rejected the
“interference from outsiders” and “undue influences” of colonial powers, and
decried the “ambition gap” exhibited by climate emitters such as the US,
Australia, and New Zealand in not doing enough to save them from the effects of
climate change. PIDF is thus poised to increase the level of inclusion of voices in
climate governance in the Pacific Islands, as well as to incorporate a range of
knowledge that includes local, contextual knowledge. This is not to deny the
need for broader knowledge about climate issues, as scientific evidence and
formal education is also valued, but rather to make space for gaps in the
conventional narrative to be filled by local voices.
Narrative Comparisons of PIF and PIDF Summit Declarations
The contrast between the effects of the global technical narrative and the
local power narrative is evident in both the participation of actors in decisionmaking in these summits, as well as the final statements of these documents.
While the PIF Summit did not focus on the inclusion of nonstate actors in climate

9

As discussed in Chapter 1, Prime Minister Bainimarama was installed following
a 2006 military coup.
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governance, the PIDF Summit emphasized the equal partnership and high levels
of involvement that marginalized groups should have in the climate governance
process. Additionally, the PIDF declaration speaks of “violations of human rights”
and “inequality and discrimination,” terms that hold a much stronger connotation
than the claim of the “disproportionate impact” on the Pacific Islands seen in
PIF’s declaration. By discussing human rights, inequality, and discrimination,
those engaged with the PIDF declaration were able to connect the
disproportionate impacts of climate change to larger, systemic challenges faced
by marginalized populations. While interviews with PIF also brought up the
villainization of the states that are sizeable greenhouse gas emitters, this was
less evident in their final declaration, potentially due to the role of Australia and
New Zealand in their negotiations. Finally, the discussion of “non-formal
education” and the use of “national languages” in the PIDF declaration shows
that civil society was active in working to ensure that these decision-making
processes were open to all—a sentiment not carried by PIF’s call for “capacity
building, technology transfer, knowledge and information sharing, and improved
access to climate change finance,” that is indicative of the strength of the global
technical narrative.
While these are relatively subtle differences, they have powerful
implications for future environmental governance. PIF’s declaration leaves the
power for decision-making primarily in the hands of governmental and scientific
elites within the region. Alternatively, by engaging civil society as equal partners
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in the battle against systemic challenges through the use of accessible
information, the local power narrative of the PIDF declaration brings the authority
for decision-making into the hands of Pacific Island peoples. The local power
narrative is thus more capable of meeting the democratic needs for
representation and accountability, while the global technocratic narrative
employed by PIF and other regional environmental organizations is less capable
of meeting these needs.
Interestingly, Pacific Island states utilize the narrative of both of these
networks in the process of navigating transnational decision-making space.
States employ their status as network bridges to strategically employ these
narratives to meet their own ends. Again, while discussions of unity and family
among Pacific Island nations was evident in the COP21 negotiations, this
emphasis on unity can hide deep disagreements about climate change
negotiation stances, the use of scientific or traditional knowledges and
methodologies, and the role of particular voices, including civil society and
colonial powers like Australia and New Zealand. The emergence of the PIDF
Summit network demonstrates attempts by state and nonstate actors to provide a
space by which to contest the dominant global technocratic narrative of PIF,
colonial powers, and other regional intergovernmental organizations with their
own local power narrative. However, the details of states’ navigation of multiple
narrative-networks in this case leaves more to be explored at a future date.
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Implications for Climate Governance
The narratives of the networks surrounding the PIF and PIDF Summits
draw attention to the global and local dimensions of knowledge production and
decision-making surrounding climate change. Struggles in the Pacific Islands
within climate change diplomacy reflect larger questions about the role of states
in shaping their own futures, especially as many of these states are reliant on
traditional donor partners (external states) for project funding. Additionally,
contestation between narrative-networks in the Pacific Islands is evident in the
struggles over the authority to “know” the Pacific. The procedural closure of
environmental decision-making through adherence to objectivity and
generalizability can leave much of the political process to the side. The global
technical narrative presents scientific research as benignly objective and correct,
thus ignoring the situatedness and power inherent in knowledge production
(Haraway, 1988; Lejano & Ingram, 2009; Shapin & Schaffer, 1985). One NGO
worker that I spoke with discussed the lack of space for dialog surrounding
environmental issues, arguing that any space that did emerge was usually
policed by regional organizations. She encouraged me to remember that
“engagement is not neutral . . . it's about power." This description is an overt
reminder of the ways in which power can shape the spaces in which decisions
are being made, particularly in international governance (Stone, 2008). Authority
to speak in those spaces is directly related to who has power to share their voice.
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This procedural exclusion through the global technocratic narrative mirrors
Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) discussion of the ways in which
bureaucratization within international organizations maintains hidden power
through classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of norms. The global
technical narrative classifies authoritative science as a normative good,
privileging ‘objective’ scientific knowledge over localized and practical knowledge
sources that the Pacific Island peoples have identified as valued. In other words,
the decisions about what is best for climate change action in the region are made
outside of any public input and hidden within the bureaucratic structure,
excluding much of the knowledges of Pacific Island peoples.
Alternatively, the local power narrative emerging through the network
surrounding the PIDF Summit is evidence of resistance to the dominant global
technical narrative. The PIDF Summit narrative-network pushed against the
prevalence of colonial powers in decision-making in the PIF Summit (alterity), as
well as the use of scientific information to dismiss the multiple ways of knowing
including indigenous knowledge and contextualized, practical knowledge
(encouraging plurivocity, instead), by setting up local Pacific Islanders as the
hero. The local power narrative demonstrates efforts being made to contextualize
knowledge in a place, as well as to put power in the hands of Pacific Islanders to
transform their climate futures. By writing Pacific Islanders into the position of
hero within the narrative, decision-making and governance is opened up to
include multiple voices and knowledges.
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Pacific Islands’ Role in the Paris Agreement
While the Paris Agreement is a product of long-term negotiations between
UN states, Pacific Island nations played a significant role in formulating the final
agreement through the High Ambition Coalition (Burleson, 2016). This is due to
the pressure that Pacific Island representatives put on global emitters related to
the loss of their atoll islands under high emission scenarios. However, it was not
just the scientific conversation of the global technical narrative that brought about
this change in targets, although that played a role in demonstrating the need for
lower warming targets to save the atoll islands. Instead, the local power narrative
was evident throughout negotiations as Pacific Island leaders emphasized their
authoritative role in climate change governance. As Honorable Henry Puna,
Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, stated during COP21:
Now that is leadership. Although we are victims to the effects of climate
change, we are showing the rest of the polluting world that we are doing
something to improve our situation not just for us but for the planet. We
are not just environment victims, we are environment leaders.
Through this quote, and others like it, the leaders of the Pacific Islands
demonstrated their commitment to the tenants of the local power narrative. This
mirrored a transformation in COP narratives from challenges to opportunities, or
‘shame and blame’ to ‘name and acclaim’ (Ivanova, 2016). Pacific Islanders,
while still demonstrating their understanding of victimhood in the climate
narrative, also demonstrate that they understand their power through their moral
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leadership, and the ability to receive acclamation for their leadership. However,
while the local power narrative held on to its authority in the COP21 negotiations,
things shifted for COP23.
COP23 and the Fijian Presidency
In 2017 at COP23 in Bonn, Germany, Fiji became the first Small Island
Developing State to hold the position of the presidency. COP23 was separated
into two zones: the Bula Zone run by the Fijian delegates for government
deliberation, and the Bonn Zone open to all sectors. This was a technical COP
focused on the implementation of the COP21 agreement. In other words, instead
of openly political negotiations, COP23 was characterized by negotiations on
how carbon emissions should be measured, how they should be reported, and
what accountability measures were in place, as well as bold moves by the private
sector (particularly in the absence of the US’s full participation).
While Fiji stood as an ardent advocate for the local power narrative during
COP21 negotiations, this was less evident during their COP23 presidency. In the
opening speech of COP23, Fijian Prime Minister Bainimarama stood beside the
Pacific Island’s collective commitment to 1.5°C warming and to “meet our
commitments in full, not back away from them.” However, while the lead-up to
COP21 included such strong statements as “Those industrialised nations which
are putting the welfare of their carbon polluting industries and their workers
before our welfare and survival as Pacific Islanders,” Prime Minister
Bainimarama shifted to a more neutral tone during COP23 opening statements:
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We hope to infuse these negotiations with the Pacific Talanoa Spirit of
understanding and respect. Because the only way for every nation to put
itself first is to lock arms with all other nations and move forward together.
… We are all in the same canoe, which is why we have Drua–a Fijian
ocean- going canoe–in the foyer. To remind us of our duty to fill its sail
with a collective determination to achieve our mission.
The opening statement exhibited a universalism that was careful not to villainize
industrialized states—as Prime Minister Bainimarama did during the lead up to
COP21—but rather to simply present greater cooperation as the hero. In this
way, Fiji’s narrative surrounding COP23 experienced bureaucratization (Barnett
& Finnemore, 1999) and depoliticization of climate change through it being a
‘technical COP,’ ignoring the contextual elements of knowledge production
(Shapin & Schaffer, 1985) and the local power narrative elements that were
emphasized during COP21. This could also reflect Fiji’s stance as a diplomatic
leader to represent their role in the UN rather than represent the Pacific Island
states, specifically. While I present only a brief investigation into this change, this
period of diplomacy for the Pacific would benefit greatly from further study.
Challenges in Future Governance
While progress is being made to open up regional climate change
diplomacy in the Pacific Islands to more democratic processes, there is still much
to be done. Many of the employees of regional environmental organizations that I
interviewed discussed how they felt that they wanted more public involvement in
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regional environmental decision-making, but that by doing so they risked
problems of accidental exclusion or being in a situation in which they would not
have the time or resources to implement programs. With the series of challenges
that the Pacific Islands face, increased levels of inclusion and accountability can
have serious tradeoffs in the efficiency of governance in the region. If time and
effort is spent ensuring full public participation in decisions, many interviewees
felt there would be limited time and resources left for achieving climate change
adaptation and mitigation goals. However, while the global technical narrative,
the use of boundary organizations, and the privileging of authoritative science
may increase efficiency within the network, this efficiency comes at a cost that
must be considered. Alternative understandings of the world and goals of
environmental governance are dismissed through procedural mechanisms
without the approval of the public. Without addressing the needs, knowledges,
and capacities of local people, environmental governance efforts are likely to lose
their effectiveness, credibility, and authority. The inclusion of nonstate actors,
while producing challenges that must be addressed, can help to produce a more
inclusive, representative, and accountable environmental governance.
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Chapter 4: Discursive Strategies of Climate Governance
Introduction
Two years ago, we wrote: “The year 2014 was Earth’s warmest in 134
years of records.” Last year we wrote: “2015 was the warmest year ever
recorded on Earth, and it was not even close.” This year, we are running
out of ways to say it. In 2016, surface temperatures on Earth were the
warmest that they have been since modern recordkeeping began in 1880.
(NASA Earth Observatory, 2017)
As the earth experiences its hottest year on record for the third year in a
row, the environmental vulnerabilities experienced by the Pacific Islands continue
to escalate. Rising seas wear away low-lying atolls, threaten fresh water
supplies, erode coastlines and coral reefs, increase the prevalence and strength
of storms, and jeopardize food security both through agriculture and fishing
(Keener, Marra, Finucane, Spooner, & Smith, 2012). As the earth becomes
hotter and hotter, the Pacific Islands are less able to adapt at the rate necessary
to meet these growing environmental challenges. While Islanders have
transformed their practices for thousands of years to deal with environmental
shifts (Barnett & Campbell, 2010), they no longer have the luxury of time to deal
with changing conditions. In order to meet the needs of rapidly shifting
environmental conditions, the Pacific Islands have been a target of large-scale
research projects, resource-intensive environmental interventions funded by
external states and agencies, and a general global interest. This makes the
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Pacific Islands a space of contention where local needs and global requirements
are negotiated.
Due to the multi-scalar nature of climate change, Pacific Islands climate
governance does not occur in a bubble, but rather is impacted by global efforts.
During COP21 in 2015, states from around the globe took serious steps forward
in acknowledging and acting upon the changing climate through the Paris
Agreement. As with any global decision, however, there were multiple ways of
understanding the problem and the solution. Within the Pacific, specifically,
competing narratives prior to COP21 played themselves out surrounding
local/global power within the climate change space (Denton, 2017). Different
constructions of power, authority, and knowledge were advocated by various
actors in attempt to secure legitimacy and resources.
This chapter looks to the post-COP21 governance space to see the way in
which these local/global power relations are ensuing in regional efforts to adapt
to and mitigate for climate change. First, I will explore the ideas of networks and
discourse, and their relation to environmental governance efforts. Specifically
using Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (2006) three environmental discourses—green
governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism—I frame
how discourses around environmental governance influence the direction of
governance. Using social network analysis [SNA] of reports, project summaries,
and research projects from the Pacific Climate Change Portal and interviews with
climate change governance decision-makers and practitioners, I analyze the
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specific nature of local/global discourse around climate change governance in
the Pacific. Finally, I position these discourses in relations of power, authority,
and knowledge within the Pacific Islands climate change governance efforts.
Discourse and Networks
Networks are a useful way to explore the interactions of power, authority,
and knowledge. Network theories assume that interactions between actors—
individuals or organizations—are grounded in the exchange of material and nonmaterial resources (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). These resources could be
finances, practical information, norms, standards, or understandings of the world.
By exchanging resources in a relatively stable pattern, actors develop and
maintain routine discourses. Discourse10 is understood here as “an ensemble of
ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and
physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an
identifiable set of practices” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 175). In other words,
discourse is not only what actors say, it is also about the activities and institutions
produced and upheld through their interactions with each other and the world
around them. These practices can include governance operations, knowledge

10

Following Howarth’s (2000) division of theoretical frames, this approach to
discourse is in contrast to the positivist, realist, or Marxist discourse approaches,
due to the centrality of human meaning and understanding in explaining the
social world. Instead, it builds on critical discourse analysis by emphasizing the
contingent nature of these social constructions. This puts it within the poststructuralist frame, drawing in the broader field of practices that shape/are
shaped by language. This is dealt with more in-depth in Chapter 2.
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production, decision-making procedures, and others. The narratives that were
explored in the previous chapter can form some of the building blocks for
discourses; however, discourse includes a broader and deeper history of the way
things come to be spoken of in a particular way.
Networks can be seen as a space to perform and normalize power
relations through regular discursive practices, or ways of speaking about,
categorizing, normalizing, and standardizing the production of environmental and
social systems. The power to shift environmental policy runs throughout the
network, as actors seek to both frame the problem and structure the solution
(Hajer, 1995; Litfin, 1994; Wesselink, Buchanan, Georgiadou, & Turnhout, 2013).
This power to shape the problem and the solution comes through the production
of knowledge (Foucault, 1980), including information about processes and
procedures (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999), knowledge about the physical and
social world (Miller, 2007), and the limits of what is considered acceptable
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). These things can help to facilitate cooperation and
shared understanding among network members, and at times the global polity
(Andonova, Betsill, and Bulkeley, 2009); however, the privileging of particular
knowledges can create spaces where some voices can be promoted at the
expense of others (Agrawal, 2005).
Additionally, while many rational choice theorists work off the assumption
that actors have a stable set of preferences that persist through time and can be
fully understood by the researcher (e.g. Downs, 1957; Kahneman & Tversky,
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1979; Marx & Engels, 1978; Olson, 1965), studying the discourse within networks
can assume that actors’ preferences are formed through exchanges between
network actors (Howarth, 2000; Lejano, Ingram, and Ingram, 2013). In other
words, actors’ viewpoints change as they interact and negotiate with other actors
in the network. While similar standards, norms, and narratives become
commonplace within networked relations (Grewal, 2008; Lejano, Ingram, &
Ingram, 2013), they are never final as they are always open for renegotiation
(Butler, 1997; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). This takes the study of decision-making
away from an objective, singular, totalizing—or all-encompassing—approach and
toward an approach that allows for the dynamic nature of network exchanges.
This is evident through the study of discourses of environmental governance.
Discourses of Environmental Governance
Governance here refers broadly to the designation of rules, standards,
and norms according to which other actors make decisions (Bakker, 2010). In
other words, governance is not limited to government, although the latter can
play a crucial role in the former. Governance, instead, encompasses the breadth
of institutions and ideologies that impact decision-making within a given society.11
In this dissertation, I do not look to “network governance” as a structure, distinct

11

This understanding of governance addresses issues of power, unlike
definitions where governance is seen as a process through which collective
interests are defined and pursued (e.g. Pierre & Peters, 2000). Instead of
defining governance as actors working toward pre-defined, collective goals, this
more general definition of governance allows the formation of goals to be
questioned, as well.
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from governance in the form of hierarchies, markets, or communities (Pierre &
Peters, 2000). Instead, I view networks as a representation of relations
throughout society that have a variety of purposes, of which governance is but
one. Through this I avoid looking only to spaces designated as “networked
governance” for networks, and instead I see the way that power is constructed in
and through networks more broadly (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2017; Grewal, 2008).
Governance of the environment is fraught with challenges as actors vie for
power within existing and transforming political, financial, environmental, social,
and technical systems (Grabowski, Denton, Rozance, Matsler, & Kidd, 2017).
The underlying foundation for these contestations is who has power in decisionmaking and practice, by what authority they have that power, and what
knowledges are considered legitimate to create and uphold that authority
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010; Hulme, 2010; Jasanoff, 2004; Scott, 1998). These
relations of power, authority, and knowledge both shape and are shaped by
discourses that run in and through them (Agrawal, 2005; Hajer, 1995; Litfin,
1994).
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s Three Environmental Discourses
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006) have provided key insights into the ways
in which environmental governance is spoken of and practiced, through three
environmental discourses: green governmentality, ecological modernization, and
civic environmentalism (Table 5). They present each of these discourses with a
weak and strong version, described here. Green governmentality “epitomizes a
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global form of power tied to the modern administrative state, mega-science and
big business” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 53-4). Following the work of
Michel Foucault, this discourse entails the use of knowledge and expertise to
regulate all aspects of human and nonhuman life through biopolitical12 fostering
or management. This discourse is typified through the use of “eco-knowledges”
(Luke, 1999, p. 104) that extend government control to the entire planet. As
Bäckstrand and Lövbrand discuss, the weak version of this discourse is elitist
and totalizing, while the strong version allows for humility and self-reflexivity in
which scientific knowledge is made legible to the public.
The IPCC, for example, is a manifestation of the effects of the green
governmentality discourse in that it surveils, accumulates global scientific
knowledge, and sets standards for the climate (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006).
While for a long time it has set itself up as the ultimate authority on climate
change, it has recently begun to become more self-reflexive in response to public
criticism (Beck et al., 2014). Thus, IPCC’s expression of the green
governmentality discourse has shifted from a weaker to a stronger version by
focusing on public trust in the form of representation, accountability, and political
relevance, though more work is still necessary (ibid.).
Ecological modernization is focused on the “compatibility of economic
growth and environmental protection, a liberal market order and sustainable

12

Biopolitics, according to Foucault (2003, 2009, 2010), is the state’s use of
scientific knowledge to classify, standardize, and normalize populations.
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development” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 52). While the green
governmentality discourse focuses on scientific knowledge and governmental
control of the globe, ecological modernization is concerned with economic
approaches and interventions at a multitude of levels. The ecological
modernization approach works to neutralize the contradictions and crises of
capitalist development by emphasizing the availability of flexible, cost-effective,
decentralized, and market-driven solutions to climate challenges that focus on
‘win-win’ scenarios (Hajer, 1995). According to Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, the
weak form of ecological modernization is technocratic and neoliberal, while the
strong or “reflexive” form allows for a bit more critique of dominant policy
paradigms and encourages greater levels of “ecological democracy” (Barry,
1999, p. 113; Dryzek, 2000).
Forestry programs where developing countries are allowed to continue
emitting by paying developed countries for carbon sinks are some preferred
climate mitigation policy tools of the ecological modernization discourse
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation [REDD] is a global example, where multi-scalar efforts allow
developed countries to ‘win’ by mitigating their carbon emissions and developing
countries to ‘win’ through poverty alleviation (Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais 2005).
The weak ecological modernization discourse of the REDD program was
challenged, however, due to technocratic decision-making that denied
developing countries’ access to the forestry products on which they were reliant,
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particularly in areas of tenuous land tenure practices (Ghazoul, Butler, MateoVega, & Koh, 2010; Ziegler et al., 2012). Adaptations have been made to
strengthen the program, including issues of good governance, equity, and the
roles of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities, shifting the
program to be called REDD+. REDD+ is an example of strong ecological
modernization discourse at work, where market solutions are highlighted but
democratic input is also valued.
Finally, civic environmentalism posits that “in order to build more effective
environmental multilateralism, groups who are affected by environmental
problems, or have a legitimate interest or stake, should have a voice in finding
solutions” (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 55). Civic environmentalism is
primarily concerned with contesting the predominance of government- and
market-driven problem/solution constructions. Still, Bäckstrand and Lövbrand
determine that this discourse at times aligns with the strong forms of green
governmentality and ecological modernization through its “reform-oriented”
iteration that emphasizes the participation of civil society organizations and the
democratization of decision-making. It also has a radical iteration that draws on
the anarchist work of Antonio Gramsci to advocate for a restructuring of global
environmental governance to a more just and eco-centric world order.
Civic environmentalism is exemplified by indigenous movements across
the globe. The shift to a more inclusive REDD+ discussed above was based on
the pressure put on by organized indigenous groups using the weak civic
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environmentalism discourse to increase participation in the existing REDD
institution. Strong civic environmentalism, however, seeks to upend existing
power structures—such as sovereignty, capitalism, and patriarchy—through a
radical ecology perspective reflected in the “Indigenous Peoples’ Seattle
Declaration,” presented at the 1999 Seattle WTO protests.
As Bäckstrand and Lövbrand describe their work, “Discourses as
‘knowledge regimes’ brings us squarely to the role of science. In expert-driven
global environmental change research, scientific knowledge, techniques,
practices, and institutions enable the production and maintenance of discourses”
(2006, p. 52). Therefore, each of these discourses is embedded in relations of
power, authority, and knowledge. Green governmentality privileges large-scale
monitoring, tracking, and scientific knowledge production. Ecological
modernization utilizes evidence-based cost-benefit analyses, certifications, and
standards. Civic environmentalism is primarily associated with context and the
democratization of knowledge to include local understandings.
Local/Global Elements of Environmental Discourse
The structure of environmental discourse used by Bäckstrand and
Lövbrand engages with the local/global contestations in climate change
governance seen in the negotiations leading up to COP21 (Denton, 2017; Table
5). Green governmentality presents a global view, where elite scientific
constructions of the social and environmental context are privileged. As Hulme
argues, “Knowledge about multi-scalar processes and globally-aggregated
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outcomes that is insensitive to the peculiarities of place and context opens the
way for unitary globalized explanations and predictions of environmental change.
Masquerading as universal truths, these assert themselves as the unassailable
view from everywhere” (2010, p. 559, italics added). Thus, the “view from
everywhere” rhetoric of the green governmentality discourse mirrors the global
technical narrative of climate change diplomacy in the Pacific (Denton, 2017).
Civic environmentalism, on the other end of the spectrum, prioritizes place and
context through local prioritization. Under this discourse, knowledge is tied to the
space in which it was created (Haraway, 1988), and mirrors the local power
narrative of climate change diplomacy in the Pacific (Denton, 2017). Ecological
modernization discourse, alternatively, exists at multiple levels and thus contains
both local and global elements. Under weak ecological modernization discourse,
technocratic solutions require more of a global gaze, while the strong version
requires broader participation.
Table 5: Chart of environmental discourses in relation to local/global strategies.
Adapted from Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006).
Global Gaze

Local Prioritization

Green Governmentality
Weak

Strong

Elite

Selfreflexive

Ecological Modernization
Weak

Strong

Technocratic Democratic

Civic Environmentalism
Weak

Strong

Reforming

Radical

While the discourses presented by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand differ
substantially in practice, their practices are also interrelated. The private sector
requires long-term regulatory frameworks to secure their investments, so as the
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private sector uses weak ecological modernization discourse it often requires the
support of a weak green governmentality discourse from the public sector
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). Additionally, while strong civic environmentalism
many times is presented as an alternative to green governmentality and
ecological modernization, weak civic environmentalism aligns with strong
ecological modernization in its emphasis on the involvement of civil society
organizations.
Implications of the Discourses for Climate Change Governance
Each of these discourses—green governmentality, ecological
modernization, and civic environmentalism—can bring about particular
consequences within climate change governance practices. Green
governmentality, while providing key insight into the global transformations of
climate change and necessary actions from sovereign states, can also produce
challenging power relations within climate change governance. As Agrawal
(2005) has discussed in his investigation of the environmentality13 of
conservation practices in Indian forests, “Once precise, statistical, generalizing
arguments are invoked in the service of polity, it is difficult to counter them with
vague, descriptive, anecdotal evidence. It is in this characteristic of statistical
representations … that their colonizing effects are to be found” (Agrawal, 2005,

13

Agrawal uses environmentality as a play on “environment” and
“governmentality,” and provides a similar discursive frame as green
governmentality here.
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p. 35). The use of models, statistics, and forecasts can have the effect of
foregoing political conversation around what can and should be valued, while
producing a one-size-fits-all solution. The strong version of green
governmentality can help to broaden participation into these decisions, but many
times brings in the public after primary decisions about knowledge and
governance have already been made.
Ecological modernization can also have the effect of depoliticizing
decision-making through focusing on streamlining, mainstreaming, and
efficiency. While these efforts can produce cost-savings and imply a ‘win-win’
approach to decision-making in a space focused on sustainable development, it
can also create a “problem closure” or defining solutions for a set of welldeveloped problems through apolitical measures (Hajer, 1995, p. 22). In other
words, by portraying a ‘win-win’ approach, it makes it more challenging for those
who do not see themselves as winning or who question the values being
highlighted in the ‘win’ to put forward an alternative view that will be considered.
The strong version of ecological modernization can allow for input from the
broader civil society space, but still presents the time for participation as after the
agenda has been set.
Civic environmentalism, in its weak form, can shift the levels of
participation from input to agenda-setting. While this can assist the development
of quality and effective outcomes in line with local needs, it is a costlier way of
working in terms of time and other resources. It can reduce the efficiency and
107

expediency of needed climate action. Strong civic environmentalism presents
challenges to the existing system that can bring about broad social change.
While achieving justice and equity targets that would be otherwise inconceivable,
this form of civic environmentalism contests all other discourses, making it
challenging to achieve change within the needed timeframe, the existing system,
and in concert with appropriate partners.
It is also important to note that even in the strong versions of green
governmentality and ecological modernization and in all forms of civic
environmentalism, there are still power relations that create uneven spaces. As
Schattschneider stated, “All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of
the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because
organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics
while others are organized out” (1960, p. 71). A careful exploration of the
mobilization of bias is necessary to better understand whose voice is being heard
in a governance arrangement that fosters any of these discourses. In other
words, while it may be tempting to venerate the inclusivity of civic
environmentalism, or strong green governmentality and ecological modernization
for that matter, a critical approach is key to demonstrating where issues are
“organized out.” This will be taken up more thoroughly in the next chapter.
These discourses can be seen in all manner of global environmental
governance efforts. Green governmentality is prevalent in efforts to measure,
normalize, and control levels of species biodiversity (Denton, forthcoming).
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Ecological modernization is utilized in arguments that present environmental
pollution as merely a product of economic inefficiencies (Hajer, 1997). Civic
environmentalism is prevalent as an element of environmental justice campaigns
across the world. While these discourses take on a variety of forms and subject
matters, they are particularly apparent in the Pacific Islands’ climate change
efforts. The next section describes my mode of investigation to look into these
discourses in the Pacific Islands—a combination of social network analysis and
qualitative methods.
Social Network Analysis Methods
In Pacific Islands climate change governance, states, NGOs, IGOs, IOs,
private enterprises, and knowledge producing institutions at the local, national,
regional, and global level are all working to meet environmental challenges.
These organizations form connections through interactions with varying degrees
of formality—e.g. designated networks of actors devoted to a particular cause,
partnerships for projects and research efforts, and informal interactions among
acquaintances. While SNA cannot capture all aspects of all relationships, it is a
useful tool in understanding the form and structure of interactions among a large
number of actors, thus making it a useful tool for understanding this broad range
of multi-scalar organizations.
The Pacific Climate Change Portal [PCCP] was used as the source of
data for this analysis. The PCCP is a central information location online that has
gathered over 1,400 articles, reports, event participation lists, and more, relating
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to climate change governance in the Pacific Islands. The PCCP was instigated
and is maintained by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental
Programme [SPREP]. The PCCP is not a complete source of all climate change
programming in the region. It is also colored by SPREP leadership as SPREP
has a vested interest in ensuring that its projects and reports, and those of its
collaborator organizations, make their way into the portal, while other
organizations may not see that type of documentation as vitally important.
However, PCCP is the best collection of data on climate change programming in
the Pacific Islands to date. The data was evaluated to identify when any two
organizations:14
•
•
•
•
•

worked together on a project,
shared financial or other resources for a project,
shared scientific or local knowledge for a project15,
produced a scientific or policy paper together, or
attended an event together.

Websites, grey papers (technical reports, programmatic information, etc.),
newspapers, blogs, environmental reports, and financial statements were used to
determine when these resource exchanges occurred. This limited the analysis to
formal exchanges, missing the important yet hidden informal exchanges that
occur regularly in the network, which is why the SNA was supported by
interviews.

14

Data was limited to the past 10 years [2006-2016] prior to analysis due to the
availability of data for that period.
15
As with the other measures listed here, this is limited to sharing that is
evidenced in papers provided about projects.
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For the SNA, I focused on exploring the relative power positions of various
organizations in the network. This served three distinct functions. First, it allowed
me to select organizations that held greater or lesser power positions within the
network as interview participants to ensure that multiple perspectives were
considered in the findings. Additionally, the power positions were visualized in a
map that was used as an interview tool to support participants’ discussion of the
power of other organizations in the network—either affirming or rejecting their
status in the visualization (Appendix B). Finally, it allowed me to place the
interview findings in context according to how embedded in the network
participants’ organizations appeared through the SNA, and what they thought of
other organizations in greater or lesser power positions. In other words, it let me
put the interviews in context according to how they viewed organizations at
similar and different power positions.
For the SNA visualization, I looked at measures of how central
organizations were to the network—in-degree, out-degree, and betweenness
centrality—to determine the organizations that held more or less powerful
positions. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni explains, “network centralization does not
concentrate formal authority in a single location, nor does it vest authority in a
single actor that is empowered to define or enforce collective rules” (2017, p.
692). Instead, centralization is an informal and fluid measure of power. In-degree
centrality refers to the number of incoming links a node has, which in this case
demonstrates that they received financing, co-led a project, or simply
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participated. Out-degree centrality refers to the number of outgoing links a node
has, which in this case demonstrates that they gave out funding or were a coleader in a project. Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, measures the
number of times a node is located on the shortest path between two other nodes.
This is a measure of how central the organization is to the network as a whole.
In-degree and out-degree centrality captures the power to influence projects
through financing, leadership, or participation, while betweenness centrality
captures influence over flows of knowledge, information, and resources in the
network as a whole. After applying an average of these measures, I divided
organizations into the core, semi-periphery, and periphery of the network. In
other words, I distinguished between those organizations with many connections
in all types of centrality (core), those with a moderate number of connections
(semi-periphery), and those with only a few connections to others (periphery).
Interview Methods
While the SNA can provide some insight into the structure of relationships
between organizations working on climate change in the Pacific, it does little to
provide feedback on why they have that power, if that power is considered
legitimate by network participants, and what sources of knowledge they use to
create and uphold that power. In other words, while SNA can give some insight
as to where power might be located in the network, it is not definitive on that
power nor does it demonstrate the authority or knowledge employed by
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organizations in relative power positions. Thus, I conducted interviews in order to
provide insight into these elements of climate change governance.
Interviews for this portion of the dissertation took place in March and April
of 2017, a little over a year after COP21 in December, 2015. Participants for
these interviews came from Fiji, Samoa, the Cook Islands, Australia, and the
Hawai’i Islands of the United States. Organizations were selected using a
convenience sample from the categories of core, semi-periphery, and periphery
(see description above) and distributed across various sectors—Pacific Island
and external states, domestic and international NGOs, and IGOs. In this
dissertation, I assumed that centrality and organizational type would impact
perceptions of the authority and knowledge used by other members in the
network (and that perceptions impact the creation and maintenance of ties), thus
making it important to capture multiple types of organizations at various
centralities. The individuals selected from these organizations generally had
extensive knowledge of the organization’s transnational environmental efforts
and collaboration with other organizations, but their exact title may vary from
organization to organization, e.g. Climate Change Advisor, Climate Services
Director, Project Coordinator, etc.
The interviews covered topics related to power, authority, and knowledge
within climate change governance in the Pacific. A copy of the interview guide is
located in Appendix C. The interviews were semi-structured and centered around
the visualization produced through SNA (see Appendix B), where I asked for
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participants’ perspectives on what power, authority, and knowledge were brought
by both central and peripheral organizations. I interviewed 30 individuals
representing 21 organizations/government departments primarily in one-on-one
settings, with 5 interviews taking place in groups of 2-3. The interviews ranged
from 30 minutes to 3 hours (organizations and interview times are listed in
Appendix D). Sixteen interviews were recorded and transcribed, and 5 were
limited to notes only for a variety of reasons, including limitations of the meeting
space and participant desires to not be recorded. The interviews were
supplemented with reports, news articles, and studies to contextualize the
interviews.
The interviews were transcribed, and then coded using thematic analysis
(Braun & Clark, 2012). This uses six steps: (1) becoming familiar with the data,
(2) generating initial codes, (3) searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, (5)
defining and naming themes, and (6) producing the report. As opposed to a rich
description of the entire data set, this dissertation focused on detailed accounts
of particular aspects of the interviews and documents associated with power,
authority, and knowledge. Thematic areas included agenda-setting, capacity
opportunities and challenges, knowledge use, and collaboration strategies, all
separated according to their existing and idealized forms as presented by
participants.
These findings from the thematic analysis of interviews with Pacific Island
practitioners were situated among broader understandings of climate change
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governance at the transnational and global scale using critical discourse
analysis. As Howarth describes, discourse analysis places "investigated
practices and logics in larger historical and social contexts, so that they may
acquire a different significance and provide the basis for a possible critique and
transformation of existing practices and social meanings" (2000, p. 129). In other
words, this type of analysis deals with more than what was said by interviewees,
but goes further to examine how those ways of speaking came to be.
Similar Chapter 3’s division between the network that used the local power
narrative and the network that used the global technical narrative, the
interviewees’ expression of the themes had a local and global expression.
However, unlike the previous chapter, not all of the participants adhered to the
either/or of global technical or local power approaches. Instead, there was a third
category of participants that advocated for global agenda-setting and local
implementation. This led me to the work of Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006),
described above. The global technical narrative of the previous chapter was
similar to the green governmentality discourse, while the civic environmental
discourse captured much of the tenets of the local power narrative. The
ecological modernization discourse aligned closely with the participants who fell
somewhat in the middle with global agenda-setting and local implementation.
While Bäckstrand and Lövbrand provide a useful set of discourses to utilize for
this discussion, the fit is not perfect. Thus, in each section of the results below, I
also provide challenges to the discourse discussed, allowing for a more nuanced
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engagement with the discourses that mirrors the flexible nature of discourses, in
general.
Results
While participants put forward complex and varying views of climate
change governance in the Pacific, distinctions in goals and strategies of
governance showed similar patterns as in the discourses of green
governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic environmentalism in both
their strong and weak forms (Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006). This section
examines climate change governance in the Pacific in light of this categorization
of discourses. I present the ways in which organizations expressed these
discourses, along with where the discourses experienced challenges. While the
interviews provided the foundation for this discussion, the SNA findings are also
used when participants are discussed as being central, semi-peripheral, or
peripheral to the network. While I anticipated a greater degree of distinction
between the discourses used at each of these levels, there was a loose pattern
that is useful for demonstrating the degree to which a particular discourse is
embedded in the network.
Global Governance of Science and Control
Green governmentality discourse was prevalent throughout many of the
more central organizations in the network (see Fig. 3). Primarily composed of
IGOs and states, these agencies were concerned with building and maintaining a
“view from everywhere” (Hulme, 2010, p. 559) through the modern administrative
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state. Measurement, analysis, and technical information were primary features of
the discussion, as well as looking to organize decision-making through the use of
expertise. Scientific knowledge was seen as an important missing element to
achieving these goals within the Pacific Islands. As one participant discussed the
knowledge situation in the Pacific:
It’s gotta be said, we are still talking about a relatively small number of
skilled professional in the Pacific, and as I just said, they will probably
always be probably dependent on Western nations not only for funding,
but also for capability. I mean [large organizations working outside the
Pacific Islands] have got access to credible computing infrastructure that
some Pacific Islanders could only dream of, and that’s just the harsh
reality.
Capacity challenges were framed as a lack of scientific knowledge and
technological capabilities that could be corrected through greater access to
resources devoted to monitoring, experiments, models, and surveys. Due to the
high cost of these endeavors, these agencies tended to speak of competition
over mandates, resources, and (occasionally) ownership of information.
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Figure 3: Pacific Island climate change network core.

Additionally, the green governmentality discourse is characterized by the
use of technical expertise to delimit options within climate change governance
discussions. One organization spoke of the findings of technical analysis as “the
only solution.” Others felt that opening up decisions to political discussion
complicated what could be a streamlined decision processes. As one participant
stated:
So, we sat down and came up with this … a list was developed and
without saying it, decided it should be this island. Just absolutely this one.
#laughs# It took the government almost a year to decide on that island.
In this quote, the course of action is normatively intertwined with the output of a
technical process. While sovereignty is a key element of green governmentality
in the Pacific Islands, this desire to optimize technical expertise in decision118

making practices is embedded in the discourse. While monitoring, experiments,
models, and surveys can be complex in and of themselves, the use of technical
solutions simplifies decision-making by delimiting options that are available for
discussion to those highlighted by experts.
These elements of green governmentality tend to foster a solution to
climate change governance in which the participants’ own organizations are
highly valued. All but one central organization with whom I spoke primarily used
the green governmentality discourse and had a technical/scientific component
that is needed to overcome the capacity challenges described in the discourse.
While weak green governmentality has previously been used to produce and
uphold the legitimacy of these organizations, there has recently been pressure to
make the practices of these organizations more democratically responsive. Thus,
participants shifted between weak and strong iterations of green governmentality,
as they struggled between the need to make knowledge accessible to the public
to allow for accountability and self-reflexivity, and a clean, elite understanding of
the world. As one interviewee described some data he had been working on for
public consumption:
It’s not as scientifically accurate as we would like but it does get the
message across and the loss in scientific integrity, if you want to call it
that, is acceptable … somewhat acceptable. And we realize that we’re just
not gonna breeze in information that’s 100% scientifically acceptable to
the media and to the public. Compromises have to be made both ways, I
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guess. And that’s interesting because there’s been a big shift in that
direction in the last few years. When I began in climatology it was all about
getting information that was 100% scientifically accurate, we did not care
what it looked like. And quite often, we spent a horrendous amount of time
showing your clients how to interpret our product. But that’s quickly
changing. It’s going the other way, and it’s forcing us to think about the
way we deliver information, and that’s resulted in communication
specialists being employed at significant numbers at the bureau of
meteorology. So, we’ve gotten to a point now where we can’t release
anything to the public unless it’s been through a communications expert.
Which is challenging, but we see the need for it. We like to work with
them.
Multiple participants with whom I spoke echoed this ongoing struggle within the
green governmentality discourse. On the one hand, scientific rigor provides the
most important solution options to growing global challenges. On the other, the
communication and distribution of knowledge to the larger population is seen as
a valuable new frontier for climate change governance. Most participants spoke
of knowledge communication as an exciting opportunity to be relevant to
decision-makers and the public, but there was also some hesitation in regards to
the potential loss of accuracy, efficiency, and opportunity for technical information
to be ignored.
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Challenges to the green governmentality discourse.
Technology plays a key role in green governmentality by providing the
ability to surveil, gather and examine large amounts of data, and run simulations
of potential control efforts. While traditional donors including the US, Australia,
New Zealand, France, Germany, and others have provided access to advanced
technologies, the fragmented nature of project-based development in the region
has limited the capabilities of Pacific Islands states to streamline their data inputs
to achieve control. As one individual who had worked both within Pacific Island
states and externally described the situation:
you may have New Zealand select a particular brand of automatic weather
station and install it in multiple countries. Then you have another donor
that says “No, I prefer to go with instrumentation that comes from my
country.” So, you’ve got a bit of a mismatch … which creates
complications in reference to having to train people at the national MET
(Meteorological) services. National MET services having to service
different sort of equipment. And I thought to myself, “You know, perhaps
you could have an agency like SPREP sort of saying, like setting the rules
to some extent or providing guidance with reference to how aid might be
provided in the Pacific.” You would be careful, because you can’t say to a
donor, “Yes we’d be happy to take money from you and we will tell you
what, or we’ll give you a list of something we want from you but we won’t
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necessarily accept something from your country.” You know what I mean.
It's a complicated space. Very complicated space.
This “complicated space” challenges the authority of Pacific Island state agencies
in their efforts to control the knowledge space in their own countries. Capacity
challenges can already be overwhelming for SIDS and LDCs due to their small
populations and economies. One interviewee pointed out the challenges states
face in just paying their employees from month to month. However, these
capacity challenges are vastly exacerbated by state agents having to learn
multiple technologies, reporting mechanisms, etc., in efforts to meet donor
requirements.
This lack of control over the technological space is only one piece of a
broader challenge surrounding state control in the Pacific. Many participants
expressed their feelings that outside donors (primarily, but not limited to, colonial
states) were leading much of the agenda of the region. As one participant
argued:
Interviewee: The problem with the countries is they keep receiving the
money, they are not in a position to just stand up and tell them, “Guys,
listen, this is the way we should do it,” because they feel like by doing that,
you upset the government, and therefore you will not get the money that
you want to get. But the reality is on the ground, despite the many
fundings for climate change coming through the region, you hardly see
any tangible output or outcome.
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Interviewer: Why do you think that is?
Interviewee: It’s dictated by the donor. Projects are being implemented
according to their terms and conditions.
Therefore, under this power relationship where external states can dictate much
of the policy agenda, as well as the technologies of environmental measurement,
Pacific Island states struggle to place themselves in positions of power within the
green governmentality discourse.16 Thus, while central IGOs and external states
utilize green governmentality to justify their financial and resource investments
into scientific programming, they are forced to broaden their discourse to
maintain legitimacy. One way in which they do this is by also including aspects of
other discourses, including ecological modernization.
Mixed Governance of Sustainable Development and the ‘Win-Win’
The ecological modernization discourse was primarily utilized by
participants from organizations in the semi-periphery of the network (Fig. 4) that
were engaged in local/regional implementation of agendas set in regional/global
networks. One central organization with whom I spoke used the ecological
modernization discourse primarily, while other central organizations used it
sparingly in conjunction with the green governmentality discourse. The ecological
modernization discourse is expressed in the Pacific primarily through efforts to

16

While this still holds true, Pacific Island states have begun exerting their
influence more assertively recently. This topic will be taken up in more detail in
Chapter 5.
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mainstream climate change into all sectors, especially sustainable development
and disaster risk reduction. The regional governance surrounding climate change
in the Pacific has shifted from the Pacific Islands Framework for Action on
Climate Change [PIFACC] (2006-2015) to the Framework for Resilient
Development in the Pacific [FRDP] (2017–2030). FRDP sees climate change as
more of a variable impacting development than the independent concept evident
in PIFACC. As the executive summary describes the framework:
The FRDP advocates for the adoption of integrated approaches,
whenever possible, for coping with and managing climate change and
disaster risks, in order to make more efficient use of resources, to
rationalise multiple sources of funding which address similar needs, and
for more effective mainstreaming of risks into development planning and
budgets. (FRDP, 2016, p. 2)
FRDP is meant to streamline funding mechanisms and activities, increase
efficiency and effectiveness toward the goals laid out in the document, and
mainstream governance mechanisms for risk, broadly defined. Resilient,
sustainable development practices are the principle goal of the practices put
forward by the framework.
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Figure 4: Pacific Island climate change network semi-periphery.

The goal of the ecological modernization approach of the FRDP is to
ensure that piecemeal planning and governance is replaced by a more
centralized mechanism for development decision-making. As one individual
pointed out:
You can have all climate change project funded, doing nice things, cutting
ribbons, but in the end of the day you get development going on that is not
resilient to disasters. So, you are just gonna keep building disasters,
basically, unless these things are incorporated into the regular
development decision-making processes. So, that is why we stepped
outside of the box and tried to get inside regular development.
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In light of this view, the relegation of climate change to one of a list of variables is
seen as justified for the sake of making sure that resilient, sustainable
development stays a priority. Participants espousing ecological modernization
use equivalencies—climate change is really the same as disasters, which all
impact development, which can actually be sustainable development—to
mainstream climate change funding and action. Under this understanding,
competition between organizations and government sectors is unnecessary and
instead there can be a ‘win-win,’ where resilience to climate-influenced disasters
is met while the region continues to engage in rapid aid-based development.
The ecological modernization discourse was primarily concerned with the
need to improve reporting to regional and global entities, to meet funding
requirements, and to integrate risk into existing governance mechanisms. Thus,
participants using the ecological modernization discourse were concerned
primarily with the lack of capacity needed to meet external requirements. These
capacity needs are described by one participant:
So, how these stakeholders can use, integrate this risk template, or use
this risk template when they implement projects; and secondly, how they
assess funds or grants to implement these projects ... And also, there’s
one other capacity building of this community groups or committee groups
to use the government templates to access funds because government
also has funding for projects that comes into their office.
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Participants like this one regularly discussed the challenges countries and
communities faced when attempting to implement donor-led projects, access
financing, and meet external evaluation requirements. While this has some
similarities to the green governmentality discourse in regards to reporting, here
bureaucratic expertise is considered more of an immediate need than scientific
expertise. The two can, however, be intertwined, as donors require both
bureaucratic and scientific inputs. As one participant described the process:
when countries are trying to apply for GCF or Adaptation Fund or what
have you, there’s lots of things that they need to provide—cost benefit
analysis, gender analysis, economic and social safety guards, EIA, and
stuff. Some countries have the capacity to do that, others don’t. So, we …
help with those types of crucial studies needed to get over the line for
funding.
In this way, technocratic reporting mechanisms cause the separation between
the green governmentality discourse and ecological modernization discourse to
become blurred in efforts to meet donor requirements.
Ecological modernization in the Pacific includes a range of local/global
scales in order to implement the strategies laid out in the FRDP. As one
organization described the governance setup:
they have to align because it all leads from the global frameworks to the
regional frameworks and then align it to the framework at the national
level. That’s the logic of how it should work. Then it goes down to the line
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ministries and relevant areas and then down to the community level where
they pilot. Whether it is a climate change adaptation project, a coastal
adaptation project, some disaster risk reduction, some of the resilience
work, some agricultural work, and then to the technical areas.
In other words, the agenda is set at the global level, which provides a framework
for regional and national actions, which then trickles down to the community
level. Most participants that used the weak version of ecological modernization
saw local/global strategies and decision-making processes as working in concert
across multiple scales, primarily through a top-down flow. As one participant
described the situation, “I don’t think there should be any reason for tensions,
because the strategies are determined by the national representatives that sit on
these regional discussions.” Those using a strong version of ecological
modernization, alternatively, emphasized the need for greater community
participation and input. However, community engagement was primarily limited to
project implementation, not agenda-setting.
Challenges to the ecological modernization discourse.
Ecological modernization is the underlying logic behind many projects in
the region. Approximately 86% of the US$748 million of bilateral and multilateral
funds given to the Pacific Islands for climate change in 2010-2014 was in the
form of project support, and around 42% was devoted to enabling environments,
or “activities to mainstream climate change into sector policies, planning and
management (including in the energy, forestry and water sectors)” (Atteridge &
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Canales, 2017, p. 17). This is compared to approximately 1% directed toward
general budget support and 9% devoted exclusively to research (ibid.). As
funding is directed toward development and mainstreaming activities within the
Pacific Islands, the ecological modernization discourse, with its emphasis on
economic solutions, is highlighted. This produces a situation in which many of the
central organizations that primarily utilize green governmentality to legitimize
their own work also discuss projects in terms of ecological modernization for
funding reasons. As previously discussed, this ‘discourse mixing’ comes primarily
by arguing for the need for operational capacity to implement scientific findings.
There is still a formidable amount of resistance, however, to the ecological
modernization discourse. In the initial discussions on the FRDP, some decisionmakers argued that a technocratic focus on development and disaster hid the
political arguments surrounding climate change. For instance, the FRDP limits
the abilities of the Pacific Islands to engage heavily with the shame-and-blame
tactics that have categorized some of Pacific Island climate change diplomatic
efforts (Denton, 2017) due to the ‘win-win’ approach between development and
climate issues that is reliant on consensus. Some participants, therefore, felt that
the FRDP was inadequate in addressing the more contentious, global issues of
climate change, such as GHG emissions by developed countries.
Additionally, organizations using the ecological modernization discourse,
again, are primarily implementing agencies in the region that are responding to
global conventions and networks. This creates an inside/outside tension where,
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in meeting global requirements and channeling outside funding, organizations
must carve out a space for themselves on the ground. One participant described
the situation like this:
From our perspective, [it] is that ability to convene, to facilitate and to be
seen as a neutral player, because of our global status. Absolutely we are
engaging the region, but we are not of the region, per se … We may only
have a couple of junior local staff headed by Pacific Islanders and the bulk
of our staff is a few expatriates like me, but that’s who we are in this
region. So, I think we fit into a space there and that shows through our
ability to bring together Pacific Island leaders and decision makers through
our leadership programs and through the summits that we have held.
Highlighting the organization’s capabilities as “neutral facilitators” that is a direct
part of ecological modernization, the participant pointed out the need to open up
facilitation to allow regional involvement:
We ask what other countries want to do, and I guess that’s the big thing.
It’s gotta be less about us coming in with ‘here’s our great regional
framework or global theme’ and much more about the countries saying,
‘We’ve already got our priorities set, we know what we want to do, and we
just want to help.’ I guess that’s the creative tension it should be.
This feeling of being “not of the region, per se” was shared by many
organizations who engaged with ecological modernization, but it was also tied
with a desire to address regional issues in ways that put more power back in the
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hands of regional players. With these challenges, both green governmentality
and ecological modernization have incorporated some elements of civic
environmentalism.
Local Governance of Traditional Knowledge and Participation
Civic environmentalism is prevalent throughout the organizations at the
periphery of the network who also tend to work more locally within the Pacific
Islands (Fig. 5). This discourse fosters local constructions of climate challenges
and solutions that utilize the capacity of Pacific Islanders. This capacity can
include traditional knowledges, community governance structure, and the
importance of proximity to climate change impacts for the ability to understand
and develop solutions. Instead of fostering a “view from everywhere” (Hulme,
2010, p. 559), participants utilizing the civic environmentalism discourse were
concerned with integrating climate and disaster risk management into the local
context with actions already being taken by communities:
They already know how to do their work, but we are just adding on what
they already know. We are not bringing something new but we are just
adding on to what they already know, in terms of the work that they are
doing. And then for them to know the importance of integration or
importance of climate change, disaster risk how it a main … it’s a main
thing that we are looking at in the best way right now in terms of what we
are fighting for, what we’ve been facing.
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As opposed to the work of ecological modernization to mainstream climate
change and disaster into government planning and development, the goal with
civic environmentalism is to directly support communities’ existing efforts. There
is a sense that communities are already working to make positive changes
surrounding the environmental ramifications of a shifting climate, and that their
work should be supported by outside organizations. Their capacity is highlighted,
while acknowledging that more can be done to integrate their knowledge into
governance practices and support their existing efforts.
Figure 5: Pacific Island climate change network periphery.

Instead of a centralized decision-making model, civic environmentalism
promotes participation by the broader community. The participants emphasized
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that local capacity and knowledge are valuable and should be taken into
consideration during decision-making. As one participant noted:
It has to be more holistic and it has to be driven by what the community
wants to learn about, what’s important to them and not just pay lip service,
but actually do it properly.
Additionally, one participant focused on building a bottom-up approach:
So, our role is to build this model up because the existing model is topdown. That means we build the bottom-up approach so that the
community can influence the policy by understanding what are the issues
affecting them and what is the priority to them.
As opposed to a weak engagement model that might be used to draw community
members in after the agenda is set, civic environmentalism argues for community
participation in agenda-setting and policy-making from the beginning. Thus,
community knowledge is valued and highlighted, but it is not venerated. The
need to integrate scientific knowledge is seen as a critical element of
governance. As one participant stated, “We are adding onto their current
traditional knowledge that they have, and try and marry that to the scientific
knowledge of climate change and disaster risk.” The need for both types of
knowledge to act in concert is a key element of the use of civic environmentalism
in the Pacific Islands.
When the organizations put forward a weak version of the civic
environmentalism discourse, they tended to be impact-oriented, looking to the
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way that projects could be reformed to be more useful to their participants. These
conversations were particularly pitted against the project challenges brought
about through organizations using the weak ecological modernization discourse:
I know like [a specific central organization], oh my god, their monitoring
and evaluation frameworks and stuff like that, they are very rigid, they are
very detailed, and all that stuff. And then it’s like, well, then what. Once
you get past that, past ticking your boxes, and past crossing your Ts and
dotting your I’s, then what are you left with? What is the big impact? …
Doing something is not achieving something or having results or having
impact for those people that need it most. And until that happens it’s same
of the same thing over and over again. Unfortunately.
Thus, the weak version of the discourse was concerned with the efficacy of
projects to meet the needs of local community members, and the way that
previous projects had failed to meet that goal. As it is a reform-oriented
approach, most advocated for a tweak of the existing system into a more
inclusive version the fostered respect for local knowledge. While some Pacific
Islanders did engage with a strong version of the civic environmentalism
discourse that was radically anti-development and democratic, the sample of
those using radical civic environmentalism was too small to fully develop insights
into its use.
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Challenges to the civic environmentalism discourse.
While presented as an alternative to the more dominant green
governmentality and ecological modernization discourses, the reformist civic
environmentalism primarily utilized in the Pacific Islands is intertwined with the
status quo. Development pathways where funding is distributed from countries in
the Global North to the developing countries of the Pacific is discussed only in
terms of broader inclusion rather than changing the mold. One particularly
straightforward interviewee stated:
Interviewee: The problem is [major Pacific organizations] still depend on
outside funding. So, they wanna impress the donor more than achieve
tangible outcomes on the ground. It’s keeping the donor happy though is
the priority so that they can keep getting more funds.
Interviewer: Which donors are the cranky ones?
Interviewee: Almost all of them. #laugh# They have been doing nothing.
Development funding is not intended on bringing about tangible change,
it’s about the country’s interest. And that’s the problem. The best approach
will be to listen to the recipient, but unfortunately, that’s not happening.
They dictate how it’s delivered, in what way, in what form, and that’s the
reality we just have to live with. Although many reports are coming through
that it’s not working, this modality, and yet nobody listen to it. So, you start
wondering whether, are they are really yielding tangible outcomes or it’s
just something to fulfill their interest, to keep you in their pocket.
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While this shows considerable distaste with the current state of funding models,
civic environmentalism in the region did not present a tangible alternative. More,
this participant just wanted to bolster the capacity of the region to deal with these
challenges, and wanted some avenues of support to lend themselves to that end.
This participant additionally stated:
For example, now we are in the process of developing a course on multilateral reporting and that’s a great deal for the countries. They are all
struggling with all this reporting on climate out of the different conventions.
Now we have the Sustainable Development Goals. So, countries are so
overwhelmed with little capacity. Most of the time they rely on foreign
consultants coming to do their reporting for them, but they say it’s about
time we build our capacity in the region.
Thus, while there is strong resistance to the form of the donor-recipient model,
the participants utilizing civic environmentalism struggle to put forward an
alternative that is substantively different from the basic operational capacitybuilding tactics of ecological modernization.
Additionally, while there is a lot of hope in that community involvement has
seen a rise among project requirements, many peripheral organizations that
utilize the civic environmentalism discourse are skeptical, at best, as to the
impact on communities’ lives. One participant stated:
I think consultation is actually really important, if done effectively, it can
actually lead to better outcomes … I’ve seen those consultations happen
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and I’m judging from an outsider’s perspective and I’m just thinking like
this just sounds … it doesn’t sound genuine. I’m left thinking, “What now?”
I’ve been left thinking that, and I wonder as a community member if you’re
like, “Oh this is just what we’ll have to do to get our next bit of funding for
the project,” rather than actually feeling they really matter in that
discussion. I don’t know, I can’t speak on behalf of communities’
experiences, but it’d be very interesting to go and ask them. And they will
definitely say, “We’re thankful to our donors.” And yes, you are for your
money, but do you really feel your needs are being met and the project is
structured the way you want and monitored the way you want, and all
these things that can actually give the community a voice? It’s very
difficult.
There was an apparent struggle among many participants who felt as if
developments within the status quo might be hopeful, but did not go nearly far
enough in their current form. In other words, while civic environmentalism is
growing in strength, somewhat, it still felt to many as a peripheral discourse that
was perfunctory rather than impactful.
Three Environmental Discourses in Conversation
In the space of Pacific Island climate change governance, these three
discourses—green governmentality, ecological modernization, and civic
environmentalism in both their strong and weak forms—appealed to different
constructions of power, authority, and knowledge (Table 6). Green
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governmentality, in both its strong and weak forms, appealed to expert authority
and scientific knowledge to produce and uphold its power. The expertise was
grounded in the ability to produce global types of scientific knowledge. Power
was located in knowledge institutions and the administrative state for the weak
form of the discourse, while the strong form moved power slightly out to the
public through knowledge communication.
Additionally, ecological modernization was focused on the rational-legal
authority (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999) embedded in an operational knowledge of
development. This authority is “invested in legalities, procedures, and rules”
through bureaucratization in the classification, fixing of meanings, and diffusion of
norms (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 707). In other words, this authority came
through the operational elements of development—the frameworks, standards,
and conventions to follow—in global, regional, and local funding and project
requirements. Under a weak, technocratic version of the discourse, development
partners that fund and set the criteria for development practices had power,
along with those implementing government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs that
carried out the projects on the ground. For the strong, more democratic version
of ecological modernization, civil society organizations were brought in as a
structured public participation mechanism for implementation.
Finally, civic environmentalism appealed to practical authority and
contextual knowledge in both its strong and weak forms. According to Abers and
Keck, “Practical authority is a kind of power in which the capabilities to solve
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problems and recognition by others allows an actor to make decisions that others
follow” (2013, p. 7). This type of authority occurs with regular, successful
engagement in the network, sustained by knowledge of the local context. The
desired location of power in the weak form was in institutionalized civil society,
while the strong form called for a more complete decentralization that denies the
predominance of development.
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Table 6: Power, authority, and knowledge in environmental discourses.
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While they are presented here as being distinct, there was overlap in the
participants’ discussions of climate change in the Pacific (Fig. 6). Central
organizations that primarily engaged with green governmentality also utilized
elements of ecological modernization by discussing the need to support
operational capacity to implement their scientific findings. Correspondingly, the
central and semi-peripheral organizations that used ecological modernization
also appealed to scientific knowledge as it was needed to obtain funding. Civic
environmentalism made its way into green governmentality and ecological
modernization in similar ways—green governmentality focused on the increased
communication of science, while ecological modernization emphasized the need
for local inclusion for project implementation. Civic environmentalism took on
elements of green governmentality by including the need for scientific knowledge
in decision-making and ecological modernization by also discussing local
involvement in development project implementation.
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Figure 6: The relationship between green governmentality, ecological
modernization, and civic environmental discourses.

While there is some overlap amongst participants using each of the three
discourses, the degree of integration varied. Green governmentality and
ecological modernization upheld each other through regular and sustained
engagement between organizations that fostered shared discursive
constructions. Due to the fact that civic environmentalism is utilized primarily by
organizations toward the periphery of the network, it has experienced a more
limited uptake by other central and semi-peripheral organizations. In fact, the
integration of civic environmentalism into green governmentality and ecological
modernization is a relatively new phenomenon, according to participants. As one
participant from a central organization described the shift:
we are hoping we would set up a whole new engagement with the NGOs
to align with their work, and the NGOS typically don’t … one of the
reasons that we haven’t worked with them is because we’re climate
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scientists and we do climate science. They most do climate adaptation,
disaster risk management, and so forth with their work. And we sort of just
said, “Oh, well, they’ll get the science along with everybody, and they’ll do
something with it.” Now we’re realizing that if we work more closely with
them right from the onset … because they’ve got connections and
credibility with stakeholders that we can’t even begin to dream about, and
we want those same people to have a better understanding of the science
is saying about the climate and climate change in particular. It seems
logical now that we would start talking to NGOs to help work with them to
actually try to get our message across to the subnational scale. This is like
the provincial governments, local community, and so forth. So, we haven’t
done much in the past but we would definitely see NGOs as an emerging
sort of stakeholder for us as science providers.
While still strongly identifying with the scientific knowledge production elements
of green governmentality, this participant demonstrated the recent shift of more
central organizations toward acknowledging the need for broader inclusion in
decision-making and governance. While still limited, it is considered a growing
field of discussion and practice in the Pacific.
Part of the reason for this shift could be a degree of disappointment with
the impacts of top-down governance. Participants from central organizations
were aware of the feelings of disgruntlement held by communities over the top-
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down governance efforts that had previously been the norm. As one participant
stated:
We got some communities now and we say we are here from [central
organization], and they are like, “That’s impressive.” But not anymore, no
one cares anymore. It’s, “You are here to waste our time some more. You
are here to talk about your big fancy sweet potatoes that can withstand
salty soils and water-logged soils, but at the end of the three-year period
you are gone, and we never hear from you again.” So, I think people in the
community have been quite adversely affected by projects.
This sense of short, one-off projects was shared by other peripheral
organizations, as well. One participant from a peripheral organization put it this
way:
Because there are a lot of piloting, piloting of models and projects. After
that, that’s it. Another funding comes, let’s pilot it again. And when you go
to the community, then there’s, “Oh, we’re here to do a baseline survey on
…” “Oh! We are over-surveyed. Where’s all the information that was
collected? The same information that you wanted the Ministry of Health, or
the local NGO, or the government came and collected it. Where’s that
information? So, you guys aren’t coordinating.” And I think one of the
lessons we’ve learned is that we’re too focused on piloting, piloting,
piloting. And I think some of the funding coming in are too regional so you
could have 90% of the funding stuck at the regional and national level.
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The focus was on building the resilience of community, but they only get
10% of that funding, which is just loose change. So that means you don’t
really have that impact.
This acute understanding of the challenges in current governance structures and
mechanisms could be bolstering the uptake of democratization of knowledge and
agenda-setting in governance priorities, either through stronger green
governmentality and ecological modernization discourses or through more civic
environmentalism in the network. In other words, the vocal assertion of
disenfranchisement by communities could be pushing organization to localize
their practices. Additionally, the success of the local power narrative in COP21
negotiations (Denton, 2017) could be seen as producing and produced by this
local shift in governance priorities. This idea will be taken up more fully in the
next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Climate Empire
Introduction
A participant shared with me an interesting perspective on the challenges
of power within the Pacific. First, he drew a picture of a Fijian in traditional attire.
He said, “See, they are half-naked.” He then drew a missionary in a suit and tie,
and he said, “See, here they come in, and they are very clothed.” He then drew
another suited figure, and stated, “So, the Fijians followed the way of the
missionary, they dressed up, and they wore their suits.” He then vaguely drew
another figure.
And now, we have all these people in the movies and around. And they
are half-naked again! And what do Fijians do? They have started to be
half-naked. So, these people from the outside, they have influence. And if
they take away climate change, then don’t you think things will go back to
the way they were before?
This participant discussed the dramatic transformations surrounding the global
emphasis on climate change on Pacific Island society, finance, and the
environment, itself. He expressed a deep concern that at some point climate
change would no longer capture the global imagination, and the Pacific Islands
would be left with the repercussions.
Governance of the climate has reshaped global pathways of power in
numerous ways. Practitioners and decision-makers are networking together on
issues of climate change at local and global levels in ways that shape both the
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global and the local spaces in remarkable ways. The networks I have visualized
so far in this dissertation have been presented as static, representing a crosssection of spaces and ideas at a particular point in time. However, the networks
that these static visualizations represent are, in reality, constantly shifting and
reacting to the spaces in which they exist. They shift and change as
organizations vie for power in the form of funding, control over rules and
standards, and influence in decision-making spaces (Grewal, 2008; Hadden,
2015). While the histories of these networks influence their trajectory (similar to
path dependence (Pierson, 2000)), the networks are not fixed. As Miller and
Edwards have argued, “global environmental governance…functions by means
of new, complex, hybrid forms of knowledge and power still being forged—and
therefore still fragile, negotiable, and worthy of our most careful and creative
attention” (2004, p. 6).
This chapter works to better understand the structure and fluidity of global
environmental governance in the Pacific Islands. First, I conceptualize the impact
of what I call Climate Empire on the social and environmental realities of the
Pacific Islands. Climate Empire builds on the work of Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri (2000) along with a reconsideration taken on briefly by Clark Miller (2004)
to explore the way in which the global systems of information and communication
are restructuring the way the earth is governed. I then look specifically at Climate
Empire within the Pacific Islands, paying particular attention to the way in which
Climate Empire has been built through the legitimation of global knowledge,
147

funding practices, and regionalism. Additionally, I explore the implications of
Climate Empire for the way in which nature is constructed and governed within
the Pacific Islands. Finally, I look to the relationship between local and global
elements of climate knowledge and its impact on the production of Climate
Empire.
Empire
The concept of empire has been used by scholars of anthropology,
literature, history, and political science through a variety of lenses and settings
throughout the years.17 While showing the ways in which empire has been used
across the disciplines, Pitt’s (2010) extensive review of the concept of empire
demonstrates its wide-ranging uses and definitional challenges, yet emphasizes
the social stratification and the inherent inequalities embedded in empire. Doyle,
alternatively, provides a usefully straightforward definition: “Empires are
relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the
effective sovereignty of other political societies” (1986, p. 19).
While empires have a long history—Persian, Turkish, Mongolian, and
others—much of the recent work in empire has dealt specifically with the
historically imperial powers of European countries and the more recent American
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While I use the concept of Empire loosely here to discuss global climate regimes, it is
important to note that historic empires have brought about violence and death, to
which the challenges of Climate Empire do not even come close to comparing. I hope to
honor the history of those that have died at the hands of agents of empires, while
exploring a subtle way in which these logics and mechanics of control share similarities
with the climate regime.
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expansions (Pitts, 2010). European empire and liberalism are in many ways
“mutually constitutive” (Armitage 2004a, p. 602, as cited in Pitts, 2010), where
the tenets of self-government, economic growth and stability, and moral
individualism are incorporated into exported forms of Western modernity. While
cultural divides and differing ideas for governance brought substantial challenges
to Western expansionism, in many ways, compliance with empire was brought
about through non-Western elites’ professionalization and internalization of
universalist values (Bull & Watson, 1984). This final understanding of the role of
elites in building and maintaining an empire provides a sort of bridge to
understanding the way in which empire is explored in this dissertation.
While states play a vital role in the governance of the globe, Hardt and
Negri (2000) present a different, less state-centric understanding of Empire in
their work by the same name. Hardt and Negri argue that the sovereignty of
states has declined post-World War II, and its place has been taken by the
governmentality, or logic of rule, that they call Empire. “Our basic hypothesis is
that sovereignty has taken a new form, composed of a series of national and
supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule. This new global form
of sovereignty is what we call Empire” (ibid., p. xii). These ‘organisms’ go beyond
traditional spaces of authority to include multinational corporations and
supranational organizations (e.g. the International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
United Nations, the G8, etc.) that police economic production and set themselves
above space, time, and the social order. In other words, they move fluidly
149

throughout global territories, presenting an ahistorical and apolitical approach to
governing.
Less than a state or set of states imposing their will, this understanding of
Empire functions as an “imperial machine” shaping and pushing networks of
information and communication. Empire works in and through a master narrative
of universality and inclusivity that, following Foucault’s biopower (2003, 2009,
2010),18 is interested in populations rather than people. In other words, instead of
policing individual bodies and actions, it deals with efforts to classify, standardize,
and normalize whole populations. “Power, as it produces, organizes; as it
organizes, it speaks and expresses itself as authority. Language, as it
communicates, produces commodities but moreover creates subjectivities, puts
them in relation, and orders them” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 33). Empire is less
concerned with the impact of traditional forms of sovereign authority, and more
with the forms of language, knowledge, and categorization that influence the
internal realities of people across the globe.
One of the primary ways that the production of Empire is made possible,
according to Hardt and Negri, is through informatization, or the transfer of the
economy from the disciplinary factory to knowledge, communication, and
affective services. Through this transfer, an information economy has emerged
that is reliant on networks of cooperation and communication imbedded in
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Foucault’s biopower, however, does differ substantially. See Dean (2003) for a
critique of Hardt and Negri’s usage.
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systems of immaterial labor. The global networks that construct the information
economy form a decentered and deterritorialized apparatus of rule that runs
throughout all spaces of production. This stands in stark contrast to the material
forms of labor and production highlighted in Karl Marx’s work (1978), thus
requiring new forms of administration.
While this network works in and through all spaces of production, Hardt
and Negri also argue, “[t]he decentralization and global dispersal of productive
processes and sites, which is characteristic of the postmodernization or
informatization of the economy, provokes a corresponding centralization of the
control over production” through a virtual panopticon of monitoring and regulation
(2000, p. 297). In other words, in response to the dispersal of spaces of
production, Empire exerts a corresponding centralization of efforts to police these
networks. It is through this constant expansion and contraction that Empire
creates its own crises. However, due to the inevitability of micro-conflicts in the
networks that form Empire, Hardt and Negri refer instead to “corruption” (ibid., p.
202), which they see as more representative of the continual state of disruption
than a central crisis.
While Empire could be understood as a bleak prognosis, Hardt and Negri
also emphasize that the networks of information and communication made to
service Empire also function to create a new political constituency, the
“multitude.” The multitude’s collective power is made possible through the new
global pathways shaped by the sovereign. In other words, the connectivity that is
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necessary for Empire’s rule also means that constituents can form relationships
with one another and create new forms of democratic rule. Their power extends
democratic possibilities through and beyond traditional state boundaries to
encircle the globe.
Colonial Histories and Empire
While Hardt and Negri devote little time to discussing Empire’s relation to
colonialism, the use of the Pacific Islands as a case study in this dissertation
makes this a particularly compelling relationship. Colonial rule existed with a
single point of domination and resistance: the administrative state as the arm of
imperial power in the colonies (Storey, 1997). This space was governed in part
through the alternating forces of coercion and threat of revolt. Alternatively, the
power within Empire is deterritorialized, scattered across multiple spaces.
Instead of letting pressure build to where coercion is required, Empire is able to
keep coercion at a minimum by virtue of its deterritorialized and decentered
nature.
An interesting analogy for these different forms of crises would be in the
differences between tomato sauce and broth when boiling. The viscosity of
tomato sauce means that, even with only moderate heat, large bubbles tend to
form and erupt. It is thus necessary to constantly stir the sauce in order to pop
the bubbles before they get to the surface. If left alone, boiling tomato sauce
makes a mess. Similarly, the tension created in the tight form of control with the
colonial state meant that, without constant attention, the pressure built in
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resistance was quite large and caused eruptions that required coercion to
contain. Thus, the crises of colonialism were acute. Alternatively, with similar
heat, boiling broth creates smaller bubbles. These smaller bubbles can let out air
a little at a time, making it less likely the bubbles will ever build large enough to,
at the point of eruption, make a mess. The governmentality of Empire creates an
unending number of spaces at which pressure can build and be released without
the need for (as much) coercion. Thus, the corruption of Empire is less damaging
to its overall structure. This is, admittedly, a bit simplified. Colonial governments
have long relied on science and technology within their colonies to shore up their
power in ways that have similarities to the efforts put forward by Empire
(Anderson, 2006). However, this differentiation will be discussed in more detail
when discussing the Pacific Islands as a case study.
Furthering Empire
The critiques to Hardt and Negri are noteworthy (Passavant & Dean,
2004; Sprague, 2011). First, their limited attention to the continued role of the
state limits their applicability to modern day forms of governance (Sprague,
2011). Although some argue that governance is now “post-sovereign”
(Karkkainen, 2004), this may be an overstatement. The transformation of
sovereignty in an age of global relations is not solely a state-constraining force, it
is also enabling (Weiss, 2005). New relations of ‘entwinement’ with other global
power networks at transnational and supranational levels that can actually
reinforce, while admittedly transforming, the role of domestic institutions in
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upholding global power relations. As Jessop (2004) argues, deterritorialization is
not causing states to cede sovereignty, but rather it is encouraging them to
increase their efforts toward metagovernance: redesigning markets,
constitutional change and juridical re-regulation of organizational forms and
objectives, organizing conditions for self-organization, and collibration, or using
the tension between two social groups to achieve policy aims. “What we are
witnessing is the rescaling of the complexities of governance, rather than the
rescaling of the sovereign state or the emergence of just one more arena in
which national states pursue national interests” (Jessop, 2004, p. 67).
Understanding state sovereignty in this way, while a conceptual break from Hardt
and Negri, can help to better frame issues at play within international
governance, particularly within postcolonial spaces like the Pacific Islands.
When looking to the Global South, Empire faces further challenges. Hardt
and Negri’s attestation of the “smoothness” and “immanence” of Empire not
applicable under the fractured and incomplete nature of governance in the Global
South (Dunn, 2004). Specifically, Empire relies on the groundwork of modern
sovereignty—where “the nation sustains the sovereign by claiming to precede it”
(Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 101)—to build their new postmodern sovereign in
Empire. In other words, Empire as post-sovereign is borne out of a stable and
somewhat universal understanding of the sovereignty of the nation-state. The
challenge is that, with the colonial histories of many developing nations, modern
sovereignty was never fully established such that it must ‘give way’ to a post154

modern sovereignty (see Dunn (2004) regarding Africa). Thus, it is important to
avoid the pitfalls of a Eurocentric Empire by allowing for a “multiple and shifting
construction of sovereignty” (Dunn, 2004, p. 146) that takes seriously the
histories of spaces and does not succumb to a totalizing “smooth” postsovereignty.
With these critiques in mind, I seek in this dissertation to build on the
concept of Empire, rather than take it as presented. One particularly useful
perspective by which to further the concept of Empire comes from Clark Miller. In
taking Hardt and Negri’s work beyond the realm of economic production, Miller
argues that their work could be improved by paying attention to the science and
technology that creates and upholds the rules of the machine. He states:
Contra Hardt and Negri, if Empire exists, its power relies in the
construction of new systems for classifying, standardizing, organizing, and
ordering knowledge and people on a worldwide basis. These systems—at
once scientific, technological, social, and political—link together the
inhabitants of far flung networks, structuring the production and
reproduction of identities, values, and bodies (Bowker & Star, 1999). This
was the fundamental insight of Foucault’s work on the normalizing,
disciplinary technologies of the prison and the sanitarium and the experts
who designed their practices and architecture (see, e.g., Foucault, 1973).
Thus, as we seek to understand the constitutional foundations of global
governance, we must not turn to the United Nations General Assembly—
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or even the Security Council—but rather to the Specialized Agencies, and
to the growing array of public and private, formal and informal institutions
of scientific, technical, and technological production and harmonization
that lie outside the UN. It is in these institutions that Empire’s regulatory
and normative armature is being forged. (Miller, 2004, p. 81)
This understanding of Empire allows for a deeper analysis into the knowledges at
play in producing and reproducing Empire. He argues that this global order
resides in:
first, the growing tendency of people all over the world to frame policy
problems in specifically global terms; and, second, the casting of actions
in specifically technical terms as a strategy for bypassing traditional
concerns with sovereignty in the world system. (ibid., p. 82)
In seeking to understand the globalism at the heart of this Empire, Miller looks
less at material flows (Keohane & Nye, 2001) and more to role of building a
global imaginary (e.g. orientalism (Said, 1978) and the making of the nation
(Anderson, 2006)). This global imaginary makes knowledge of the earth feasible
by organizing systems to produce and reproduce the globe (Miller & Edwards,
2001). Technical assistance is the practice of power that bolsters the authority of
these global governance institutions.
Miller’s attention to the full range of systems at work in the Empire—
scientific, technological, social, and political—along with his emphasis on the
practices of power can make the concept of Empire more useful for analyzing the
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current system of governance. This expansion allows for greater nuance than the
“smooth” and “global” Empire, and takes seriously the fragmentation that occurs
in the reproduction of Empire in multiple spaces. In other words, by taking
seriously the rules of the imperial machine, it becomes easier to see the way in
which those rules shift, change, and are differently interpreted in multiple spaces.
This is particularly evident within the global systems of climate change
governance.
Climate Empire
In this section, I explore the processes occurring globally and within the
Pacific Islands regarding climate change governance under the concept of
Climate Empire. Climate Empire is the network of knowledge and communicative
services that imagine, build, and administer the globe. This includes the
scientific, technological, social, and political systems that make the climate
legible and governable. Following Miller, Climate Empire includes the “public and
private, formal and informal institutions of scientific, technical, and technological
production and harmonization” (2004, p. 81) that produce the technical and
bureaucratic knowledge and procedures meant to control anthropogenic climate
change.
These networks of communicative and knowledge-producing institutions
are not free-flowing, but rather are grounded by the “regulatory and normative
armature” (Miller, 2004, p. 81) of global climate change governance. The
regulatory armature is found in the ability of institutions to deem what is and is
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not deemed authoritative knowledge for work in the Climate Empire. The master
narrative of universality and inclusivity within Empire produces a normative drive
toward biopolitical control over the earth and its inhabitants. State sovereignty is,
thus, transformed by the governmentality of Climate Empire.
In this understanding, power is less about the disciplinary or juridical
power of governments over constituents. Instead, power “is deployed and
exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98), where the
entire network of climate change practitioners and decision-makers is wrapped
up in the circulation of power. This does not assume that Climate Empire is a
post-sovereign space, nor that it is smooth. Rather, it is a space of both
domination and renegotiation among multiple actors.
In the same way as Empire is the “non-place” of power in relations of
production (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 190), Climate Empire encompasses the
whole globe as its ‘territory.’ Climate Empire has set itself as a policing force
above space, time, and the social order. The climate itself is constructed as a
global and globalizing force (Jasanoff & Martello, 2004; Miller & Edwards, 2001),
thus providing space for Climate Empire to cross sovereign boundaries through a
deterritorialized and decentered apparatus of rule. In other words, because
climactic changes are unable to be studied and solved on a state-by-state basis,
global networks of climate knowledge and communication are necessary to meet
the challenge of climate change, as presented by Climate Empire.
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Climate Empire gains authority by exploiting an apolitical discourse, as the
purveyors of instrumental solutions to global, technical problems (Demeritt,
2001). In other words, the authority of Climate Empire is fostered by the
expectation that decisions should defer to scientific expertise and bureaucratic
structures. Scientific, technological, social, and political systems form the
“engineering rules” of the imperial machine that is Climate Empire. In other
words, the scientific view of the earth, the technologies we use to measure it, the
social ways in which we relate to it and one another, and the political systems by
which we seek to govern it all work to produce and reproduce the Climate
Empire.
Efforts to know the earth rely on a global imaginary that is created and
upheld through networks of climate communication. In order to police the climate
multitude, Climate Empire’s panopticon comes through authoritative science
(Bocking, 2004), and its ability to monitor, evaluate, and regulate knowledge
production according to the standards of unanimous, quantitative, generalized,
and conducted according to scientific process. As Bocking has described, “The
authority of science … is not simply self-evident; it is a phenomenon embedded
within environmental politics, constructed and asserted whenever participants in
environmental politics require it to support their positions” (ibid., p. 10). It is
upheld through administrative rationalism, or the process of “seeking, with the
guidance of technical expertise, rational and efficient solutions to the problems of
society, translating the authority of science into political power” (ibid., p. 21).
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Climate Empire thus polices what is considered authoritative knowledge. It does
this by using administrative rationalism to not only require authoritative science
for its own activities, but also to legitimize the use of authoritative science as the
final say in decision-making in its subjects’ eyes. As Agrawal has pointed out,
“[M]odern forms of power and regulation achieve their full effects not by forcing
people toward state-mandated goals but by turning them into accomplices”
(2005, p. 217). Forms of climate knowledge are thus taken up by people as they
seek to meet global requirements for resources and eventually become
internalized as legitimate ways of knowing the earth.
This is not to say that the Climate Empire is somehow outside or distinct
from the productive machine of the Empire. In fact, governance of the earth is
tightly interwoven with the professionalization, economization, and overall
neoliberalization of productive systems throughout the earth (Bakker, 2010;
Castree, 2008). Specifically viewing climate change diplomacy and governance
as functioning under a Climate Empire, however, can provide a different
perspective on the ways in which the imperial machine of Empire governs the
globe.
Local and Global Construction of Climate Empire
Globally, climate information flows through networks that are primarily
dominated by a relatively closed group of white, male climate change scientists
and practitioners from industrialized nations (Barnett & Campbell, 2010). This
allows for relative ease within these spaces to police the types of knowledge
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considered legitimate and maintain the authority of Climate Empire (an exception
being the “climate deniers” that many times come from these same spaces).
However, knowledge cannot stay at this global level and be useful for
overcoming climate change challenges. While Climate Empire can be seen
purely in global terms, the local and global actually work together in producing
and reproducing the Climate Empire. This is primarily accomplished through the
relocalization of information that is a necessary component of climate knowledge.
As described by Miller:
Technical assistance works as a two-way street. Data collection networks
developed by these institutions provide detailed information for
increasingly sophisticated models of global systems and processes. At the
same time, these networks help relocalize global knowledge in a variety of
ways: (1) translating and extrapolating the outputs of global models into
locally relevant information; (2) transmitting and transplanting this locally
relevant information from sites of production to sites of consumption; and
(3) helping recipients interpret and make sense of information in relation to
local or national policy. (2004, p. 83)
The relocalization of knowledge, then, occurs as the outputs of global technical
models are reintegrated into the spaces from which their inputs came (Fig. 7).
The relocalization of knowledge reconstructs local categories and
representations by working to meet global requirements. The local also plays an
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important role in reshaping these spaces, as knowledge is gathered through data
collection networks and incorporated into global models.19
Figure 7: Diagram illustrating the knowledge transfer within Climate Empire.

Thus, the local and global are not pitted against each other at ends of the
spectrum, but rather are co-constituted as data is locally collected, globally
analyzed, and relocalized within polices and projects. As Hardt and Negri
describe it, “In many characterizations the problem rests on a false dichotomy
between the global and the local, assuming that the global entails
homogenization and undifferentiated identity whereas the local preserves
heterogeneity and difference” (2000, p. 44). They call instead for a more nuanced
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Miller’s work deals with the transformation of the global by the local limitedly,
but this topic is taken up more in the “Relocalization of Knowledge and
Reshaping the Climate Empire” section of this chapter.
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understanding of the relation between the two. This chapter seeks to do just that.
While the previous chapters of this dissertation have presented local and global
as positioned on opposite ends of the spectrum, this chapter works to reconsider
the creation of both the local and the global under a network of relations. The
next section is concerned with the way in which Climate Empire is structured
within the Pacific Islands. I will then look to the way in which relocalizing
knowledge impacts Climate Empire in ways that have been heretofore
underexplored.
Building the Pacific Island Climate Empire
The colonial legacies of the Pacific Islands are still palpable within
governance in the region. An emphasis on vulnerability, lack of capacity, and
powerlessness is evident in the speech and practices of actors, particularly those
external to the region. Climate change governance in the region is ripe with
“assumptions about scale (large global forces literally and metaphorically
drowning small islands); power (social-ecological drivers of vulnerability which
overwhelm weak local systems); and knowledge (models and indexes are a sine
qua non for decision making)” (Barnett & Campbell, 2010; p. 2). While these
views are challenged by some (a topic taken up later in this chapter), they
directly impact what is understood as possible and desirable in the region.
These views of power, authority, and knowledge are mirrored in the global
elements of the narratives and discourses in Chapters 3 and 4 of this
dissertation. In Chapter 3, the villain of the global technical narrative was lack of
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capacity, resources, and scientific information. As discussed in Chapter 4,
organizations that used the green governmentality discourse framed capacity
challenges as a lack of scientific knowledge and technical capabilities, while
organizations that used ecological modernization discourse were concerned with
the lack of bureaucratic capacity necessary to meet external donor funding
requirements. While focused on slightly different operational elements of climate
change governance, these ways of speaking all share the view that legitimate
decision-making occurs through the use of scientific and bureaucratic knowledge,
and that a lack of those particular types of capacity is the foundation of the
problem in the Pacific.
These ways of speaking about and governing climate change have, over
time, built Climate Empire. Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands has come about
through three main processes. First, informatization of the climate has ensured
that the scientific and technical expertise remains at the forefront of decisionmaking. Second, financing for climate change governance has cemented colonial
legacies and ensured that Western logics of rule remain pertinent to Pacific
Island decision-making. Finally, regionalism within the Pacific Islands has
fostered a focal point for these logics of rule, fortifying the networks of knowledge
and communication, while also deepening the policing capabilities for Climate
Empire. Each of these areas are taken up below.
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Informatization
Informatization, again, is the process behind the production of the
information economy through knowledge, communication, and affective services.
Within Pacific Island Climate Empire, knowledge networks work to gather local
climate information, deliver it to global information processing spaces, and
relocalize it. In these spaces, scientific and technocratic understandings of the
climate and its inhabitants are required in order to ensure efficiency across the
dispersed transnational and global spaces in which the nodes of the network are
situated. In other words, due to the multi-scalar and distributed production of
climate knowledge—both regionally within the Pacific Islands and globally—
authoritative science is privileged for its ease of translation and scalability.
By forming climate change governance around these models and indexes
that accompany authoritative science, efforts to boost scientific, bureaucratic,
and technical capacity have been pushed to the forefront of governance, while
the adaptive capacity of community interventions has been largely ignored
(Barnett & Campbell, 2010). This has left many of the central Pacific Island
climate practitioners privileging bureaucratic and scientific knowledges over local
constructions of climate vulnerability in order to meet the capacity constraints
produced by informatization.
Additionally, global requirements have pushed governance in the region to
form in particular ways due to the ill-adaptive ways of informatization. As one
participant stated:
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[UNFCCC] demand[s] countries to put in place frameworks, national and
regional frameworks on climate change, national adaptation plans on
climate change, national policies on climate change. So that that’s an
outside-driven problem. So, when countries follow those instructions, they
silo climate change as a sector, which in fact is not a sector.
In other words, UNFCCC’s drive for clear bureaucratic structures pushes
countries to consider climate change as external to the other issues and
challenges being faced as a region. This silo-ing effect of outside influence was
criticized by many of the participants with whom I spoke. Many participants
stated that an integrated approach was the only way they could see climate
change issues actually being addressed. However, the high levels of expertise
required by the informatization of climate change in the Pacific stood as a
formidable barrier to greater levels of integration.
Financing
Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands is, in many ways, built by the flows of
resources in the region. While the discursive practices upholding the scientific
and bureaucratic authority do considerable work to legitimize the Climate Empire,
they gain much of their power through financial backing. The transformative
impact of global financing on governance in the region was discussed by many
participants, particularly within government agencies, but also in regional
organizations more broadly. One participant described the impact of GCF’s
globally regulated funding as follows:
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there was a GCF project approved Vanuatu that is like 40 million USD for
the MET office. I’ve worked with the MET office, and it’s like there’s
probably 5 people in the climate section. I just can’t imagine how that’s
gonna distort the MET office compared to other government departments.
How that’s gonna exacerbate the differences between … well anyway, I
guess this is all part and parcel of the climate change space.
This individual also stated:
In relation to the funding, again, what I’m interested in is some of these
projects are so … they almost reinforce the silo-ing of climate change
ministries and create empire-building within the countries themselves,
within the climate change ministries.
Funneling unprecedented quantities of money into government departments
bolsters the ability of Climate Empire to shape Pacific Islands governance
according to its own image.
In the Pacific Islands, global and regional organizations discuss the need
for states to be at the forefront of decision-making. In practice, however, states’
interests are many times dictated by the requirements of funding. Traditional
donor partners—including post-colonial states—along with global bodies such as
the UN agencies, the Global Environment Facility [GEF], and others, provide
much of the funding for the region through a variety of bilateral, multilateral, and
regional funding mechanisms (Atteridge & Canales, 2017). While donors’
activities vary considerably, many funding requirements tax the capabilities and
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capacities of Pacific Islanders in ways that can limit access. One participant
described a project in this way:
Fiji was the first one to get approved, the Green Climate Fund project. So,
overall that was a $200 million project that the Green Climate Fund was
gonna put in 40 million, because it’s in phases and the first phase cost 40
million. We did some calculation with the others whose work contributed to
this, and we reckoned it was 2 million for all the things that went down
[cost benefit analysis, gender analysis, economic and social safety
guards, environmental impact assessment, etc.]. 2 million in from 200
million up, not bad. But nobody in the region has 2 million lying around to
do that in the first place.
In other words, while there was a formidable amount of funding on the table,
GCF required $2 million of upfront investment in research to access the funds
that they may or may not receive in the end, a considerable barrier for many
Pacific Island countries. Participants regularly discussed this type of issue. The
series of bureaucratic, scientific, and technical boxes needing to be checked off
in order to receive financing took up valuable time and energy, while ensuring
that Western logics of rule remain pertinent to Pacific Island decision-making.
The bureaucratic, scientific, and technical conditions to be met for
financing sediments the imperial power of Climate Empire. Funders from external
to the region gain dominance over decision-making spaces by holding the keys
necessary to access resources. They determine the rules of the game, ensuring
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their requirements are met through administrative functions and the production
and policing of authoritative knowledge. While there are conversations about
changing these forms of funding (as one participant stated, “This absolute
appetite for rethinking [the donor-recipient] relationship in the Pacific.”), there
remains a power imbalance between funder requirements and the ability of
Pacific Island states to determine their own climate futures. This is reinforced
through efforts toward regionalism.
Regionalism
Much of the informatization and financing within the Pacific Islands occurs
through regional governance efforts, particularly through CROP agencies. As
many states are small, regional agencies concentrate the capacity of the region
by drawing top Pacific Island and international talent into their organizations.
Repeating again from the introduction of this dissertation, CROP agencies were
described by one participant as a “decolonization process that warped into
technical assistance.” This relationship to the colonial histories of the Pacific
Islands impacts the current governance efforts. While CROP agencies are
mandated to receive instructions from states, the colonial legacies within CROP
agencies is evident in the partial or full participation of states such as Australia,
New Zealand, and others. This is not to say that outside states control these
decision-making spaces, but rather they make for complicated and, at times,
contentious relationships.
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CROP agencies gain much of their regional power by being a funnel for
climate financing in the region. The bureaucratic structures that form the rules for
finances within the Pacific put pressure on the limited bureaucratic capacities of
organizations, thus privileging the CROP agencies’ ability to pool the region’s
resources. For instance, the process to become an Accredited Entity for Green
Climate Fund [GCF] funding is challenging, expensive in terms of time and
resources, and yet it is necessary to access the billions in global financing
available through GCF. SPREP was the first regional entity able to commit the
time and resources to achieve this accreditation. This put this CROP agency in a
unique position to determine what projects would and would not receive this
financing.
Colonial legacies and control over finances have also placed CROP
agencies in the position to lead the data collection networks (Miller, 2004) that
serve to push locally gathered information into global climate models. This is
accomplished through technical assistance programs that work to increase the
capacity of states and local knowledge producers. The technical assistance
provided by CROP agencies to connect the global and the local plays a large role
in policing knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 3, CROP agencies many times
serve as ‘boundary organizations’ in the Pacific. They play this role by lending or
taking away authority from different ways of knowing. This is not to say that they
work at the boundary of the network, but rather that they form a boundary
between different portions of the network. CROP agencies hold central positions
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within the Pacific Islands climate change network (Chapter 4), but also serve
significant brokerage functions in the network. For instance, SPREP and SPC,
two of the CROP agencies most focused on climate change, have gatekeeper20
scores approximately 3.5 times larger than any other organization in the network.
The brokerage scores allow regional entities to form a boundary between the
local community information and strategies and the global donor bodies that
allows them to be a gatekeeper for the type of knowledge that is deemed
acceptable.
CROP agencies could thus be understood as agents of Climate Empire,
functioning at a regional level to institutionalize the global technical logic of rule.
Through bureaucratic and technical expertise, CROP agencies reinforce the
requirements for particular types of knowledge and capacity that have authority in
global intergovernmental organizations and post-colonial states. This type of
decision-making can impact the sovereignty of states through subtle means. As
one participant described the role of CROP agencies:
a lot of outcome documents and communiqués are written by the agencies
for themselves, it seems. Just to justify their ongoing work, rather than a
proper discussion and debate on a hard decision that needs to be made,

20

Gatekeeper scores are determined by the number of instances of BàAàA,
where A and B are separate groups in the network and the middle position is the
broker. For instance, AustraliaàSPREPà
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and what that means for the countries to make that decision. That kind of
conversation. It seems to be about just agencies justifying their existence.
The decision-making within the region, thus, tends to more heavily reside in the
activities of these agencies, rather than the countries’ informed decisions.
What makes this procedural control interesting in light of Climate Empire is
the ability to both extend the network and centralize control. Regionalization
makes for easier policing of the logics of rule at work within Climate Empire, as
CROP agencies can work as a focal point for multiple projects in multiple locales
simultaneously. The brokerage scores discussed earlier in this section
demonstrate their role in finance, where they channel funding from global actors
to local projects. Their connection to global financial flows, along with their work
on the ground, allows them to monitor the local representations of climate
change projects, thus extending the Climate Empire’s panopticon to multiple
levels. These elements of the Climate Empire impact both the social and
environmental realities of climate change governance in the Pacific Islands.
Climate Empire and Nature in the Pacific Islands
The discussion of immaterial labor formed through knowledge networks in
Climate Empire can leave behind the material realities relevant to production
(Sprague, 2011), particularly when considering production of the environment.
Another way in which this investigation of Climate Empire can shift away from
Hardt and Negri’s Empire is through a careful consideration of the material
elements of constructing and governing the climate.
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One example of this material relationship with nature comes in the form of
pigs. Pigs pay an interesting role in the social and environmental histories of the
Pacific. Products of migration as early as the fourth century A.D., pigs have
played an integral role in the survival of Polynesians. The pua’a (Polynesian
pig), was small, free-roaming, and relatively domesticated. As Maly, Pang, and
Burrows discuss:
Clearly, domesticated pua‘a carried strong cultural value in traditional
Hawai‘i. Aside from being an important possession and food source, an
oral tradition describes the adventures of Kamapua‘a (the pig child), a
powerful demi-god who ranged over the islands and into the sea. Even the
name of the traditional land management system, ahupua’a, refers directly
to the pua‘a and highlights the animal’s importance among the variety of
resources that were collected and offered during the annual mahakiki
tributes. (2013, p.2)
However, the modern pig shares little with the pua’a beloved by fourth century
Polynesians. The modern pig is a product of European immigration and is much
larger and feral, gradually moving further away from humans and into “pristine
upland forests” (ibid.). Conservation efforts have recently explored options to
remove these feral pigs from the land due to their non-native status along with
the environmental challenges they pose (East Maui Watershed Partnership,
n.d.). This is made even more relevant as climate change impacts the forests’
ability to recover from disturbances like the pig.
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One individual I spoke with, however, shared a different view. Luau feasts
that include kālua pigs cooked in an imu, or underground oven, are a critical part
of native Hawai’ian social connectivity. They provide a space to get together and
share abundance, and have served a variety of purposes throughout the
Polynesian history on the islands. During the collapse of the sugar cane industry,
native Hawai’ians were hit with high levels of unemployment, a particularly
vulnerable position with limited employment options. However, this period also
saw an increase in luaus, made possible by hunting the feral pigs around the
islands. The pigs thus offered an opportunity for the community to feed itself,
check in and reconnect, and make sure that everyone was getting the support
they needed to get through this challenging period. Additionally, the pig
represented the connectivity of the community—it had to be passed around to be
slaughtered, butchered, cooked, then passed out to the community. It served a
role as both the catalyst for the network and a practice of the network at the
same time.
While this story is specific to the US Hawai’ian islands, the sentiment was
shared by others I spoke with throughout the Pacific Islands. The individual who
shared this story was concerned with the inextricability of the social and
environmental networks. He discussed how any environmental management
actions had to be placed within their social contexts in order to capture potential
unintended consequences.
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As environmental concerns are subjugated to scientific and bureaucratic
expertise, nature becomes an ‘other’ (Scott, 1998) to be oriented in service of the
Climate Empire. In other words, instead of understanding nonhuman nature as a
player in governance networks through its activities and efforts for survival
(Latour, 2005; Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013), Climate Empire makes nature
into an object that can be “terraform[ed],” where “nature is approached as a
terrestrial infrastructure subject to state protection, management and domination”
(Bäckstrand & Lövbrand, 2006, p. 55). The construction of nature as separate
and controllable as opposed to integrated and fluid creates challenges for climate
change governance. While Climate Empire works to create a “terraform” project,
exerting control through governmentality onto social and environmental systems,
local constructions of nature in the Pacific Islands introduce fluidity, adaptability,
and responsiveness to governance of these systems. These competing
discourses and their resulting practices can have tangible impacts on social and
environmental governance. This misalignment is evident as knowledge is locally
collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized in the Pacific Islands under Climate
Empire.
Relocalization of Knowledge and Reshaping the Climate Empire
Following Judith Butler’s (1997) work, Agrawal argues, “although it is fair
to suggest that development discourses colonize subjects, surely they do not
colonize all subjects” (2005, p. 225). This is also true of Climate Empire’s efforts
within the Pacific Islands. Local and regional organizations in the Pacific Islands
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have made efforts to reframe power, opening up the climate change space to
include local strategies for governance (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this
dissertation). The split in the narrative of climate diplomacy mirrors a larger trend
of localization within environmental governance (Agrawal, 2005). Environmental
loss to recuperation, appropriation to resistance, these stories of a new
environmental governance mirror the post-colonial trend in discourse among
developing nations from domination to freedom and subjugation to power. They
are stories of liberation from the rigidity of the colonial master to the agency of
the ‘local,’ in whatever form that takes. However, the Pacific Islands’ localism still
struggles against the discourses of powerlessness embedded in colonial
legacies, focus on technical and bureaucratic capacities, and reliance on external
funding.
While Climate Empire works in and through global strategies to produce
and uphold their technical bureaucratic and scientific authorities, these global
spaces are pushed into contact with these local challenges through data
collection networks and efforts to relocalize knowledge. Data collection networks
gather local information in order to globally analyze it. The relocalization of
knowledge occurs within Climate Empire as climate information is communicated
throughout the network. Again, this is done through:
(1) translating and extrapolating the outputs of global models into locally
relevant information; (2) transmitting and transplanting this locally relevant
information from sites of production to sites of consumption; and (3)
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helping recipients interpret and make sense of information in relation to
local or national policy. (Miller, 2004, p. 83)
In the Pacific Islands, information on sea level rise, weather patterns, ocean
temperatures, marine species, etc., is meticulously gathered through data
collection networks, like the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS). GCOS
was established in 1992 in order to standardize and routinize climate
observations (Salinger et al., 2002). The Pacific Islands’ GCOS (PI-GCOS)
gathers climate information in-situ (more detailed than satellite data), and works
through a formal system for delivering that information to GCOS. Global
organizations like the World Meteorological Organisation and Intergovernmental
Oceanographic Commission are working directly with organizations like SPREP
and SPC to build the PI-GCOS data collection network. The information is then
analyzed at a global level according to statistically predictive climate models in
hopes of uncovering the true and correctable patterns of the globe. This globallymodeled data is then relocalized into Pacific Islands climate policy. The first
objective presented for the PI-GCOS is, “To continually advocate the importance
of GCOS observing systems to policy applications on the part of national
governments and other interested users (e.g. social, cultural and economic
implications)” (ibid., p. 7). Therefore, the relocalization is complete as PI-GCOS
interprets global climate information for national policy.
The relocalization of knowledge produces crises as local and global ways
of knowing come face to face. As local and global understandings of climate
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change in the Pacific Islands come into contact, resistance against the global
constructions of environmental governance is discernable. Particularly in my
interviews with participants from organizations at the periphery of the network,
the local/global disconnect was evident. As one individual stated:
How people from outside governments pretend that they know everything
in that region. They say, “we have the solutions to your problem.” When
you see most people talking about the solutions in the Pacific are the ones
from outside. So, sometimes I just wonder, these are crazy people!
The idea that an external actor—even an external actor with access to technical
knowledge and resources—could know the Pacific Islands well enough to speak
for them and offer definitive solutions was deemed laughable by many
participants. Communities can also feel confused or overwhelmed by the climate
work occurring in the region. As one participant stated:
I just think the way it’s structured right now makes it difficult for
communities to know whether their money is coming from the SPC,
SPREP, the UN … I don’t get the sense that they really know that. I heard
one of the communities say, “Well, we always know when we have to talk
about the project because we see the UN truck, and that’s how the
community knows.” Fair enough.
These challenges can cause disconnect in the ability of Climate Empire to work
in these localized spaces.
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While many times the local constructions of climate change can come in
contrast with global constructions, they are all still focused on a similar goal—to
alleviate the burden of challenges brought about by climate change. However,
the complex nature of climate change in the Pacific Islands makes this even
more of a challenge than in other places. As one individual I spoke with
described her work:
one community we went to said, ‘we need more knives.’ And they were
talking about climate change, and we were like, ‘what?’ And then we
realized it’s because they associate money coming from big institutions,
and then we’re there, so they are like, ‘we should ask for knives so we can
use this for fishing, agriculture or whatever.’ So, for them, this is a holistic
way of looking at the issues. It’s not like they’re worried about sea-level
risk. The way we break down issues, I don’t think it’s the same at all
because ‘this is my life, this is my experience, so it doesn’t really matter
what it affects…whether the soil is eroding or whether the sea-level is
rising. No matter is happening, this is how I experience this problem in my
life.’
In this case, local participants may question the relevance to climate change to
their lives at all. In fact, the focus on climate change may be seen as deferring
resources away from more immediate needs—knives—such that the imperial
imposition of Climate Empire is apparent. These levels of detachment between
global climate change and local realities—ranging from disconnected decision179

making to imperial imposition—presents a challenge as agencies work to
connect the global and local for the production and reproduction of the Climate
Empire.
It is in this space that CROP agencies become vitally important for the
production and reproduction of Climate Empire. CROP agencies function as
boundary organizations in order to mitigate the corruption formed from local
resistance. These boundary organizations mediate and facilitate the coproduction
of knowledge (Cash et al., 2006) in ways that may stifle, delegitimize, and
displace certain forms of knowledge (Lejano & Ingram, 2009) in order to
streamline knowledge processes. Boundary organizations, thus, work to police
Climate Empire by managing corruption in multiple spaces of data collection
networks and relocalization processes. This ensures that there is not a single
point of resistance, but multiple spaces of contestation. Returning again to the
analogy earlier in this chapter, while the “tomato sauce” of colonial forms of rule
required continuous attention, Climate Empire works in and through the “broth” of
regional governance by creating multiple points of pressure and pressure
alleviation. This can also be demonstrated through network structure, as is done
below (Fig. 8). Again, this is not a perfect analogy. Colonial powers many times
worked through regional elites (Bull & Watson, 1984) in ways that may mirror the
Climate Empire network approach. However, this is meant to exemplify a broader
shift in organizational power structures of control.
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Figure 8: Network visualizations of differing relations of power under colonial and
Empire rule.

While this could be analyzed under a unidirectional pattern of boundary
organizations conforming the local to the global requirements—fitting with the
traditional understanding of Empire—it is also important to consider the ways in
which these boundary organizations recalibrate global spaces to adapt to the
demands of the “multitude.” Relocalization of knowledge requires that global
spaces are capable of creating locally relevant information out of the global
climate models, while transmitting that information to sites of consumption where
it can be transformed into policies and practices. While the influence of colonial
legacies and financing in the Pacific Islands ensures that those local spaces are
transformed in ways that can accept the global climate information, the continued
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resistance of local spaces has caused reverberations that run throughout the
Climate Empire, all the way up to the global level.
Global projects are responding to these reverberations of resistance by
including varying degrees of local involvement in their projects. The REDD
program has become REDD+, now including good governance, equity, and the
roles of indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities. The Convention
for Biological Diversity is working to increase the “full and effective participation
of indigenous and local communities,” guided through an advisory committee
(Convention for Biological Diversity, no date, para. 1). The UN Climate
Secretariat has recently added the local communities and indigenous peoples
platform to inform decision-making (UNFCCC, 2017). This is not to say that these
programs have completely or even effectively brought local issues into their
decision-making, but rather that local resistance has encouraged shifts in their
programs.
One participant spoke of a project in the Pacific that addresses some of
these issues. Under pressure from states and local entities, agencies have
begun to invest in both the collection of local proverbs and the use of scientific
methodologies to adapt those local proverbs to the current state of the climate. In
other words, agencies are collecting these proverbs, verifying proverbs
scientifically, and then creating new proverbs that are relevant to changing
conditions. Interestingly, agencies have not stopped there. While the global
elements of climate change are still considered vitally important to understanding
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and acting upon the challenges ahead, experiences of climate change vary
across scales and spaces. A fisherman on the Fijian coastline will experience
dramatically different effects than a hunter in the Fijian hills. This type of detailed
scale is not currently possible with the climate models available. However,
agencies have begun to consider using the local proverbs to change the way in
which climate change is understood and studied to include the small-scale shifts
in local patterns.
While new, pilot-based, and lightly funded by Australian aid, this project
makes an interesting step. Pressure within the region has caused external
partners—like Australia—to fund projects that highlight local knowledge and
strategies in ways that may have previously been seen as somewhat illegitimate
under the global, technical solutions of Climate Empire. Again, the goal of this
project is to incorporate local knowledge into existing scientific models and
strategies. Therefore, these types of projects could alternatively be seen as
furthering the biopolitical (Foucault, 2003, 2009, 2010) control over local
populations. In projects like these, the panopticon of Climate Empire extends
further down into the local spaces, measuring, quantifying, and standardizing
experiences at all levels. Enlisting local participants in legitimizing the authority of
foreign rule occurred throughout the successful empires of the past (Storey,
1997), and is now repeated within Climate Empire. By using authoritative science
to validate and update local knowledge, it also extends the normalizing impact of
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Climate Empire. It is in this tension, space of corruption, and series of
contradictions that Climate Empire remains ripe for future exploration.
Conclusion
Using Climate Empire as a concept by which to explore the power,
authority, and knowledge within climate change governance in the Pacific Islands
can ensure that the complexity inherent in the network of local/global spaces is
properly considered. Grounded in the technical and scientific approaches to
climate change diplomacy and governance, Climate Empire gains authority by
utilizing apolitical discourse, bringing instrumental solutions to global, technical
problems. The informatization of climate change governance that fosters these
technical approaches, the use of financing to secure the use of Western logics of
rule, and the regionalization efforts that provide avenues for monitoring and
policing all work together to form the Climate Empire in the Pacific Islands. The
relocalization of knowledge, while providing depth for the reach of Climate
Empire, also provides space for local resistance to make space to transform the
globe.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations
Introduction
In a recent study of Tuvalu’s landmass, researchers found that, as
adaptive ecosystems, the islands of Tuvalu had actually grown over the last four
decades (Kench, Ford, & Owen, 2018). These findings produced a wide range of
reactions among recipients: hope among islanders, vindication among climate
deniers, or anger and frustration among Pacific Island climate negotiators,
depending on the recipient’s position (Friedman, 2018). In 2016, the Guardian
released a story entitled, “Five Pacific islands lost to rising seas as climate
change hits” (Anon., 2016). Immediately after, the publication released a
correction requested by the study’s authors, “Headlines 'exaggerated' climate link
to sinking of Pacific islands” (Mathiesen, 2016). These instances highlight the
fact that debates over knowledge within climate change diplomacy and
governance within the Pacific Islands are rarely that simple. The power and
authority produced by and productive of climate change knowledge means that
contestation is at the heart of the decision-making. One of the ways in which
these contests play out is through the ways of speaking about climate change
diplomacy and governance—the narratives that ground the stories of policy and
the discourses that frame climate change in historical contexts.
This dissertation explored the way that these issues of power, authority,
and knowledge are constructed and circulated through networks of climate
change practitioners and decision-makers in the Pacific Islands. Utilizing social
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network analysis, narrative, and discourse approaches, I focused on issues of
communication and collaboration in efforts to govern the globe—locally,
regionally, and globally. In this conclusion, I will provide a summary of the
dissertation, draw broad themes that run throughout the dissertation, and gather
together the recommendations for governance that were described by
participants.
Summary
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I explored the theories that could help to
explain the ways in which power, authority, and knowledge run throughout
transnational environmental governance networks in the Pacific Islands. First,
transnational governance was positioned as a multi-actor space that includes
non-state actors. Power was presented as productive, relational, distributed
throughout society, and expressed through the text and practices of discourses.
Power/knowledge—or the ways in which this productive, relational, and societal
discursive power is heavily embedded in regimes of knowledge and ways of
understanding the world—was used to orient the role of knowledge production in
formulating power relations. Networks were presented as a useful tool for
organizing the dynamics of power, authority, and knowledge within the multiactor space. Finally, I organized power, authority, and knowledge according to
traditional, bureaucratic, scientific, and practical relations.
In Chapter 3, I discussed the diplomatic efforts of the Pacific Islands in the
lead-up to COP21, particularly the declarations presented at the Pacific Island
186

Forum [PIF] Summit and Pacific Islands Development Forum [PIDF] Summit.
These declarations were explored from a narrative-network approach, where
both the organizational representation and narrative construction differed
between the two groups. The PIF Summit included a limited representation of
states and IGOs, producing what I referred to as a global technical narrative that
emphasizes the scientific and bureaucratic solutions to climate problems.
Alternatively, the PIDF Summit had broader participation that included more
states and wide variety of domestic and international NGOs, producing what I
referred to as a local power narrative that advocated local decision-making and
information. The global technical narrative was presented as efficient, but had
some challenges for representation of alternative ways of knowing. Alternatively,
the local power narrative can open up knowledge and decision-making, but can
also be costly in terms of time and resources.
For Chapter 4, I used Bäckstrand and Lövbrand’s (2006) three
environmental discourses—green governmentality, ecological modernization,
and civic environmentalism—to further explore the use of discourse in producing
and reaffirming the local/global contestations over the power, authority, and
knowledge of Pacific Island climate change governance efforts. Green
governmentality emphasized scientific expertise, global knowledge, and decisionmaking concentrated in the administrative state and knowledge producing
institutions. Efforts were being made to broaden these decision-making spaces
through the use of science communication. Ecological modernization applied the
187

rational-legal authority embedded in an operational knowledge of development.
Authoritative decision-making under this discourse was either concentrated in
donor partners and implementing agencies, or distributed to civil society
depending on the strength of the discourse. Finally, civic environmentalism
functioned under practical authority, focusing on contextual knowledge and social
inclusion. Civil society was brought into development processes under the
reformist version of the discourse, while the radical version that denies the
primacy of development was limitedly discussed. There was some overlap
between the central organizations that employed the green governmentality
discourse and the moderately central organizations that used the ecological
modernization discourse. The civic environmentalism was used slightly by other
groups, but mostly was used at the periphery of the network.
Finally, expanding on Hart and Negri’s (2000) work in Empire, Chapter 5
looked at climate change diplomacy and governance under the concept of
Climate Empire—the network of scientific, technological, social, and political
systems that produce knowledge and communicative services to make the
climate legible and governable. Climate Empire is formed as informatization (the
production of the information economy through knowledge, communication, and
affective services) privileges scientific and technical expertise, financing has
ensured that Western logics of rule remain pertinent, and regionalism has
fostered a focal point for these logics of rule. Importantly, the local and global
elements of climate change diplomacy and governance are connected in the
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relocalization (Miller, 2004) processes inherent in global knowledge. In climate
change spaces, data is locally collected, globally analyzed, and relocalized within
polices and projects. This interaction between the local and global spaces means
that both are impacted in significant ways.
Drawing the Strands Together
While the dissertation follows a number of threads within diplomacy and
governance in Pacific Island climate change networks, there are a few themes
that run throughout the dissertation. Chapters 3 and 4 both deal extensively with
the local and global elements of climate change diplomacy and governance in
the Pacific Islands (Tables 6 and 7). Global constructions of climate change were
found in diplomatic spaces through the global technical narrative, while in
governance spaces it was found in the green governmentality and ecological
modernization discourses. While these ways of speaking and acting are
described in previous chapters as distinct, they also hold strong similarities as
they privilege the role of global technical information in decision-making and
practice. The local power narrative of the discussion on diplomacy and civic
environmentalism discourse of the discussion on governance both share many
key elements of local construction. In these ways of speaking and acting, local
understandings of climate change and its impacts have power and should be
considered within decision-making.
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Table 6: Discourses of Pacific Island climate governance.
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Table 7: Narratives of Pacific Island climate diplomacy.
Global Technical Narrative
Victim: PICs
Villain: Lack of Capacity, Resources,
and Scientific Information
Hero: Regional Organizations
Policy Moral: Greater Regional
Functionality

Local Power Narrative
Victim: PICs
Villain: Ecological Vulnerability due to
Emitters
Hero: Pacific Island Peoples
Policy Moral: Local Inclusion in
Decision-Making

These discourses align in such a way that they provide a local/global
break in the power, authority, and knowledge considered in strategies in the
Pacific Islands. The global way of understanding power, authority, and
knowledge in the Pacific Islands is focused on expert and bureaucratic authority
through the privileging of scientific and operational knowledge (Fig. 9). Through
the requirements that these types of authority and knowledge place on
organizations working toward diplomacy or governance, power is found in
organizations that have large quantities of technical capacity at their disposal. In
other words, in order to gain power and authority according to global
requirements, capacity for technical knowledge and expertise is required. These
ways of knowing the earth also have particular strategies for governing it,
specifically terraform projects that view the earth as separate from the social
world and controllable. Thus, the climate is approached with particular attention
paid to the ways in which it can be approached globally and technically, and
controlled.
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Figure 9: Outline of the global discourse within climate change governance and
diplomacy in the Pacific Islands.
Power:
Global
Global Technical
Narrative
Global

Green
Governmentality
and Ecological
Modernization

Authority: Expert
and Bureaucratic
Knowledge:
Scientific and
Operational
Society and Nature:
Separate and
controllable

Local strategies for speaking and acting upon climate change governance
and diplomacy privilege practical authority and contextual knowledge (Fig. 10).
This reframes capacity challenges under the ability to know the local environment
and to make decisions at that level. In local strategies for governance and
diplomacy, nature is unable to be terraformed and controlled. Instead, it is
integrated with the social world and it is fluid. Nature is, thus, a player in
governance networks through its activities and efforts for survival (Latour, 1995;
Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013). This understanding privileges local, adaptive
efforts to be enacted alongside global strategies.
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Figure 10: Outline of the local discourse within climate change governance and
diplomacy in the Pacific Islands.
Power:
Local
Local Power
Narrative

Authority: Practical

Local

Civic
Environmentalism

Knowledge:
Contextual

Society and Nature:
Integrated and fluid

While these local and global strategies are in many ways distinct, they are
brought together under the formation of Climate Empire. Climate Empire works in
and through global strategies to produce and uphold their technical bureaucratic
and scientific authorities; however, these global spaces are also reconnected
with the spaces of local resistance through data collection networks and efforts to
relocalize knowledge. This connection means that both the local and the global
are impacted through the production and reproduction of the Climate Empire.
While the use of local strategies in global projects has increased in recent years,
this could have varying impacts on the circulation of power in these spaces. For
instance, projects that incorporate local knowledge can make for better decisionmaking in local spaces, or they could extend panopticon of Climate Empire
further down into the local, measuring, quantifying, and standardizing
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experiences at all levels. It is in this place of expansion and resistance that work
remains left to be done.
What Now?
There were a few themes that I heard from the majority of Pacific Island
participants about what could be done to improve the system of climate change
governance and diplomacy. First, it is important that the burden of climate
change is distributed according to historic roles in causing climate change. This
includes the full range of strategies, particularly in regards to diplomatic
leadership in emissions reductions, domestic mitigation strategies, and easy to
access, sufficient, and sustainable financing for countries facing the brunt of
climate challenges. The US has been and continues to be one of the largest
emitters of GHGs in the world, yet President Trump recently rescinded US
support of the Paris Agreement. Additionally, the transition in the US has caused
trepidation within Pacific Island countries that rely on the funding. As one
participant explained:
Donors don’t like long term investments. I guess it’s understandable, the
kind of flux that we have in terms of change. Just this morning I heard
USAID budget might be slashed in the next year, and USAID has only just
come back in the region like two years ago with a huge amount of money.
They wanted to align to climate change. So, on Trump’s end, he’s cutting
all that out. I have some friends who applied for these USAID posts, and

194

they’re going to go for an interview, but they’re probably not going to take
it seriously, because they don’t think he’ll last too long. #laughs#
While lighthearted, this quote one example of how participants felt that their
projects could easily be put in limbo based on the political shifts of other
countries. Australia, for instance, had shifted focus while I was there from
“climate change” to “climate variability” due to the political pressure. This
adjustment in vocabulary changes the timescales on which their MET services
focus, shifting emphasis and funding from long-term endeavors. These efforts
among climate emitters to reduce their involvement and shift responsibility vastly
exacerbates the already challenging task among Pacific Islands to adapt to
climate change.
While it may require committed global action to overcome the challenges
of climate change, the second issue pertains to the role of global powers in
Pacific Island affairs. It is vitally important for the Pacific Islands to receive
financing and technical assistance in adaptation and mitigation strategies. That
being said, there are ways of doing this that concentrate power in the hands of
external actors and those that work to rely on local actors to set the agenda. It is
not enough that local actors are brought to the table to work on projects dictated
by external actors. Instead, the practical knowledge and experience of local
actors must help drive the agenda in the first place. This is important not only for
issues of justice, but also for efficacy. For example, Govan (2009) and Sievanen,
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Gruby, and Campbell (2013), among others, have demonstrated the ways in
which local involvement can bolster the impacts of governance in the region.
Along the lines of efficacy, a third issue that came up multiple times in the
interviews is longevity of projects. Pilot projects, short-term interventions,
surveys, etc., were discussed as being the mode of operations of many funders.
This forced the already understaffed organizations and agencies to juggle
multiple projects at a time with multiple funders, interventions, and reporting
strategies. As one participant described the pressure that puts on practitioners:
All these things are an inverted pyramid that lands on one particular
person’s head on the ground. That person has to have the pyramid stuck
on his head and goes down to the community level to try and translate all
those results from all those projects and all those technical interventions to
make it work at the ground level. It’s hard. … So, all these fancy people
like myself that might say, “Yeah, you need to drop a good work plan, and
these are the things we think you need to do.” But at the end of the day,
that poor sap’s gotta go out and figure out how to do it on his or her own.
This pressure on practitioners—particularly those within government agencies—
has exacerbated existing capacity challenges within the region. Unsurprisingly, a
“brain drain” was also discussed as educated and trained individuals leave
positions in search of better pay and less stressful environments. This happens
some with the concentration of capacity in regional agencies, but also as Pacific
Islanders move to Australia, New Zealand, the US, and others. Thus, a number
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of participants with whom I spoke emphasized the need for long-term
interventions that are properly funded, particularly in regards to organizational
capacity and support.
While these interventions are significant, as it is said, it is important not to
throw the baby out with the bathwater. These chapters have critically discussed
the challenges at play with local, regional, and global governance in the region,
but there is a lot of good at work, as well. Many of the region’s funders, decisionmakers, and practitioners are aware of the challenges discussed in this
dissertation, and some even made progress toward mending power imbalances
between my 2015 and 2017 trips through funding requirement changes and
project shifts. As I spoke about in chapter 6, recent projects have worked to
integrate local knowledge into climate models in ways that could mutually benefit
local and global strategies. While acknowledging room for improvement, most
participants spoke to a few key projects that they saw really making strides
toward what they wanted to see in climate change governance and diplomacy.
Perhaps most importantly, many of the individuals with whom I spoke held
passion, hope, and motivation for a better world that was contagious.
Acknowledging and appreciating where network actors at all levels can agree (or
come close to agreeing) that things are working well can help guide future efforts
for governance and diplomacy.
Again, these suggestions were generated through the conversations I was
able to have with Pacific Island climate change practitioners and decision197

makers, which brings me to the final suggestion. Empowerment is a key element
of governance and diplomacy that is more challenging in these postcolonial
locales. Space to have open, collaborative communication that recognizes and
addresses issues of power is vital.
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Appendix A: Interview Guide for Chapter 3
Introduction of the interviewer.
Sample:
Hello, and thank you for agreeing to an interview. Again, my name is
Ashlie Denton, and I am a doctorate student at Portland State University,
in the United States. As you may remember from my phone call/email,
participation in this interview is voluntary. This means you may choose
now not to participate, refuse to answer any question, or end the interview
at any time. If you decide after the interview that you do not wish your
interview to be included in the study, you can contact me and have your
interview deleted. I will leave my contact information for you. Additionally,
this interview will be recorded, per your approval. Recording the interview
will help me ensure that I capture your answers more fully, but if you wish
to not be recorded, that will in no way effect your participation in the
interview process. Here is the consent form that goes into greater detail on
the information that I have just provided to you. Please check the boxes
accordingly and sign.
Thank you! Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me better
understand the environmental governance work that is occurring in the
Pacific Islands. Please feel free to expand on any questions you find
interesting. Any information you can provide is valuable to my research.
Main Questions

• What work do you do in
environmental governance?

Clarifying
Questions

Additional Questions
• What is your job position?
• What (other) environmental
organizations are you associated
with (if any)?

• What other organizations,
individuals, or government
agencies do you work with
regularly?

• How frequently would you say that
you are in contact?

• Tell me about a time in
which a project or series of
projects were particularly
successful.

• Why do you think these were
successes?
• Which other organizations worked
on these projects?

• Tell me about a time in
which a project or series of

• Why do you think these projects
were less successful?

•

Can you
expand a
little on this?

•

Can you tell
me anything
else?

•

Can you
give me
some
examples?
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projects did not turn out as
planned.

• Which other organizations worked
on these projects?

• What sources of
information do you use to
make decisions on
mitigation/advocacy/policy?

• Do these sources of information
come from local, regional, or
international sources?

• Is there any organization,
individual, or agency that
your or your organization
has chosen not to work with
for any reason?
• What changes in recent
years do you see around
the issue of climate change,
locally, domestically, and/or
internationally?

• Who made the decision to no longer
work with them? (If applicable)
• Why? (If applicable)

• What do you attribute these
changes to?

What do you think would help facilitate working together as a group?
Is there anything you would like to add to what we have spoken of thus far?
This concludes your interview. Thank you again for allowing me to interview you.
As stated in the letter, if you would like to receive results of these interviews,
please email me. Also, please let me know if you decide at any point that you
wish for your interview to not be included in the final reports. Also, it is possible
that I will contact you in the next few months to clarify answers or confirm
findings. If you wish to not be contacted, you are welcome to say so now or email
me.
Finally, I am contacting participants for my surveys through recommendations of
other participants. (Name of previous participant) referred you for this interview (if
applicable). I was wondering if there were other individuals with whom you think I
should speak. Would you be willing to provide me with their name and
email/phone number?
Thank you again for your time. Here is my card, please contact me with any
questions or comments.
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Appendix B: Social Network Analysis for Chapter 4
For the social network analysis, I used an ‘actors-as-networks approach’
(Kahler, 2009), where the unit of analysis was not the whole network, but rather
the organizations in the network. The boundaries of the network were formed
using a positional approach, where characteristics or formal membership criteria
are used to determine whether actors are a part of the network (Wasserman &
Faust, 1995). The boundary was drawn at organizations—government agencies,
environmental NGOs (Pacific Islands focused and global; advocacy and
scientific), local user groups, and financers—that identify one of their primary
activities as governance of climate change within the Pacific Islands. The data
was organized into an adjacency matrix, one-mode (e.g. actor x actor; where
rows and columns refer to a single set of entities), and using a weighted,
directional approach (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). This research focused on
organizations as nodes. Analysis focused specifically on organizations that
identify as:
•
•
•

having an office in the Pacific Islands,
engaging in transnational projects, and
working on climate change adaptation and mitigation governance.

The ties in the network were defined as the resource exchange evident in
websites, grey papers (technical reports, programmatic information, etc.),
newspapers, blogs, environmental reports, and financial statements. This data
was restricted to that information which is provided in the archival data itself. This
has its limitations, as it only captured those relationships that are formalized
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through reporting, but it missed informal discussions and collaborations. This is
why feedback from local practitioners was vitally important to understanding
whether the data gathered through archival data captures the nature of
transnational relationships in climate governance in the Pacific Islands.
In addition to the data on collaborations and relationships, attributes of the
organizations networked together in climate governance in the Pacific Islands
were also gathered. This included:
•
•
•
•

Type—consultancy, financial organization, intergovernmental
organization, nongovernmental organization, private company, scientific
advisory organization, government, or university
Level of work—local, regional (within the whole Pacific Islands), or
international
Location—this applied to both the location of their primary offices and any
office within the Pacific for those organizations working internationally
Focus—carbon trading, climate change, communications, conservation,
development, education, financial, food systems, government, health,
human rights, marine resources, modeling and scientific advice, power,
private business, religion, and general consultants.

Finally, the type of interaction was recorded for analysis:
•

•

Archival type—this was used to indicate whether the demonstration of
resource exchange happened in the context of:
o Project or Program
o Scientific Report
o Policy or Plan of Action
o Event
Level of interaction—categorization and the weight of interaction was
determined through the level of participation ascribed through the
introduction, acknowledgements, participant lists, or other key indicators,
including the presence of logos.
o Coleadership was demonstrated in the archives when the two
organizations were discussed as both being central to the
functioning of the project/plan/event or key to the production of the
document itself. This category was given mutual directionality and
given a score of 5.
222

o Financial Support was demonstrated in the archives when the
organization was discussed as providing “support,” “funding,” or
was thanked in the document without clear reference to their role in
participation. This category was used as an “input” to the
leadership, and was given a weight of 3.
o Participation was demonstrated in the archives when the
organization was mentioned in a participant list21 or acknowledged
or thanked without showing leadership. This category was the
recipient of the “output” of resources through the leadership, and
given a weight of 1.

Organizations were combined for clarity into the largest organization that could
be distinguished from all other organizations listed. For instance, if multiple
government agencies from the Cook Islands were listed, they were collapsed
under one “Cook Islands” governmental node. A few other combinations are of
note:
•
•
•

•

21

The European Commission was combined with the European Union
SOPAC, as it is now under the Secretariat of the Pacific Community, was
combined with the Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
When the participant in the document is listed as a program, the
organization at the head of the program is given credit for the interaction.
This does include secretariats of agreements and programmatic
organizations, though. In other words, the European Union’s GCCA
program would be listed under the European Union, but Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change would remain.
If an organization is a branch of a larger org, then they were combined
under the name of the larger organization.

Note: For larger conferences that do not list participants, conference agendas
were used.
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In order to ensure that Wasserman’s and Faust (1995) patterns of interaction and
longevity of structure are exhibited in the network, any interactions that scored
less than 5 were removed from analysis.
Data Limitations
While the PCCP database provided access to many of the documents
produced in climate change governance in the Pacific, it is still limited to those
resource exchanges that were evident in the documents. This limits the data to
those relationships that were formalized, and may miss the exchanges occurring
through conversations, undocumented projects, or organizations that have not
uploaded their documents to the database. It also may miss small NGOs that
engaged regularly, but may not have held leadership positions. As PCCP is
administrated by the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environmental
Programme [SPREP], this could account for some of the strength of ties seen
with this program and others with whom SPREP partners, such as the
Secretariat of the Pacific Community, University of the South Pacific, and the
European Union. This is why conversations with local practitioners are vital to
understanding more about the network.
Data Analysis
For the SNA, I focused on exploring the relative power positions of various
organizations in the network. In order to do so, I used a combination of network
analysis software options—R, Graph Commons, Gephi, and UCINET. R was
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used to transform the data from an affiliation matrix to an adjacency matrix.
Graph Commons was used primarily for visualization of the network. Gephi and
UCINET provided the analysis measures.
There are a few measures that provide key insight into the power of
particular organizations, all of which rely on a graph-theoretic analysis of the
network (Wasserman & Faust, 1995). The measurements used in this
dissertation are as follows:
•

Centrality—Centrality is a measure of where an organization is in the
network, as a whole. There are a number of measures of centrality that
was explored here:
o Degree centrality—Degree centrality is a simple measure of to
how many other nodes (organizations) a particular node is tied. Indegree centrality refers to the number of directed ties going into the
node, out-degree refers to the number going out of the node. Below
the first grey node has an in-degree centrality score of 4, the
second has an out-degree centrality of 4:

o Betweenness centrality—Betweenness centrality was used to
show how central the organization is to the entire network.
Betweenness centrality measures the number of times a node is
located on the shortest path between two other nodes. In the
example below, the grey node would have the highest
betweenness centrality, because many of the shortest paths
between two nodes must past through the grey node.

These measures were used for the visualization below.
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Appendix C: Interview Guide for Chapter 4
Introduction of the interviewer.
Sample:
Hello, and thank you for agreeing to an interview. Again, my name
is Ashlie Denton, and I am a doctoral student at Portland State University,
in the United States. I am talking with individuals throughout the Pacific
Islands in order to better understand how climate change issues are
understood and governed. As you may remember from my [phone
call/email], participation in this interview is voluntary. This means you may
choose not to answer any question, or end the interview at any time. If you
decide after the interview that you do not wish your interview to be
included in the study, you can contact me and have your interview
deleted. I will leave my contact information for you. I would like to record
this interview to help ensure that I capture your answers more fully.
However, if you do not wish to be recorded, that will in no way effect your
ability to participate in the interview process. Here is the consent form that
goes into greater detail on the information that I have just provided to you.
Please sign, and please keep a copy for your records.
Thank you! Now I am going to ask a few questions that will help me
better understand the climate change work that is occurring in the Pacific
Islands, including the relationships between organizations, the knowledge
they share, and challenges they face. Please feel free to expand on any
questions you find interesting. Any information you can provide is valuable
to my research.
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Main Questions
• First, I’d like to ask you a few
questions about your organization
and your work. In your own words,
tell me the mission or purpose of
your organization.

• Of course, a lot of organizations
are working on climate change
issues in the Pacific. What is your
experience and understanding of
how organizations work on these
issues? Do you see organizations
working together, or more
independently?

Additional Questions

Clarifying
Questions

• How does [name of organization]
engage with climate change
issues?
• And what is your role in
[organization]? Please tell me a
little bit about the nature of your
job, specifically.

Can you
expand a
little on this?

• How do you think about your
work in terms of a larger
network? How do you understand
your place in regards to the larger
picture?

Can you give
me some
examples?

Can you tell
me anything
else?

For this research, I looked at the documents shared on the Pacific Climate
Change Portal. Through these documents, it seems that there are a number of
ways that organizations work together or share resources. They participate in
events together, work together on research reports, co-produce plans or policies
for governments, or engage in projects or programs together. In terms of these
sorts of activities which organizations jump out to you as being central to climate
change activities, and what kinds of activities do they perform?
Give participant a copy of the social network map that highlights the highly
central participants and explain:
This is a visualization that I made from information from the Pacific Climate
Change Portal that represents the documented interactions between different
organizations engaged in climate change issues in this region. The organizations
highlighted in this map are those that are most central to the network as a whole.
We’re going to discuss the “map” of relationships for the rest of our interview, so
take a moment to look over it.
Pause briefly.
Ok, now we’re going to discuss what these highlighted organizations bring to the
network. [Provide the list of resources that organizations can bring to the
network.] Here is a list of things that I think these organizations can bring to the
network as a whole. For instance, an organization can provide practical
resources to the network, including knowledge of the local situation and a history
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of past successful projects. They may also bring informational resources to the
network, such as scientific knowledge about climate change adaptation, or they
may be in a position to set rules or standards, such as limiting the amount of
greenhouse gas emissions that others can produce. Finally, they may bring what
I refer to as governmental resources, meaning that they have access to
government funding or their decisions are determined by a government body. Are
these clear to you?
Pause for a response and take the time to answer any questions/respond to any
comments.
Ok. Now we are going to talk through what these highlighted organizations bring
to the network. Feel free to discuss any contributions of the network outside of
what I have listed here. The point of our conversation is for me to get a better
picture of how climate change issues are understood and governed.
• Looking at X organization, specifically, can you please tell me which of
these resources X organization brings to the network.
• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings practical
resources: What practical
resources do they bring?

• How do these practical
resources facilitate the work of
the network, either positively or
negatively?

• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings knowledge or
information: What types of
knowledge or information do they
bring?

• Is this knowledge useful for
decision-making in the region? If
yes, in what ways?

• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization sets rules or
standards: What types of
rules/standards do they set in the
network?

• How does their ability to affect
processes and procedures
impact the work of the network?

• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings government
resources: What types of
government resources do they
bring to the network?

• How would you characterize
their level of involvement in the
network? Would you like to see
more, less, or the same level of
involvement?

Can you
expand a little
on this?
Can you tell
me anything
else?
Can you give
me some
examples?

Repeat for 5 central organizations
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Give participant a copy of the social network map that highlights the peripheral
participants and explain:
These organizations appear to not be as involved in the network as other
participants. I’m now going to ask you to circle the 5 organizations that you
engage with most frequently or that impact your organization’s work most
directly. These could be organizations that enjoy working with, or organizations
that present challenges to your work. I just want to make sure that you are
familiar enough with the organizations that you choose so that we can have a
conversation about them. Please take a few moments to select the 5 most
relevant organizations to your work.
Pause and allow for the participant to complete this activity.
Thank you. Now, we’re going to go through a similar exercise with the 5
organizations that you listed.
• Looking at X organization, specifically, can you please tell me which of
these resources X organization brings to the network.
• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings practical
resources: What practical
resources do they bring?

• How do these practical
resources facilitate the work of
the network, either positively or
negatively?

• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings knowledge or
information: What types of
knowledge or information do they
bring?

• Is this knowledge useful for
decision-making in the region?
If yes, in what ways?

• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization sets rules or
standards: What types of
rules/standards do they set in the
network?
• If the interviewee denotes that the
organization brings government
resources: What types of
government resources do they
bring?

Can you
expand a little
on this?
Can you tell
me anything
else?

• How does their ability to affect
processes and procedures
impact the work of the network?

Can you give
me some
examples?

• How would you characterize
their level of involvement in the
network? Would you like to see
more, less, or the same level of
involvement?
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In your opinion, why are they not more central to the work of the
network?
Repeat for 5 peripheral organizations.

Is there anything we haven’t discussed that you feel is important for me to know
about your organization’s work in climate change efforts and your understanding
of how others are involved in those efforts?
This concludes your interview. Thank you again for allowing me to interview you.
As stated in the letter, if you would like to receive results of these interviews,
please email me. Also, it is possible that I will contact you in the next few months
to clarify answers or confirm findings. If you wish to not be contacted, you are
welcome to say so now or email me.
Finally, I am contacting participants for my interviews by my own identification, as
well as through recommendations of other participants. Another participant
referred you for this interview (if applicable). I was wondering if there were other
individuals with whom you think I should speak. Would you be willing to provide
me with their name and email/phone number?
Thank you again for your time. Here is my card, please contact me with any
questions or comments.
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Appendix D: Interview Participants and Times for Chapter 4
List of organizations interviewed during the second trip to the Pacific Islands and
their approximate recorded interview times (many interviews lasted much longer
than their recorded sessions, however). These do not include numerous informal
conversations, such as those with individuals from the University of the South
Pacific, local organizations, and independently interested parties.
Organization
Apidae Development Innovations
Australian Bureau of Meteorology
(BOM)
Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO)
The Fiji Red Cross Society
International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
Live and Learn
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA)
Pacific Centre for Environment and
Sustainable Development (PaCE-SD)
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat
(PIFs)
Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC)
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional
Environment Programme (SPREP) 1
SPREP 2
SPREP 3
British High Commission Suva
United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP)
World Wildlife Fund (WWF)

Interview Time
50 minutes
49 minutes
1 hour, 14 minutes

1 hour, 43 minutes
46 minutes
1 hour, 11 minutes
53 minutes
24 minutes
33 minutes
1 hour, 15 minutes
1 hour, 23 minutes
1 hour, 53 minutes
1 hour, 26 minutes
53 minutes
41 minutes
50 minutes

Unrecorded interviews:
Cook Islands MET
Samoa MET
Samoa Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE)
Te Ipukarea Society
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